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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Although the British construction industry is one of the safest in Europe, one third of all work 
fatalities happen in construction and construction workers are six times more likely to be killed 
at work than employees in other sectors.  A similar situation exists for non-fatal accidents.  
Although previous research has led to a good understanding of the extent and pattern of 
accidents in the construction industry, there has been only limited objective analysis of the full 
range of contributory managerial, site and individual factors.  With this background, the study 
had the following aims: 
 
1. To collect rich, detailed data on the full range of factors involved in a large sample of 
construction accidents. 
 
2. Using this information, to describe the processes of accident causation, including the 
contribution of management, project, site and individual factors in construction industry 
accidents. 
 
The research used a combination of focus groups and studies of individual accidents in pursuit 
of these. 
 
FOCUS GROUPS 
Seven focus groups were held with industry stakeholders to identify issues for subsequent 
investigation in the accident studies.  The groups comprised 5-7 participants as follows: 
(1) client team, (2) senior managers, (3) site managers, (4) operatives – large site, (5) operatives 
– small site, (6) construction safety professionals, (7) mixed group.  Participants were recruited 
on a convenience basis, via the industrial collaborators on the research steering group.  Each 
group was asked to consider where failure occurs and why accidents still happen, with the 
ensuing discussion structured under the headings of project concept, design and procurement; 
work organisation and management; task factors; and individual factors. 
 
The focus groups led to wide discussion, with strong opinions expressed regarding the sources 
of problems with safety and the causes of accidents.  The main themes to emerge were 
suggestions that: 
  
 Clients and designers give insufficient consideration to health and safety, despite their 
obligations under the CDM regulations. 
 Price competition among contractors gives advantage to companies less diligent with health 
and safety.  
 Key documentation, such as the health and safety plan, method statements and risk 
assessments are treated as a paper exercise, having little practical benefit.  
 Lengthy sub-contractor chains result in elements of the construction team being distanced 
from responsibility, inadequately supervised, and with low commitment to projects.   
 Frequent revision of work schedules leads to problems with project management and 
undesirable time pressure.   
 A long hours culture in the industry results in fatigue, compromised decision-making, 
productivity and safety. 
 Bonus payments act as a strong incentive, but encourage productivity over safety.  
 A skills shortage in the industry is leading to increased reliance on inexperience workers, 
coupled with difficulties verifying competency. 
 Problems exist with the availability, performance and comfort of PPE. 
 Training is seen as a solution to all problems, but with content often superficial. 
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 There have been improvements in safety culture over recent years, but safety still has to 
compete with other priorities. 
 
ACCIDENT STUDIES 
One hundred accidents were then studied in detail, to collect further evidence on the issues 
raised by the focus groups.  Access to accidents was obtained through organisations that had 
previously agreed to participate in the research, via companies contacting the project team in 
response to project publicity, and through approaches to industry contacts already known to the 
researchers.  Sampling was on a quota basis, to ensure a spread of accidents across construction 
build type and RIDDOR accident categories.  Criteria for inclusion in the study were that the 
accident was not subject to investigation by HSE, that the accident had occurred within the 
preceding two months, and that the accident victim and supervisor/manager were still on site 
and willing to participate in the research. 
 
Site based data collection entailed interviews with accident involved personnel and their 
supervisor or manager, inspection of the accident site (where this still existed), and review of 
relevant documentation, such as accident notification form, risk assessment and method 
statement.  A report of the site based findings was then prepared and reviewed by an expert 
pairing of a construction and ergonomics (human factors) specialist from within the research 
team.  The expert pairing suggested areas for further follow-up examination.  Where possible, 
issues identified by the expert pairing were pursued directly with the designers, manufacturers, 
and suppliers relevant to the incident.  In many of the studies, however, this proved impossible 
due to difficulty identifying the appropriate individuals to contact and then securing their 
cooperation in assisting with the research.  In these cases, the issues were instead discussed with 
other professionals, independent of the accident, but qualified to comment. 
 
Due to the need to avoid incidents subject to HSE investigation, most of the accidents studied 
were not reportable under RIDDOR.  However, following assessment of the possible outcomes 
of each accident, more than a third were judged to have had the potential to have caused a 
fatality and more than two thirds could have been ‘major’ as classified under RIDDOR.  On this 
basis, it is argued that it is reasonable to generalise the findings concerning causation from this 
sample to more serious accidents. 
 
The research has found that: 
 
 Problems arising from workers or the work team, especially worker actions or behaviour 
and worker capabilities, were judged to have contributed to over two thirds (70%) of the 
accidents.  This points to inadequate supervision, education and training. 
 
 Poor communication within work teams contributed to some accidents, due to the physical 
distance between work colleagues or high levels of background noise. 
  
 In many cases, the accident occurred when those involved were not actually performing a 
construction task, but moving around site, for example.   
 
 Workplace factors, most notably poor housekeeping and problems with the site layout and  
space availability, were considered to have contributed in half (49%) of the accident studies.  
Standards of housekeeping and workplace layout with respect to safety are low in 
construction when compared with other industrial sectors. 
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 Despite poor weather often being cited as one of the reasons for construction having a poor 
safety record, this research found little evidence in support of this. 
 
 Shortcomings with equipment, including PPE, were identified in over half (56%) of the 
incidents.  Poor equipment design and inappropriate use of equipment for the task were 
prominent aspects of this.  Designers, suppliers and purchasers of equipment appear to give 
insufficient attention to the safety of users. 
 
 Deficiencies with the suitability and condition of materials, including packaging, featured in 
more than a quarter (27%) of incidents.  The operation of the supply/purchase chain at 
present appears to act as a barrier to innovation as far as safety is concerned.  
 
 Originating influences, especially inadequacies with risk management, were considered to 
have been present in almost all (94%) of the accidents.   
 
 Frequently, no risk assessment had been undertaken covering the circumstances involved in 
the accident.  Where a risk assessment had been carried out, it was often found to be 
superficial and unlikely to have prevented the accident.  
 
 It appears that PPE is relied upon habitually as a substitute for risk elimination or reduction 
at source. 
 
 It was judged that up to half of the 100 accidents could have been mitigated through a 
design change and it was found that, despite CDM, many designers are still failing to 
address the safety implications of their designs and specifications. 
 
 Accident investigation by employers or supervising contractors is frequently superficial and 
of little value as far as improving safety is concerned.  It appears that HSE investigations 
generally focus on safety failures in the activity being undertaken, without capturing the 
upstream influences upon these. 
 
 The influence from clients on safety appeared limited in the construction sectors 
predominant in this research (civil engineering, major building, residential).  This was, 
again, despite the responsibilities on clients imposed by CDM. 
 
 Many of the incidents were caused by commonplace hazards and activities that will 
continue to occur on site whatever design changes might be made.  The widespread 
presence of the many generic safety risks accompanying construction needs to be tackled 
before the benefits of design improvements will be realised. 
 
Together, these factors point to failings in education, training and safety culture in the industry.  
A large majority of those working in construction, both on and off site, continue to have only a 
superficial appreciation of health and safety considerations. 
 
Drawing together the findings from the research, an accident model has been proposed, 
illustrating the hierarchy of influences in construction accidents.  The model describes how 
accidents arise from a failure in the interaction between the work team, workplace, equipment 
and materials. These immediate accident circumstances are affected by shaping factors, 
whereby the actions, behaviour, capabilities and communication of the work team are affected 
by their attitudes, motivations, knowledge, skills, supervision, health and fatigue.  The 
workplace is affected by site constraints, work scheduling and housekeeping.  The suitability, 
usability, condition and, therefore, safety of materials and equipment depend on their design, 
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specification and supply/availability.  These shaping factors are subject to originating 
influences, including the permanent works design, project management, construction processes, 
safety culture, risk management, client requirements, economic climate and education provision.   
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Achieving a significant and sustained reduction in accidents will require concerted efforts 
directed at all levels of the hierarchy of causation.  Important points are: 
 
 Responsibility for safety needs to be owned and integrated across the project team, from 
designers and engineers through to skilled trade personnel and operatives.   
 
 Other research has shown how the lead given by front line supervisors has a strong 
influence on safety performance.  Worker participation in managing safety is important, to 
generate ideas and to build ownership and responsibility. 
 
 Where safety depends on communication and coordination, it is important that a robust safe 
system of work is established. 
 
 A step change is required with standards of site layout and housekeeping.  principal 
contractors should raise expectations of what constitutes acceptable practice. 
 
 Greater attention should be given to the design and selection of tools, equipment and 
materials.  Safety, rather than price, should be the paramount consideration. 
 
 There needs to be greater sophistication with the design and use of PPE.  Current PPE is 
often uncomfortable and impedes performance.  Forcing workers to wear PPE when risks 
are not present is counterproductive.  PPE should be a last rather than first resort for risk 
management. 
 
 There is a need across the industry for proper engagement with risk assessment and risk 
management.  Emphasis should be on actively assessing and controlling risk, rather than 
treating risk assessment as merely a paper exercise. 
 
 Construction should be encouraged to benchmark its safety practices against other 
industries.  The excuse that construction is ‘different’ in some way does not stand up to 
scrutiny. 
 
 Greater opportunity should be taken to learn from failures, with implementation of accident 
investigation procedures, both by employers and HSE, structured to reveal contributing 
factors earlier in the causal chain. 
 
 It is important that ‘safety’ is disassociated from ‘bureaucracy’. 
 
 Frequently, safety does not have to come at a price.  Where there are cost implications, 
however, regulatory bodies and trade associations should work to make sure there is a level 
playing field. 
 
Most of these changes depend on achieving widespread improvement in understanding of health 
and safety.  Education is needed over training, so as to promote intelligent knowledge rather 
than unthinking rule-based attention to safety. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The research presented in this report arose from a submission to the 1998 HSE Competition for 
Ideas.  The study proposal was prompted by recognition that safety in the construction industry 
continues to be a serious problem, with construction having more accidents of greater severity 
than other industrial sectors.  Since then, the spotlight has turned on the industry in the UK, with 
high profile initiatives such as Rethinking Construction (DETR, 1998) and Accelerating Change 
(Strategic Forum for Construction, 2002) concerned with the wider performance of the 
construction industry, including its poor health and safety record.  This study and 
complimentary work by BOMEL (2001 and work in progress) is contributing to the HSE 
Revitalising Health and Safety in Construction review of strategy for the sector. 
 
The industry has generated this attention because, despite considerable efforts directed at 
reducing the number of deaths, injuries and ill health, construction has one of the highest rates 
of fatal and major injuries.  When the number of fatal injuries are compared in all industries 
(1998/99 -2000/01) the construction industry accounted for 33% of all work related deaths. 
 
The 2000/2001 statistics (HSC, 2001a) made disturbing reading: 
 
 Overall, the number of fatal injuries reported for construction was 31% higher than the 
previous year and the highest for ten years. 
 A breakdown of fatal accidents in 2000/01 showed the majority resulted from falls from 
height (44%); being struck by a moving vehicle (17%); being trapped by something 
collapsing or overturning (17%); and being struck by a moving/falling object.  
 There was a similar pattern of reported non-fatal major injuries to workers. 
 Although the rate of over 3-day injuries in 2000/01 was the lowest for ten years, the 
most common causes of injuries were handling, lifting or carrying (34%); slips, trips or 
falls on the level (19%); being struck by a moving/falling object (18%); and falls from 
height (14%). 
   
These accident causes have characterised the industry for decades suggesting that lessons from 
the past have still to be learnt.  Although figures for fatalities are accurate, surveys 
commissioned by HSE indicate a reporting rate by employers for other reportable injuries of 
less than 40% (Drever, 1995).  Thus, the published statistics are the tip of the iceberg.  
Accidents in the construction industry represent a substantial cost to employers and society. 
 
The most recent health and safety statistics for 2001/02 (HSC, 2002) do give hopeful signs that 
progress is being made, with a decrease in fatalities and reported major injuries.  However, the 
analysis points out that it is unclear to what extent the decrease in injuries is real or due to 
underlying variation in reporting rates. 
 
At the time this project was instigated, previous research on accidents and injuries in the 
industry had largely been confined to the collection, analysis and interpretation of data derived 
from accident reporting schemes, such as RIDDOR (eg Culver et al, 1993; Hinze and Russell, 
1995; Hunting et al, 1994; Kisner and Fosbroke, 1994; and Snashall, 1990).  This approach is 
limited by problems with data collection (eg under reporting) and the broad classifications used 
for coding.  Problems of this nature were reported by BOMEL (2001) in their more recent 
analysis of RIDDOR data.  Previous work by ourselves had found the quality of accident data 
collected by construction companies to be poor, coupled with a failure to collate and undertake 
effective analysis of the data that are collected (Gyi, Gibb & Haslam, 1999). 
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HSE (1978, 1988) used case study procedures to examine fatal accidents and identified causes 
such as failure to ensure safe systems of work, poor maintenance, use of defective materials, and 
poor supervision and training.  However, the reports concentrated on fatal accidents and it is 
probable there are differences in the aetiology of non-fatal accidents (Saloniemi and Oksanen, 
1998).  Whittington et al (1992), in a project funded by HSE, is one of the few other studies that 
has attempted to undertake systematic analysis of accidents in the industry.  Their findings 
identified a range of headquarter, site and individual factors in accidents examined, 
approximately in the ratio 1:2:1.  Whittington et al acknowledged limitations of their work due 
to the relatively small number of accidents investigated (30) and incomplete information in the 
accident records.  In addition, there had been important changes affecting safety management 
since Whittington et al’s research, particularly in connection with the introduction of the CDM 
regulations (HSC, 2001b). 
 
In a UMIST study, examining behaviour modification approaches to improving construction 
safety, Duff et al (1994) developed a safety audit checklist, used to monitor safety performance 
of construction sites.  Further work by Suraji & Duff (2001) at UMIST led to a model of risk 
factors for accidents in construction operations.  The UMIST model distinguishes between 
problems with operator actions, site conditions and construction practices, and linkage of these 
with project, contractor and process management influences.  The model is theoretical and the 
intention was that this research would contribute to its evaluation.  In recognising that project 
concept, design and management factors are frequently an origin of site based failures, Suraji & 
Duff’s approach is a significant development on other theoretical ‘root cause’ models that 
confine their attention to site personnel, their behaviour and actions (Gibb et al, 2001; Suraji and 
Duff, 2001).   
 
In summary, while there is good understanding of the extent and pattern of accidents in the 
construction industry, there has only been limited objective investigation regarding the full 
range of contributory managerial, site and individual factors.  This study addressed this 
problem, having the following aims: 
 
1. To collect rich, detailed, data on the full range of factors involved in a large sample of 
construction accidents. 
 
2. Using this information, to describe the processes of accident causation, including the 
contribution of management, project, site and individual factors in construction industry 
accidents. 
 
Pursuit of these objectives was achieved using a combination of focus groups and accident 
studies, Figure 1.  The focus groups were held at the commencement of the research with 
stakeholder representatives from the industry having an influence on or concerned with safety.  
The accident studies involved in-depth investigation of 100 accidents, as soon as possible after 
each incident had occurred.  Examination of off-site influences on the accidents was achieved 
through accident-specific (investigation of paths of causality in individual accidents) and 
accident-independent (expert opinion on generic issues) methods. 
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Figure 1  Summary of research methodology 
 
Focus Groups to identify issues
Development of sample frame 
and study methodology 
Accident studies 
Analysis 
Review and Conclusions 
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2 FOCUS GROUPS 
The aim of the focus groups was to consult stakeholders in the construction industry, exploring 
where failure occurs and why accidents still happen.   
 
A focus group is a style of group interview whereby the data obtained arises from the interaction 
and discussion generated from within the group (Morgan and Krueger, 1998).  Groups are 
guided by a moderator, with a style that can be more or less directive, depending on the nature 
and purpose of the investigation. 
 
A degree of caution is required interpreting focus group findings.  For example, groups may 
generate a level of conformity and acquiescence, suppressing individual views that might be 
held in private.  Alternatively, the researcher may direct discussion into an area unimportant to 
participants, or achieve this through data interpretation.  Nonetheless, focus groups are an 
established method for gaining insight into views surrounding a research question. 
2.1 METHOD 
2.1.1 Participants 
Seven groups were conducted (Table 1) with an earlier pilot group run with construction 
undergraduates.  Assistance in accessing appropriate focus group members was provided by 
collaborators from the research steering group. 
Table 1  Focus group categories and participants 
Group Employment Target participants 
One  Client team Planning Supervisors and health and safety specialists 
 
Two Senior managers From general and specialist contractor firms representing civil 
engineering, major building or residential sectors 
 
Three Site Managers Mix of those in general supervisory and managerial roles and 
those with health and safety responsibilities 
 
Four Operatives (large site) 
Five Operatives (small site) 
Tradesmen or general operatives 
 
  
Six  Safety professionals Industrial safety professionals and construction enforcement 
officers 
 
Seven Mixed group A mixed discipline group (trades and professionals) 
 
 
The composition of group one varied from original intentions, due to the practicalities of 
recruiting participants.  It had been hoped that group one would include individuals representing 
client, architect, design, engineer roles.  The absence of contributions from these backgrounds is 
reflected in the results.  All groups had between 5-7 participants.   
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The seven groups took place between February and June 2000.  The ‘safety professional’ group 
was held at Loughborough University campus, whereas all others were based at a location 
convenient for the participants. 
2.1.2 Information for participants 
A review of  the work of Whittington et al (1992), HSE (1997 and 1999) and Suraji & Duff 
(2001) generated four discussion areas for the focus groups: 
 
1. Project concept, design and procurement 
2. Work organisation and management 
3. Task factors  
4. Individual factors 
 
Participants were provided with a briefing sheet describing the nature of focus groups and 
summary details of the research.  At the outset of each focus group, overhead transparencies 
were used to provide a short presentation of the research and focus group discussion areas (not 
reproduced here).  Participants were assured of anonymity.   
 
To clarify and distinguish the four discussion headings, examples were provided to enhance the 
participants’ understanding and to prompt discussion.  These examples were developed with the 
assistance of a construction specialist.  Each of the four discussion areas (and examples in 
brackets) was presented on a flip chart sheet (Table 2-Table 5). 
 
With each theme participants were asked to consider where failure occurs and why accidents 
still happen. 
Table 2  Project Concept, Design and Procurement 
 Client background  (skills and experience of the client) 
 Selection of design team  (Designers giving consideration to practicalities of construction?) 
 Procurement of contractors  (What role do price and safety play in selection?) 
 Safety considerations  (Safety in construction considered?) 
 Allocation of resources  (Financial – where the money is spent) 
 Legislation  (Enhances or hinders?) 
 Strategic design considerations  (Choices of site, appropriate building design) 
 
Table 3  Work Organisation and Management 
 Project management and supervision  (Style, degree of input and instruction from management 
and supervisors) 
 Managing change  (Handling of any design modifications of work in progress) 
 Work scheduling  (Time pressures, overlap of operative / trades) 
 Resources  (Availability of contractors, suitable skills of contractors) 
 Safety considerations (Risk of injury assessed, safety managed appropriately) 
 Site layout and logistics  (Safe access routes, placement of essential services) 
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Table 4  Task Factors 
 Tools and equipment  (Appropriate selection, maintenance) 
 Adequacy and use of procedures/method statements  (Appropriate?) 
 Is safety considered?  
 Training in task and health and safety skills  (Appropriate?) 
 Work load / time constraints  (Time pressure upon individuals and/or groups) 
 Environmental conditions  (Weather, out of hours work) 
 Design of task or working area  (Layout of immediate area, is safety and access considered?) 
Table 5  Individual Factors 
 Experience and competence of all employees 
 Safety considerations  (Safety behaviour, attitude to risk) 
 Personality influences 
 Health status and fitness for work 
 Conformity  (Company ethos, pressure to comply) 
 
2.1.3 Procedure 
Each group was scheduled to last 1½ hours, but with the time allocation used flexibly.  Audio 
recordings were made of each focus group to permit subsequent transcription. 
2.1.4 Analysis 
An abridged transcription was made from each audiotape.  The transcriptions recorded the main 
points made as each participant spoke.  This included a number of quotes where these were 
clear and salient points.   
 
To facilitate interpretation of the transcriptions, intermediate analyses were undertaken which 
involved summarisation of all text into short bullet point statements.  These were a subjective 
interpretation by the researcher of the main points of what the speaker was saying.  This enabled 
significant points to be extracted and permitted later comparison and categorisation of 
information according to the discussion area headings and sub-headings. 
 
The analysis aimed to identify:  
 the nature and range of the discussion data  
 differences between opinions of each group or among participants 
 whether any of the prompts were omitted from conversation by participants 
 if additional and unexpected aspects were introduced into the discussion 
2.2 FOCUS GROUP RESULTS 
The focus groups provided a valuable insight into the perceptions of stakeholders across the 
industry regarding safety and accident causation. 
 
It is important that readers are aware that in reproducing the essence of the focus group 
conversations, no judgement is made on whether the views expressed are right or wrong.  It is 
also possible that in some respects, focus group participants may be factually incorrect or hold 
opinions with which others disagree. 
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The main views are expressed as bulleted comments (in no particular order) under the four main 
discussion headings. 
2.2.1 Project Concept, Design and Procurement 
Client background 
 It was perceived that the larger high-tech organisations such as the petro-chemical and oil 
industries had a responsible attitude towards construction safety and anticipate costing for 
this at the project concept stage. 
 Clients were considered to vary in their commitment to health and safety.  Many criticisms 
were directed at client ignorance in certain areas of the process, such as their legislative 
responsibilities under CDM, the contractor’s responsibilities and the practical implications 
of any build or design changes they request.  
 The decisions of many clients were portrayed as frequently being determined by the lowest-
price tender, avoiding being accountable for a breach of the law and maintaining a high 
public profile (e.g. environmental issues, or general public safety being a high priority) but 
not the welfare of construction workers. 
 Clients were reported to impose considerable time pressures, to be inflexible and to have a 
perpetual urge to trim construction times. 
Strategic design considerations 
 An increased desire for aesthetic qualities was generally seen to inhibit ease of building 
which in itself induces safety hazards.  
 It was felt that time and financial pressures from the client impede appropriate opportunities 
for review or audit of designs yet, were this possible, it would permit deferral of 
responsibility back to the client for revision (instead of contractors having to accommodate 
this late in the process). 
 It was understood that designers positively encourage off-site pre-assembly and that there 
are great benefits in this, especially to compensate for a lack of available skills on-site and 
to make a faster, more buildable and safer structure.  It was however also reported, that pre-
assembly often does not account for continuously developing prototypes.  Pressure needs to 
be put on manufacturers to revise products; an example was provided concerning design 
revision of timber trusses, whereby the manufacturers were reported to have ignored 
requests for design improvements. 
 Clients were heavily criticised for not leading design innovation. 
 There was a general rejection of traditional management whereby price and speed of 
construction directed the process. 
Allocation of resources 
 It was reported that clients (and mostly their lawyers), make the money in construction, with 
price being their priority in important decisions such as contractor appointment or 
apportioning appropriate arrangements for safety. 
 Cost incentives mean that longstanding ‘fixed’ client-contractor relationships are 
diminishing and that there may be some pressure to attribute ‘competence’ to those 
submitting the lowest tender.  Although clients are required to consider safety in tenders, 
this was reportedly not necessarily the case; it was felt that in built safety costing in a tender 
had led to both loss and acceptance of contracts. 
Selection of contractors 
 It was reported that the selection process is generally a paper-based exercise and some 
documentation, used universally, is more than ten years old. 
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 There were comments that the Health and Safety Plan is generated more to impress the 
client than to be used as a working tool, and contains meaningless generic statements about 
hazards. 
 General thoughts were that principal contractors are more safety aware than sub-contractors 
and that sub-contractors often have a poor safety culture and do not adequately price safety 
in tenders. 
Safety considerations 
 It was reported that commercial incentives influence the drive to consider health and safety 
but that such competition may positively influence the development of new initiatives. 
 It was reported that a ‘top down’ culture drives attitudes towards safety, yet clients are not 
necessarily offering this commitment and were reported to have ignored contractors’ safety 
requests. 
 It was indicated that certain client team members, such as quantity surveyors, designers or 
structural engineers do not have adequate training to appreciate their impact upon site 
workers. 
Client team 
 A number of comments were made about designers acting in an ‘insular’ manner, not 
communicating appropriately, consulting other disciplines nor forming part of a team with 
others on a project. 
 As part of a ‘design team’ it was reported that although the designer is responsible for 
informing a client of their need to appoint a Planning Supervisor, many are in fact ignorant 
of the Planning Supervisor function. 
 Although it was acknowledged that designers can be good at designing out risk, it was 
reported that although they are starting to understand safety matters, they have little 
understanding of health-related issues.  It was thought that designers do not necessarily 
associate their design as having a part to play in influencing accident causation. 
 From a scheduling perspective designers were seen as frequently unprepared for work 
commencement and were reported to be often absent from sites. 
 Designers had been known to take between two and three weeks to revise a drawing thus 
delaying the start (or progress) of the construction works. 
 There were reports of inadequate site investigation by designers and that their work had to 
be double-checked at contract outset. 
 It was also pointed out that design is not just about the design team and that this is a loosely 
used term and many people do not actually know that they are designers.  For example, 
contractors often act as designers, but do not necessarily see themselves as such or 
appreciate their (legislative) responsibilities in this respect. 
 There were reports that Planning Supervisors vary in performance and contribution to a 
project.  Clients, contractors, designers and architects were often considered ignorant of 
‘Planning Supervisor’ functions and as such these professionals are under-resourced and 
under-used.  From a negative perspective it was suggested that some Planning Supervisors 
are appointed only to protect the client and in this capacity they do not enhance the project. 
Legislation 
 The CDM Regulations were seen by some as poorly understood or incorrectly addressed by 
clients and designers.  Legal requirements were often treated as a paper exercise and to have 
created an additional role that clients have had to assume from what had traditionally been 
viewed as contractor responsibilities. 
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2.2.2 Work Organisation and Management 
Project Management and Supervision 
 It was felt that method statements, to a certain extent, reflect the variable quality of 
information provided by the client or designer.  Method statement quality was also seen to 
be vulnerable to deterioration when highly technical information is the subject matter. 
 Although method statements may provide a task breakdown they do not necessarily provide 
adequate procedural information.   
 Method statements are reportedly mistaken for risk assessments and were criticised for 
accommodating rather than addressing risk control.   
 It was said that there is often little variation in method statement content and they were 
portrayed as an ‘office’ based exercise, prepared by someone at safety/management level.  
There was believed to rarely be consultation with the operatives doing the work and 
consequently inadequate appreciation of or understanding of the demands of their work.  
The process of developing the method statement was portrayed as a ritualistic paperwork 
exercise resulting in material that does not necessarily reflect practice.  In addition, much of 
the material was reportedly generic and often boring, too long and not of an appropriate 
language style for the end user and as a consequence of this it was argued that operatives do 
not necessarily see, read or understand them. 
 With regard to planning it was noted that the parameters for work scheduling always change 
and may in fact be obsolete even within about three weeks of a project start.  Changes to 
work in progress, due to, for example, design modification, transport and delivery problems, 
or as a result of weather conditions, contribute to planning problems. 
 The consequences of planning problems were described as trade overlap (and loss of work 
sequence), work back-log and the generation of time pressure – all of which were felt to 
contribute to risk.  It was generally indicated that greater attention is now being given to 
planning, but that client commitment (to a longer work programme for example) is required. 
Work scheduling 
 Time pressure within work scheduling was mentioned frequently and was described as 
having effects upon two interacting factors – work performance and the skill base of 
contractors.  To accommodate time pressure in work scheduling it was indicated that 
unskilled labour and poor subcontractors are sometimes appointed. 
 Nearing the end of a contract, it was reported that performance and quality of work can 
suffer; negative effects such as short cuts resulting from increased work intensity and trade 
overlap were cited. 
 There were concerns from operatives that they were not appropriately consulted concerning 
the scheduling of trade overlap resulting in loss of work sequence and in the re-doing of 
work on occasions. 
Resources 
 A number of criticisms were made regarding the move from direct labour towards lengthy 
chains of sub-contractors.  The advantages of direct labour (over sub-contractor labour) 
were perceived as project dedication, better teamwork, a better safety attitude and better 
overall housekeeping.  It was noted that the appointment of sub-contractors is generally 
‘price’-led and thus competitors undercut each other; this creates pressure to drop standards 
to be competitive, or to appoint less qualified people. 
 Sub-contractors, and especially those most distal in the chain from principal contractors, 
were seen as distanced from responsibility and ignorant of and not committed to the team 
work of the site.  Secondly the logistical problems experienced by site managers were also 
noted, especially in co-ordinating and overseeing lengthy chains of sub-contractors. 
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 Skill availability was reported as a considerable problem for the industry.  This affects 
recruitment and retention of competent sub-contractors, site managers, foremen, and trades-
people – a problem noted to be worse in London. 
 The consequences of these skill shortages were that people without site specific experience 
were appointed in trade, supervisory and management positions.  At operative level this 
meant that at times new employees cannot be left unattended and that, in the absence of 
even the most basic common-sense, considerable pressure is put upon gang leaders to 
undertake and supervise the work of the operatives. 
Safety considerations 
 Positive comments were made about the improvement in safety culture in the industry over 
recent years, and all participants appreciated this.  The success of top-down commitment 
was reported to depend heavily upon the attitude of the project or site manager and of the 
supervisors or team/gang leaders. 
 Inhibitors to effective safety culture were that management on site was generally seen as 
reactive rather than proactive.  Time pressure plays a considerable part in work methods 
chosen and although it was reported that people may be committed to safety, it was at times 
portrayed as a competing priority at site level. 
 The traditional ‘blame-culture’ showed signs of receding, but there were still cases where 
individuals were blamed if procedures were violated. 
 Risk assessments were strongly criticised and it was indicated that they can be confused 
with method statements and are at times of little value.  Faults in preparation were described 
as being inadequate attention to hierarchy of control, inadequate consideration of 
maintenance issues and, at times, over-specification of risk circumstances (which can inhibit 
consideration of broader factors).  Problems were also attributed to the use of generic risk 
assessments, which do not include operative consultation and which are of more use as a 
bargaining tool to impress clients. 
 There were also criticisms of the accident reporting system, in that some participants felt 
that they were prohibitive and that the recording of remedial action could appear very 
trivial. 
 The safety advisor role was generally reported positively and it was felt that support would 
be given to operatives should they have any safety concerns.  It was noted that, to make a 
stand, a certain amount of self confidence was needed by operatives and that this is how 
some less experienced / familiar operatives can be influenced to work in an unsafe manner. 
 A number of participants indicated that they perceived that the state of housekeeping on a 
site closely reflects the site safety culture and the attitude of the project/site manager/site 
agent. 
Site layout and transport 
 There were a number of comments indicating that the provision of a “lay-out area” has 
decreased and that this impedes work processes.  Access problems to a task area were 
frequently reported and on occasions, haul roads had to be used to compensate or to 
accommodate all who need to use a particular area. 
2.2.3 Task factors 
Tools, equipment and materials 
 Although it was generally acknowledged that, where provided by the principal contractor, 
tools were often good and new to each site, it was indicated, that their selection is too cost 
motivated and that they were not always freely available. 
 Equipment was reported as not always being of a good quality and that there were problems 
with the selection of the correct capacity tooling and providing adequate maintenance 
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(directed to lifting equipment).  There were some concerns about the unknown quality of 
equipment that was used by sub-contractors and of the use of multi-functional equipment.  
One example, relevant to sub-contractor tool-use, was that to compensate for unknown site 
circumstances, they are known to bring their largest capacity equipment to site, and proceed 
with using this although the equipment may in fact be too large for the task. 
 Availability and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) was reported to vary widely.  
The impression gained was that for larger companies there were plentiful supplies, but for 
smaller companies availability was limited and in some cases operatives were expected to 
provide their own PPE. 
 It was acknowledged that non-use of correct PPE does occur and, although this is more 
likely to happen at the weekend, use was seen as an individual’s responsibility.  It was 
indicated that those advocating the use of PPE do not adequately appreciate the 
practicalities and negative influence on performance from its wear.  For example, loss of 
mobility; helmets that impede vision and fall off unless secured by ear muffs; and goggles 
that steam up frequently interrupting work in order to clean them. 
Task supervision and communication 
 Inadequacies were reported with both supervision and communication across the different 
disciplines at task level, and these were seen as contributing towards accident potential.  It 
was generally indicated that there is more supervision on larger sites.  The lack of 
supervision of lorry drivers and sub-contractors was mentioned a number of times.  
Particular reference was made to small groups undertaking a high rate of small jobs, who 
were less likely to be formally managed as their supervisors may cover many different sites. 
As such, safety behaviour may only be concurrent to the time of the supervisor’s visit. 
 At site level, the efficiency of supervision was seen to deteriorate with a rise in the volume 
of sub-contractor labour, yet where supervision was regarded as good, sub-contractors 
would conform to standard.  There were indications, however, that some task requests were 
inappropriate and that these relate to problems with communication.  Within this there were 
indications that adequate consultation and liaison at trade level was lacking. 
Task, techniques and safety factors 
 Small jobs, isolated work or short term contracts were seen to involve little forethought and 
with safety factors more likely to be considered on an ad hoc basis or at an individual level 
only. 
 It was noted that setting up safely and waiting for arrival of, and use of safety equipment 
can take longer than the job itself.  Duration of exposure to a ‘risk’ was believed to 
influence an individual’s choice of safe working methods. 
 More generally, working methods were described by some as outdated, but that there is 
resistance to, or ignorance of ‘new developments’.  Additionally improvisation or short-cuts 
in work methods were seen as contributory to the causes of accidents. 
Training in task and health and safety skills 
 Induction training was criticised as being overly long and repetitive of base-line information 
common to all sites (such as PPE) such that workers become blasé about it.  It was also 
reported that they are inconsistently provided and that they do not necessarily deliver the 
‘appropriate’ site-specific information. 
 When discussing training in more general terms it was indicated that it is often 
inappropriately seen as a response to all problems.  The provision of training for young 
people was seen as inadequate (in terms of a lack of appropriate apprenticeships), as was the 
use of multi-skill training. 
 Generally, for training content, it was mentioned that not all understood the terminology 
used and that Agency staff especially perceived training as a waste of time.  It was indicated 
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that there is a shortage of courses, that training is not provided consistently (no manual 
handling training for labourers for example) and that larger sites provide more training 
opportunities.   
 The use of a trainer unknown to the trainees appeared to be criticised (and understood in 
analysis to be due to their lack of understanding/empathy of specific work problems).  
Additionally the training content was also criticised (especially at task level), whereby it 
was considered by some that too much time is spent on office-based theory with insufficient 
time spent on practical field skills. 
 The lack of practical field skills was thought especially important.  In this respect problems 
were mentioned with one day training courses that provide a certificate of competence.  The 
certificated person is apparently not evaluated for competence, yet is still expected to 
display a wide range of skills from a very early stage.  It was also reported that working 
without the correct certification is permitted, but that learning on the job in this manner may 
convey the wrong techniques. 
Work load and time constraints 
 The scheduling of workload appeared to be influenced considerably by the revised work 
patterns and long hours culture that is now prevalent in the industry.  Although it was 
recognised that long hours are well rewarded financially, this is invariably disruptive to 
domestic life and can routinely entail early morning starts. 
 It was also reported that there has been an increase in the introduction of weekend, night 
and block work by clients.  It was suggested that management staff at the weekend may be 
unfamiliar with workload and that there can be omission of PPE or tolerance of unsafe work 
practices (especially whilst the Safety Advisor is absent) during this time period. 
 Time pressure was repeatedly mentioned in relation to undertaking tasks for example, poor 
work set-up prior to task commencement, interruptions whilst working, and the pressure to 
meet deadlines. 
Financial considerations 
 It was indicated that pay is commonly directly related to the work undertaken and that 
expectations of payment leads the choice of work methods.  Some reported that they no 
longer see fixed wages for trades people, as all work is now target or bonus related.  
Financial expectations are high and exceeding the work target and increasing bonus related 
pay is considered essential for income and the prime incentive for operatives.  Bonus pay 
may be safety-related, but it seemed that most often bonus pay is solely related to task 
performance. 
 It was indicated that there may be a financial penalty if a job is difficult or slow to complete 
and that any mistakes have to be resolved within the company’s or individual’s own time.  It 
was also commented that there is a reliance on younger employees and that this is reflected 
in a low basic wage. 
Environmental conditions 
 Poor environmental conditions were raised as a factor which can impede work for 
operatives.  It was suggested that, where work has to continue in bad weather, this can 
induce risk-taking to finish tasks hastily.  It was suggested that some operatives, such as 
pipe layers and scaffolders, may be more vulnerable in wind/rain conditions.  It was also 
reported that bad weather affects morale and especially as some clients can stipulate that 
there will be no schedule revision in these circumstances. 
Job roles at task level 
 There was consensus that there are insufficient competent and experienced trades people in 
the industry and that this has consequences not only in loss of task skills but in safety 
awareness too. 
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 Clarity of job role received varied comments and different participants saw this in both a 
positive and negative light.  Firstly, for speed, jobs were reportedly more fragmented 
nowadays and this could inhibit use of the full range of operative skills. However 
fragmentation was also seen in a favourable light as certainty and role clarity of just doing 
specific jobs was valued as well. 
2.2.4 Individual factors 
Age, attributes and experience 
 There appears to be an increased reliance on younger and inexperienced employees on sites 
and there is particular concern about early responsibility and use of dangerous equipment by 
younger workers.  Although younger workers were described as more likely to follow work 
instructions, it was perceived that they experienced a high accident rate, especially within 
their first week of appointment. 
 It was also said that construction does not attract high calibre school leavers and at operative 
level there was a certain amount of concern about the impact of inexperienced people on 
site, and especially about the lack of even the most basic common sense among newcomers.  
There were also references to lack of concentration and carelessness. 
 The verification of what constitutes ‘experience’ was reported as difficult to assess.  
Concerns were people with inadequate skills presenting themselves as a skilled trades 
person, or the use of trades people from outside the industry being appointed despite 
reservations of the transferability of their skills onto site. 
 Although experienced workers were described as having fewer accidents, experience was 
also seen to have a negative side.  The range of problems associated with experience were 
noted as work fatigue, over-familiarity and over-confidence, complacency, omission of or 
low safety awareness, and difficulties in changing work techniques. 
Competency issues 
 ‘Competency’ lacked a clear definition for many workers.  Moreover, competency needs to 
be relevant to site conditions/equipment used and can not be inferred just by certification.  
There was concern among some that too much emphasis is placed upon certification as, for 
‘managers’, this implies competence of workers and defers responsibility from themselves.  
There was concern too about spurious attribution of competence when convenient (i.e. when 
a particular task needed doing in a hurry) as it was indicated that proceeding without 
certification may result in lack of ‘cover’. 
Attitudes and conformity 
 There were a number of reports of pressure to conform, such that jobs must be done at any 
cost.  There was indication too of peer pressure to maintain work pace, especially in the 
context of achieving the bonus.  It was also indicated that a degree of self-confidence and 
authority was needed to reject pressure to conform, but that once stated it was accepted.  On 
the other hand it was also mentioned that fear of the consequences can inhibit operatives 
from complaining and as such violations remain insidious and tolerated. 
Health status and fitness for work 
 One concern highlighted by workers was ‘the next day effect’ upon individuals of high 
alcohol intake.  This was discussed as being connected with life-style factors associated 
with the industry, such as site distance from home, long hours and early work starts. 
 Other views and differing perspectives of general health status were also noted. For 
example, that the ability to do a task is evidence enough that a person is adequately fit to do 
the job.  On the other hand, there were also concerns that there are considerable health 
problems among construction workers, and that operatives are at particular risk and may 
continue to work with inadequate health status for fear of dismissal. 
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 Their was a general feeling that ill health and health-related issues (especially slowly 
developing health issues) are under-appreciated in the industry and that an increase in the 
extent of litigious action is anticipated in the future. 
 The skills shortage was described as leading to the appointment of people with health 
problems and there were concerns about inadequacies in verification of health status – 
especially for sub-contractors.  
2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON FOCUS GROUPS 
It can be seen that the focus groups led to a wide discussion, with strong views expressed 
regarding the sources of deficiencies in safety and the causes of accidents.  Several points were 
made criticising clients and designers, although it should be noted that the absence of 
representatives from these stakeholders groups, meant that their voice was not heard.  This is 
likely to have led to an imbalance in this respect. 
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3 ACCIDENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
This research adopted an ergonomics systems approach, acknowledging the wide involvement 
of human and physical, proximal and distal factors in construction accidents.  The accident 
studies were ‘holistic’ and qualitative in nature, concentrating on depth over breadth.  The 
intention was not to apportion blame but to collect evidence on the patterns of causal influences 
that lead to these complex events. 
3.1 SAMPLING STRATEGY 
A sampling strategy was devised to ensure that accidents examined for the research would, as 
far as possible, be a representative cross-section of those that occur in the industry.   
3.1.1 UK construction industry profile 
Table 6 shows the target sample across four categories of construction build-types, as covered 
by this study: 
 
 Engineering Construction Petro-chemical / power generation and heavy industrial 
 Civil Engineering  Roads, rail, bridges etc 
 Major Building   Non residential building, including refurbishment 
 Residential   Houses and apartments 
Table 6  Construction profile sampling strategy 
 Build type (construction ‘sector’) 
 Engineering 
Construction 
Civil Engineering Major Building Residential 
Initial target distribution 5 15 45 35 
 
3.1.2 Representation of UK construction accident types 
A second dimension of the sampling strategy was that the studies should cover a broad range of 
accident causes, as classified under RIDDOR.  HSE data for the four-year period 1996/97 – 
1999/00 formed the basis of this.  Figures were summed for each causal factor for the four-year 
period, with the percentage representation within each given in Table 7.  The sample for this 
project is included in the table for comparison (Loughborough sample).  As described later in 
this report, a number of the incidents studied (12) directly involved materials, tools and 
equipment.  These incidents do not fit easily into the RIDDOR categories and have therefore 
been separated out for the purposes of this comparison.  These accidents have been included in 
the results and discussion sections later in this report, however.   
 
In developing the sampling strategy, the research had to operate within the constraint that it was 
necessary to avoid inclusion of accidents subject to HSE investigation.  A policy change within 
HSE just prior to commencement of data collection led to a requirement upon HSE Enforcement 
Officers to undertake a much higher volume of investigation of reportable accidents.  The result 
of this was that most major accidents and some ‘over 3-day’ accidents were no longer available 
to the research.  Because of this restriction on the study design affecting severity of outcome of 
the 100 accidents, the ‘falls’ categories have been combined in Table 7.  Four of the accidents 
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studied were categorised as dangerous occurrences (see Table 11), however, here these have 
been re-categorised under the most relevant heading in the table.  
Table 7  Reportable injuries to construction industry workers (1996/7-1999/00) 
compared with Loughborough University (LU) sample 
 RIDDOR 
fatalities 
% 
RIDDOR 
major 
injuries 
 % 
RIDDOR  
over 3day 
injuries 
 % 
LU  
sample 
(N=88) 
% 
Falls from a height 55 38 14 
Slips, trips and falls on same level 0 19 17 {    24 
Injured while handling, lifting or carrying <1 8 34 19 
Struck by moving (+ flying / falling) object 15 19 19 22 
Struck by moving vehicle 9 3 2 2 
Contact with electricity or electrical discharge 8 2 1 2 
Trapped by something collapsing or overturning 5 1 <1 7 
Strike against something fixed or stationary <1 3 5 9 
Contact with/by moving machinery 3 3 3 5 
Other accident events types  4 4 5 10 
 
 
Table 7 demonstrates that the Loughborough sample provided a reasonable spread across 
accident categories.   
3.2 ACCIDENT STUDIES 
Figure 2 summarises the method used for the accident studies.  The qualifying period for 
inclusion in the research was that the accident had occurred within the past two months.  This 
timing was a compromise between the desire to interview those involved in the accidents as 
soon as possible after the incident, while events would still be clear in their mind, and what 
proved practicable in terms of gaining access to accidents to study. 
3.2.1 Selecting accidents 
Figure 3 shows the process adopted for selecting appropriate accidents for the research.  Where 
an accident was reportable under RIDDOR, a representative of the HSE project management 
team reviewed the possibility of Enforcement Officer action, before giving permission to 
proceed with the process of site liaison and visit organisation. 
 
The accident notification form is reproduced as Proforma 1 in Appendix A. 
3.2.2 Site liaison and visit organisation 
Each of the contributing companies provided a list of contacts (most commonly the Area Safety 
Advisors), with whom a first stage liaison was made to obtain the full details of the accident (for 
sampling strategy purposes) and site contact information.  Arrangements for the site visit were 
made either via this contact person or directly with site personnel.  Discussion with the site 
contact included a description of the research, what the visit would entail and assurance that all 
findings would be reported anonymously.  In turn the discussion also ensured that the necessary 
research criteria existed, namely that: 
 
 HSE were not investigating the accident  
 The accident had occurred within the preceding two months 
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 The accident victim and supervisor/manager were still on site and willing to participate in 
the research 
 
It was also important to emphasize that the work was independent from HSE accident 
investigations and that all interviews would be undertaken in confidence.  Where possible, a 
briefing sheet was sent in advance of the visit (for circulation to those who would be involved), 
describing the research and highlighting the voluntary and confidential nature of information 
provided at interview. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Summary of accident study procedure 
 
Contact site 
Visit site 
Interview involved persons 
Interview supervisors, 
managers, H&S staff  
(as appropriate) 
Evaluate accident area and 
environment (where possible)
Draft initial study report 
Review of report by 
independent expert panels to 
identify issues for follow-up 
Follow-up studies  
(generally off-site) 
Complete accident study report
Evaluate against sample frame
Obtain details of incident 
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Figure 3  Accident selection process 
  
3.2.3 Site based data collection 
The process for undertaking an accident study during a site visit is shown in Table 8.  
Table 8  Practicalities of an accident study 
On site assessment method Additional activities 
1. Upon arrival 
review accident 
details with site 
contact person 
Obtain / confirm baseline data including: 
 accident event information  
 contact details of personnel involved 
 P
ro
fo
rm
a 
1 Review and record 
accident details from 
the company records 
2. Then review 
accident details with 
accident involved 
personnel 
Obtain consent and interview relevant 
personnel, covering aspects such as: 
 accident event information  
 work profile aspects  
 personal details  
 
Pr
of
or
m
a 
2 
Pr
of
or
m
a 
3 
Undertake task based 
ergonomics 
assessment 
(observation, weight / 
linear measurements 
as appropriate etc.) 
3. Finally review 
accident details with 
supervisor  / 
manager / safety 
advisor 
 
Obtain consent and interview relevant 
personnel, covering aspects such as: 
 accident event information 
 work profile aspects  
 personal details  
 
Pr
of
or
m
a 
3 
   
Pr
of
or
m
a 
4 
Evaluate risk 
assessment and 
method statements 
(removing copies off-
site if possible) 
 
   
The main objectives with the site-based interviews were: 
 
 That the methods should be readily transferable across a range of accident and site 
situations. 
- Different site management structures, build types and stages of build indicated that a 
broad range of information would be obtained.  This meant that the methods should be 
suitably open and adaptable to incorporate this. 
 
 The methods should be appropriate to the role and responsibilities of the interviewee. 
- It was anticipated that job roles and responsibilities of interviewees would vary between 
accidents and sites.  Beyond the fixed data information requirements, the methods then 
Reportable accident
Non-reportable accident
Industrial 
contact 
Sampling 
strategy 
HSE 
permission 
Site liaison and 
visit organisation 
Accident 
required 
Accident not 
required 
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needed to gain information about the accident and to acquire information from the 
perspective of the interviewee in relation to their work circumstances. 
   
 The enquiries should be non-confrontational and encourage the interviewee to discuss issues 
openly and without inhibition. 
- It was anticipated that there might be some resistance to participation, given fears of 
blame.  The semi-structured interview content and style was developed so that issues 
readily identifiable and of greater familiarity to the interviewees were discussed first. 
   
 It should be possible to complete the semi-structured interview within a 30-minute period. 
- It was felt that this would provide sufficient time for a full discussion, but would not be 
unduly demanding or remove the interviewee from their work for too long. 
 
Further proforma were developed as data collection tools for the accident studies, reproduced in 
full in Appendix A.  Each was used as a basis for the confidential semi-structured interviews.  
Proforma 2 and 4 were for data collection about the work situation, with the main elements of 
enquiry summarised in Table 9.   
 
Proforma 2 collected data from those undertaking the work activity when the accident occurred.  
These ‘accident-involved’ interviewees included any injured party or co-worker.  Proforma 4 
collected data from those with a supervisory, managerial or safety role.  Whilst the questions are 
different from those in Proforma 2 they addressed the same themes, but with questions relevant 
to job roles (Appendix A). 
 
Further data collection by the researcher on site included analysis of the work and/or accident 
event area and content analysis of any supporting documentation (such as risk assessment or 
method statement for the accident task). 
3.2.4 Follow-up investigation 
Subsequent to the site visit, a report of the site based findings was then prepared and reviewed 
by an expert pairing of a construction and ergonomics (human factors) specialist from within the 
research team.  The expert pairing suggested areas for further follow-up investigation, 
depending on the nature of each accident and the apparent failures which had led to the events.  
Where possible, issues identified by the expert pairing were pursued directly with the designers, 
project management team, manufacturers and suppliers, as appropriate, linked with each 
accident.  Architects, planning supervisor, temporary works manager, groundwork contractor, 
and equipment manufacturers are examples of functions followed-up in this way. 
 
In many of the studies, however, this proved impossible due to difficulty identifying the relevant 
individuals to contact and then securing their cooperation in assisting with the research.  In these 
cases, the issues were instead grouped together and discussed with other professionals, 
independent of the accidents, but qualified to comment. 
 
3.2.5 Ethical considerations 
There were ethical considerations in this research with regard to ensuring the anonymity of 
participants and that information collected would remain confidential.  Data handling 
procedures were established to address these aspects, with ethical approval for the accident 
studies obtained from Loughborough University Ethical Advisory Committee, prior to any data 
collection taking place. 
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Table 9  Enquiry areas for site based data collection of the work situation 
 
 
Proforma 2 
 Accident-involved interviews 
 
Proforma 4 
Manager/Supervisor/Safety advisor interviews 
Comments on accident cause and remedial action (Both proforma) 
Task details 
Skill, training and experience issues 
Interruptions &/or task overload 
Known risks (eg chemical, electrical) 
Solitary or gang work  
 
Opinions on task content and difficulties 
 
 Managing design revisions 
Management of redesign 
Problem solving issues 
PPE 
Provision, care and training 
Usability comments  
 
Environment 
Site conditions (such as light, noise, wet) 
Compensatory measures 
 
Workspace interaction  
Space and movement issues 
Housekeeping 
Comments on tools and equipment 
 
Work scheduling  
Task, work, rest issues 
 
 
Managing delays and changes 
Availability of skilled workers 
Work organisation 
Interaction / overlap with other trades 
Personnel availability 
Presence of production targets 
Consultation and communication issues 
 
Assessing competency 
Liaison and communication 
Planning teamwork 
Dealing with productivity pressures 
Interacting with sub-contractors 
Provision of training  
Health and safety responsibilities 
Work pace  
Determinants of work rate 
 
Motivation of employees 
Managing time pressure 
Target / payment issues  
Method of payment 
Use of incentives 
 
Opinions on conflict to safe working 
Supervision / Management  
Opinion on adequacy of supervision 
Communication issues 
 
Retrospective opinion relating to accident 
Welfare  
Break and facility comments 
 
Procedures / method statements / risk 
assessments / training 
Knowledge of documentation & content 
Perception and use of these 
 
 
Preparation of documents 
Consultation and communication issues 
Dissemination of information 
Review and evaluation of materials 
 Training provision 
Nature of induction, 
Provision of task training & tool box talks 
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4 ACCIDENT STUDY RESULTS 
One hundred individual accident studies were undertaken involving a wide range of site, build 
and accident conditions.  Summary details of the accidents included in the research are given in 
Appendix B.  Findings in the following sections are cross-referenced to examples of the 
accident study(s) from which they were derived.  It is important to note that a count of the 
referenced accident studies does not indicate relative importance of the issue, nor are the 
references intended to be exhaustive.  Rather, they are examples of involvement across this 
particular accident sample. 
 
This section of the report deals first with the accident sample and accident circumstances.  It 
then presents an analysis of causal factors, before illustrating the key factors under the headings: 
 Worker factors 
 Site factors 
 Materials and equipment factors 
 Underlying causes 
 Design potential to reduce risk 
 
4.1 ACCIDENT SAMPLE  
Table 10 provides a breakdown of the accidents studied by construction sector.  It can be seen 
that major building and civil engineering were over-represented, while the residential sector was 
under-represented against the original targets.  Nevertheless, the accidents examined 
encompassed the range of industry sectors. 
Table 10  Distribution of accidents studied (n=100) 
 Engineering 
construction 
Civil engineering Major building Residential 
Target 5 15 45 35 
Result 4 25 49 22 
 
 
There was wide variation in the nature of build and organisational details of participating sites, 
ranging from short contract work to major building projects, being undertaken over a number of 
years.  All but 16 of the sites were brownfield (4 unknown/missing data). 
 
Sites varied considerably in size, accommodating between 7-2500 personnel and with build 
schedules varying between 1 week to more than 10 years.  From the 100 accidents, 71 projects 
were reported to be running to time, 1 was ahead and 18 were behind schedule (10 
unknown/missing data). 
 
Four of the sites were undertaking concurrent phases of their work, whereas 11 were in the 
‘start’ phase, 58 in the ‘middle’ phase, 9 between ‘middle’ and ‘end’ phases, 7 in the ‘end’ 
phase and 2 in the ‘after’ phase (9 unknown/missing data).  The remaining 4 projects were 
refurbishment. 
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Many of the main UK principal contractors were represented.  The contract types were as 
follows: 
 design and build / contractor led – including residential developer build (n=31) 
 integrated, eg partnering / PFI / alliancing (n=24) 
 lump sum / fixed price / design then build (n=14) 
 construction management (n=13) 
 other contract types (n=4) 
 unknown i.e. not identified in the accident study (n=14) 
 
It was not possible to gain adequate detail relating to project value and company employee 
numbers to enable comparison and this information is therefore not reported.  
4.2 ACCIDENT CIRCUMSTANCES  
Twelve of the 100 accidents should have been reported under RIDDOR (but were not 
necessarily actually reported as such).  Of these, three were dangerous occurrences, eight 
resulted in absences of over 3-days and one was a major accident.  The sample accidents are 
reported according to the HSE categorisation in Table 11 (revised to combine slips, trips and all 
falls data together) with an additional category for ‘injuries directly involving materials, tools or 
equipment’. 
Table 11  Distribution of accident types (n=100) 
Category Accidents number reported Total 
Slips, trips and falls (all levels) 16, 17, 23, 36, 37, 46, 47, 51, 
53, 54, 55, 58, 62, 64, 73, 75, 
77, 81, 86, 88, 100 
 
21 
Injured while handling, lifting or carrying 5, 14, 15, 28, 29, 31, 33, 34, 
38, 39, 48, 50, 56, 57, 76, 83, 
84 
 
17 
Struck by moving (+ flying / falling) object 1, 4, 9, 19, 24, 32, 35, 43, 44, 
61, 63, 68, 69, 78, 89, 93, 96, 
97 
 
18 
Injuries directly involving materials, tools or equipment 7, 26, 30, 49, 59, 74, 80, 87, 
92, 95, 98, 99 
 
12 
Strike against something fixed or stationary 6, 18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 82, 91 
 
8 
Dangerous occurrences 3, 10, 11, 20 
 
4 
Contact with/by moving machinery 2, 12, 13, 42, 85 
 
5 
Trapped by something collapsing or overturning 60, 65, 70, 72, 90 
 
5 
Contact with electricity or electrical discharge 52, 71 
 
2 
Other accident event types 8, 40, 41, 45, 66, 67, 79, 94 8 
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4.2.1 Pattern of activities and involved items 
The pattern of involvement of tools, equipment and materials / structures, along with the nature 
of the task or activity being undertaken at the time of the accident are given in Table 12. 
Table 12  Activities and involved items within the accident sample (n=100) 
 Tools Plant / 
equipment 
Materials Site / 
structure 
Total 
Setting-up  31, 42, 74 
 
34 16, 67, 73 7 
Actual task 
activity 
2, 3, 7, 13, 14, 
26, 30, 39, 49, 
59, 65, 87, 89, 
97, 99 
 
8, 11, 29, 38, 
60, 71, 94, 79 
5, 9, 10, 15, 
33, 35, 40, 43, 
45, 48, 57, 63, 
80, 84, 95, 96 
20, 24, 27, 28, 
52, 55, 58, 61, 
77, 78, 91, 92, 
93 
52 
 
Clear-up / 
maintenance 
98 
 
 
4, 12, 21, 32, 
46, 56 
54, 66, 70, 83 82 12 
Movement / 
transit 
50 6, 17, 19, 22, 
36, 37, 41, 51, 
62, 85, 90 
1, 25, 44 18, 23, 47, 53, 
64, 68, 69, 72, 
75, 76, 81, 86, 
88, 100 
 
29 
Total 17 28 24 31 100 
 
 
 
The location of 25 accidents was indoors and of the remainder that occurred outdoors, adverse 
weather conditions (ie damp, wet or wind) were reported in 19 accidents. 
 
With regard to working height, 71 accidents happened at basement or ground level, with the 
remainder occurring at height.  Of the latter, 3 accidents featured some form of level change. 
4.2.2 Accident-involved individuals 
Interviews were undertaken with 100 accident-involved individuals (mean age 35.5, standard 
deviation 12.2, range 17-62 years).  Table 13 provides descriptive data for the sample. 
4.2.3  Timing of accidents 
The month, weekday and time at which the accidents occurred are summarised in Table 14.  The 
sample encompassed accidents across all seasons, with the majority taking place between the 
hours of 08.00 and 17.00.  Of the 15 other accidents, for 13 the time of day was unknown, one 
happened in the early hours of the morning at 01.30 and the other at 18.30. 
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Table 13  Details of accident involved individuals (n=100) 
 Accident involved individual on site (n=100) 
 Unskilled operative 
(n=27) 
Skilled/semi-skilled 
operative (n=60) 
Other (n=13) 
Job titles (examples) labourer 
ground worker 
fitters mate 
hod carrier 
joiner 
glazer 
bricklayer 
electrician 
duct worker 
lorry driver 
pipe fitter 
scaffolder 
 
site manager 
engineer 
brickwork manager 
trainee manager 
foreman 
Age  
 
32.7 (10.7) 
18-57 
37.2 (12) 
17-62 
32.8 (15.2) 
18-57 
    
Duration on site 
(months) 
 
4.3 (6.7) 
0.5-36 
(n=26) 
 
6.2 (7.8) 
0.25-36 
(n=53) 
6 (2.9) 
2-11 
(n=11) 
Duration in industry  
(years) 
10.4 (10) 
0.33-38 
(n=24) 
 
18.1 (12.1) 
0.8-46 
(n=54) 
14.7 (16.7) 
0.08-42 
(n=12) 
Duration with 
employer 
(years) 
1.7 (4.1) 
0.04-18 
(n=19) 
3.9 (5.2) 
0.08-22 
(n=47) 
5.9 (11.1) 
0.08-42 
(n=13) 
    
Average designated 
hours / week 
42.7 (5.5) 
35-60 
(n=27) 
 
42.4 (5.5) 
26-55 
(n=59) 
45.9 (8.6) 
35-65 
(n=13) 
Number able to specify 
weekly overtime hours 
 
11 33 8 
Average hours of OT 
per week 
(where specified) 
10.7 (13.5) 
4-38 
(n=6) 
 
5.1 (2.9) 
2-12 
(n=12) 
5  
(n=1) 
Daily travel time to 
work  
(oneway-mins) 
41 (23.4) 
5-90 
(n=25) 
34 (23.6) 
5-90 
(n=58 
40 (28.9) 
5-120 
(n=13) 
 
* mean (sd) and range presented in all cases 
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Table 14  Timing of accidents (n=100) 
Month No Day of the week No 
Jan 7 Monday 15 
Feb 2 Tuesday 20 
Mar 6 Wednesday 21 
Apr 11 Thursday 21 
may 8 Friday 9 
Jun 17 Saturday 5 
Jul 16 Sunday 1 
Aug 6 Unknown 8 
Sep 5   
Oct 5   
Nov 7   
Dec 6   
 
? 4    
 
4.3 ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES 
As explained earlier, the limitations on the accident sample meant that most of the accidents 
studied were not reportable under RIDDOR.  In order to consider the extent to which the 
research findings are transferable to more serious incidents, an analysis was undertaken to 
assess potential outcomes (Figure 4).  These have been classified as ‘likely’ or ‘possible’ based 
on the RIDDOR classification and are recorded in Appendix C.  This rationale is based on an 
evaluation of the incident information and evaluation of alternative outcomes if the injured 
person had been in a slightly different location or if a different part of the body had been 
involved.  Likely outcomes would have required only a minor change in circumstances; possible 
outcomes would have required a number of circumstances to change.  Some of the ‘major’ 
incidents may have led to permanent disability and hence loss of the individual to the industry. 
 
 
 
Likely Outcomes 
 
 
Possible Outcomes 
  
Figure 4  Likely and possible accident outcomes 
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Had the situation varied only slightly, it is possible that almost half of the accidents could have 
resulted in absences of more than three days and almost half could easily have been major 
incidents.  Between 4 and 6 accidents could have resulted in fatalities looked at on this basis.  
Considering a worse outcome, more than a third of the accidents were judged to have had the 
potential for a fatality and more than two thirds could have been major. 
 
4.4 ANALYSIS OF CAUSES 
Appendix D gives a simple analysis of the causes of each accident, based on the information 
collected during the site visits.  A summary of the findings is presented in Table 15. 
 
This analysis was performed by the researchers, based on their judgement of ‘reasonable 
confidence’ that a factor was causal in an accident.  It should be borne in mind that it is easier to 
be confident concerning the involvement of more immediate factors, eg worker actions or site 
hazards, than wider influences, such as safety culture.  This is because the action of the 
immediate factors is direct and more obvious, while the involvement of other influences is more 
subtle.  Possible involvement of such ‘upstream’ influences is investigated in the subsequent 
results sections. 
Table 15  Summary of accident causes 
 
Category 
 
 
Causal Factor 
 
Number of accidents 
Worker & 
Work 
Team 
worker actions/behaviour 
worker capabilities (including knowledge/skills) 
communication 
immediate supervision 
worker health/fatigue 
49 
42 
7 
13 
5 
 
 
70 
Workplace site conditions (excluding equipment, materials, weather) 
site layout/space 
working environment (lighting/noise/hot/cold/wet) 
work scheduling 
housekeeping 
11 
15 
9 
11 
19 
 
 
49 
Materials suitability of materials 
usability of materials 
condition of materials 
12 
8 
13 
 
27 
Equipment suitability of equipment 
usability of equipment 
condition of equipment 
44 
19 
12 
 
56 
Originating 
Influences 
permanent works design 
project management 
construction processes 
safety culture 
risk management 
27 
24 
12 
15 
84 
 
 
94 
 
 
It may be seen from Table 15 that 70 of the accidents had the worker or the work team as a 
contributing cause; almost half included the workplace; more than a quarter had materials as a 
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factor; more than half implicated equipment and almost all identified originating factors as 
significant, especially risk management. 
 
The categories from Table 15 have been used to organise the discussion of the results from the 
accident studies.  Where possible, specific accident numbers have been added in brackets as 
examples of the points being raised.  These examples are not intended to be exhaustive. 
4.5 WORKER AND WORK TEAM FACTORS 
It can be seen from Table 15 that a failure by the worker or within the work team was 
considered to be a causal factor in 70 of the accidents.  Worker or work team factors in 
construction accidents involve the actions of individuals, their capabilities and communication 
problems.  Possible influences on these arising from worker attitudes and motivation, pay and 
remuneration, supervision and deployment, education and training, health, and working hours 
are considered in the following sections.  The term ‘worker’ is used broadly and includes 
operatives, trade personnel and specialist professionals. 
4.5.1 Attitudes towards safety 
A wide variety of views were heard in relation to health and safety within the industry.  
Although there was no real rejection among interviewees of the need to ‘be safe’, perceptions of 
what constituted safe and advantageous varied.   
 
Some interviewees thought the prescription of ‘safety measures’ as detrimental to performance, 
by slowing the job down (60) and reducing earning potential (2, 17).  There were a small 
number of isolated responses to the effect that some special measures (such as special risk 
assessments for young people or anti-vibration gloves) were ‘over the top’ (52).  Others 
mentioned that safety measures sometimes introduce new risks (52) (eg. safety barriers creating 
trip hazards or harnesses hindering safe escape in emergency situations).  Also, the view was 
expressed that increasing implementation of safety measures had led to relinquishment of 
personal responsibility for safe working behaviour (21, 52).   
 
… People lose their wits because of regulated safety … 
 
Others felt that some general safety measures were unnecessary.  The blanket policies on all 
sites about the wearing of PPE (hard hat and harnesses especially) were considered by some to 
be inappropriate to a range of work circumstances (23, 18).  Interviewees suggested that this 
stipulation undermined their ability to make informed decisions (as to the safety of any given 
work situation) and was also an insulting intrusion into their otherwise high risk, high 
responsibility roles.   
 
Use or non-use of PPE was reported by operative and supervisor/manager interviewees alike as 
one of the main indicators of safe practice (41); yet there was irritation among some operative 
interviewees that focus on this was at the expense of concentration on less visible but greater 
hazards (1, 62). 
 
… We’re forever getting told off by the principal contractor about things not done.  It’s 
over the top, like complaining about you taking your hat off if it’s in the way – they go on 
about minor things, but the major stuff is all down to money … 
 
There was mention of working safely when the safety advisor was around, with instructions to 
resume ‘normal’ practice when they left (23). 
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Conflicting views were offered regarding young or trainee workers.  From one perspective they 
were seen to be more safety aware (22, 25).  Other indications were that inexperience, 
reluctance to complain, and picking up poor habits and attitudes from older and more 
experienced workers rendered them less likely to act on this knowledge (2, 5, 17, 20, 25). 
4.5.2 Providing motivation 
A range of practical schemes were described.  One principal contractor interviewee’s company 
awarded a monthly prize (£100) to the best sub-contractor team (judged upon their management 
procedures, safety performance and adherence to method statements and risk assessments) (25).  
Where poor performance or unsafe work was observed, sites reported various disciplinary 
measures such as work supervision and warnings prior to dismissal.   
 
Across sites, motivational methods included financial incentives to meet target dates (25, 64), 
‘job and knock’ (especially on Friday’s and weekend work) (4, 12, 20, 23, 34, 37, 52) and 
increased hours or double shifting (25), however ‘job and knock’ was not necessarily believed 
to compromise safety (20).   
 
… We did ‘job and knock’ as the site really wanted to get the work done … 
 
In one instance, it was suggested that the absence of sick pay and fear of redundancy acted as 
incentives to work safely (51). 
4.5.3 Pay and remuneration 
Most interviewees received either salaried (for permanent employees) or fixed wage payments.  
Fixed wage payments were most common among interviewees at operative level and those on 
site for a transient period only.  Only two operative interviewees received priced work payments 
(4, 63), yet it appeared that the pay for a number of managers or supervisors from smaller sub-
contractors may have been interlinked with the fixed price of the work contract and performance 
bonuses for work completion (25, 34).  When describing payment preferences interviewees, for 
the most part, indicated a preference for fixed wage arrangements (9, 19, 18, 20, 21, 22, 33, 36, 
38, 50, 60, 61). 
 
… At 31 I’m getting too old for priced work now …  
 
… priced work isn’t good if delivery of equipment is late … 
 
… there’s less stress and you don’t have to take so many risks to earn more … 
 
Those with a safety role were critical of priced work for conflicting with safe working practice 
(2, 11, 13, 22, 25, 36, 37, 63). 
 
Some of the interviewees would have preferred priced work, however, because of the increased 
earning capacity that this method brings (4, 5, 23, 40, 52).  One interviewee reported that priced 
work was more likely at the weekends (61).   
 
… It would be very hard to get a bonus on this type of site, but I can go faster on house 
building work as it doesn’t have to be perfect … 
 
A small number of alternative payment methods were also described, such as a share of the 
bonus scheme for finishing work quickly or for working through the rain (34, 52).  One 
interviewee received a loyalty bonus of time off equivalent to 4 weeks sickness absence per year 
(64).  
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4.5.4 Supervision and deployment 
The level of responsibility within the supervisor role varied across interviewees.  Some had 
responsibility for overseeing a large number of people, up to 20 in one case (36), while other 
supervisory positions were more informal (20, 34, 40).  Promotion to a management or 
supervisory role from a skilled operative position was not always welcome (62). 
 
In discussing their supervisory style, some interviewees described the need for a firm approach 
to ensure that work progressed (9, 20, 52) and that correct PPE was worn (40). 
 
… I have to stand over and drive them - if you don’t then they don’t do it … 
 
… The lads just don’t see the danger and therefore they need to be told and kept in line …  
 
Demands on supervisors are added to by various dissatisfactions, such as the need to assess and 
oversee the performance of new operatives (9), concurrent demands of dealing with mobile 
phone calls, averaging 20-30 per day for one interviewee (2) and with long working hours. 
 
In practice, many operatives appeared to organise their own tasks and workload (2, 7, 9, 13, 18, 
22, 23, 61).  This appeared to be especially the case with the self-employed or those engaged in 
a specialist trade (23).  Close supervision was thought to be inappropriate for experienced 
workers (both by operatives and supervisors/managers alike), many of whom might have held a 
supervisory role themselves on other sites or under different circumstances (2, 4, 13, 52, 53). 
 
Sometimes, problems occurred when experienced operatives undertook tasks which were ‘one-
offs’ and with which they were unfamiliar, such as covering labourers’ work due to human-
resource shortages (12, 20, 21, 39, 60, 61, 84, 85, 90, 96).  This may arise due to a need to 
accommodate unplanned work, perhaps as a consequence of fluctuations elsewhere on site, 
owing to shortages in labour or resources (2, 19).  In accident 2, for example, a stock of window 
braces was being made up because extra bricklayers had unexpectedly been appointed to site 
(using up the existing supply) and because a shortage of carpenters was anticipated in the 
following few days.  Not all assistance is altruistic, however, as there was one report from a 
supervisor who chose to take ‘the risk’ himself as a measure to avoid having to do any 
paperwork (21).  
 
Other issues relating to inexperience were observed (although were rarely reported as problems 
by study participants themselves).  Amongst these were apparent difficulties keeping up with a 
fast work pace (5, 12, 40) and sometimes a reluctance to request assistance or a break when 
needed (40, 50). 
 
In putting together a team of workers, supervisors/managers aimed to avoid disruption of 
established gangs, where there was often strong cohesion.  In some situations there were family 
connections or a history of longstanding co-working (2, 5, 34, 50).  Where teams had to be 
made up they would aim to mix experienced with inexperienced employees, although this was 
not always possible (12, 19).  
4.5.5 Communication 
Interviewees reported that communication beyond their own peer group was limited (37, 38) 
and that there was a certain amount of sectorial behaviour (20).   
 
… It’s the brickies versus the chippies and then M&E versus everybody else … 
 
There also appeared to be an undercurrent of dissatisfaction between different employee groups.  
At times this was interlinked with dissatisfaction with the housekeeping of another trade, or was 
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related to poor performance or behaviour of others that the interviewee felt had induced the 
accident event (4, 11). Additional friction was apparent between (non-grade dependent) 
employee groups, distinguished by age, language and literacy.   
 
Issues relating to language and literacy also arose in some accident studies.  There were reports 
of communication problems due to non-English speaking co-workers in a small number of the 
accidents.   
 
… I had a full trolley of plasterboard and was wheeling it along the gangway with help 
from a foreign labourer.  There were communication problems.  If the other man could have 
understood ‘stop pushing’ instantly it probably would have helped prevent the accident …  
 
It was reported that language and literacy affected communication of safe working practice (8, 
19, 22), yet there was some reluctance to address this as a safety matter, for fear of being 
accused of racism.  Communication problems through poor literacy were also described or 
apparent (12, 24), although there were few reports of disadvantages from this.  Where relevant, 
any difficulty was accommodated by reading out or describing the instructional materials.  One 
supervisor/manager interviewee reported using the induction process to confirm language and 
literacy skills (23).  
4.5.6 Education and training 
Many interviewees were unable to provide details of education and training history at the time 
of the interview.  However, of those who were able to provide some details, it appeared that for 
a sizable minority of these, toolbox talks and inductions were their only source of training.  
While operatives in trade positions had often undertaken apprentice or City and Guilds training, 
further training for them and others in labourer positions was focused upon CSCS or ‘ticket’ 
based training for use of site plant or equipment.  Many interviewees reported having received 
no particular training for undertaking the accident event task (9, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24, 34, 35, 38, 
40).  In some cases this was because the accident had occurred during non-task activities, such 
as movement around site, or because they had learnt how to perform the task through a variety 
of informal methods. 
 
There were, however, differing perceptions between those in operative and supervisory/ 
managerial roles as to what constitutes training.  In a number of accidents the supervisor/ 
manager reported that training (eg toolbox talks, induction, task technique) had been provided to 
the accident-involved individual.  Discussions with the indicated recipients, though, often 
revealed that they did not see things this way (17, 20, 22, 40, 61).  Informal site based 
instruction or toolbox talks were least likely to be perceived as training (65).  
 
… I’ve never had any safety training … (then, later in the same interview) … I had a 
toolbox talk this morning ‘How to walk safely on site’ – it was OK … 
 
Mistrust or trivialisation of training was also observed, with comments implying that it is a 
means of satisfying health and safety rules rather than as a method of skills development (20, 
38).  In accident 5, for example, it was reported that the supervisor provided manual handling 
training to the accident-involved interviewee, after which they then proceeded with the manual 
lift in spite of the extreme load and mismatch of team handlers. 
 
An interesting observation is the value given to obtaining a trainee’s signature.  In many 
instances, interviewees reported ‘signing for it’ after receiving some type of information (1, 5, 9, 
25, 50, 51, 61, 62).  Some interviewees described this then being used for reprimanding rule 
breaking (37) or as a disclaimer of responsibility by those in authority (4, 5, 9).     
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Training schemes 
Interviewees reported having undergone a variety of baseline trade, apprentice and NVQ 
training schemes, generally undertaken as school leavers and supplemented with subsequent 
experience on the job (1, 2, 7, 11, 18, 22, 23, 51, 61).  The styles and duration of these different 
types of training was varied and appeared to involve a mix of college and practical based 
experience.   
 
Among the few trainee participants interviewed, a number of problems were reported.  
Scaffolder training, for example, was described as two to three block-release sessions at a 
training centre, with examination after each, this subsequently permitting a certain level of 
unsupervised work.  The formal training was supplemented with ongoing ‘on the job’ learning 
and supervisor assessment.  Interviewees in a trainee role expressed concerns about the quality 
of ‘on the job’ learning, citing inconsistency of standards and lack of enthusiasm among the 
training providers (17, 23). 
 
… The training involves labouring with scaffolding thrown in if they can be bothered … 
 
A range of titles are given to the various stages of trainee development (from ‘mate’ to 
‘improver’ for example) and the rationale for determining promotion intervals appeared flexible, 
lacking formal time scheduling or criteria for decision making of skills achievement (17, 24).  
Employers and the self-employed both reported paying for such training provision. 
CSCS training  
Interviewees described experience of CSCS training schemes, lasting between one and five 
days.  Typically these involved training for use of a particular piece of plant or equipment (eg 
scaffold tower, mobile equipment, fork lift truck) or for supplementary safety training for their 
trade or area of responsibility.  The CSCS scheme, with each training and assessment session 
referred to as a ‘ticket’, was well established on many of the sites visited and was used as a 
formal method by which to determine competence of workers to operate on site.   
 
Some unfavourable comments relating to the CSCS scheme were made, concerning a perceived 
overemphasis on classroom style instruction compared with the practical component of a 
training course.  A novice user of an item of motorised mobile equipment might complete and 
attend a full day training course for example, but the time spent on practical training for the 
‘ticket’ did not then provide sufficient experience for using the equipment unsupervised on site.  
 
… The crane co-ordinator course I had was not training – it was just here’s the form, fill it 
out and sign it … 
On the job learning 
Interviewees also reported that their skill development also occurred through less formal (and 
unassessed) methods, such as practical experience from working on their own (5, 20, 40, 60), 
and by ‘on the job’ learning. 
 
… I do this job six days a week, and you can’t get any more trained than that … 
 
… I haven’t had any training – its just something you pick up isn’t it … 
 
‘On the job’ training had been the sole method of skills development for those whose work was 
not a formally recognised trade, such as groundwork (52), ceiling fixing and ductwork (22, 24, 
34), although it was reported that efforts are being made to develop an NVQ system for duct 
workers.  Interviewees from these groups indicated they were dependent on the ability and 
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goodwill of their co-workers or supervisors in learning the necessary skills (9, 22).  Some also 
felt that their expertise was underestimated (22, 52). 
Supplementary training 
Paper-based training methods were regularly used for supplementary training, including 
conveying information.  Approaches included use of booklets or leaflets on general health and 
safety information, manual handling training techniques, site inductions, toolbox talks, method 
statements and risk assessments.  Where paper-based methods were used, it was reported that 
interviewees would either be given the material to read themselves, or that this would be read 
out to them (often during inductions).   
 
Use of other training mediums, such as video or case histories, seemed infrequent (53) and there 
were concerns that the training messages were lost because of use of inappropriate interface 
styles for the target audience (25).  Interviewees who held supervisory positions, which included 
acting as training providers, commented on the lack of training that they had received to 
undertake their own training role.  Mention was made of their own needs for training in safety 
and management, and in the provision of toolbox talks and inductions (1, 40, 52). 
Site induction  
Both positive and negative comments were received about site inductions.  Positive reports 
concerned the value of induction to introduce information unique to the site and also to inform 
newcomers about necessary emergency and health and safety information (40, 52, 64).  On the 
other hand, other interviewees reported that site inductions offered no value (9, 22, 23, 25, 34, 
37, 40, 50, 51, 52), citing reasons such as ‘its all common sense’ (2, 36, 38), that they fail to 
stimulate attention (18, 38 52) and that they ‘tell you what you already know’ (5, 34).  Others 
found them a time consuming formality to enter site (6, 36), appropriate for specialist sites only 
(61) and complained that they cover issues (such as drugs/alcohol) that those running the 
inductions are not qualified to make a judgement upon (40). 
 
Interviewees described a variety of different styles of site induction, ranging from a single sheet 
bullet point list of information, through to mixed media including a range of video presentation, 
discussion, pictorial and paper-based methods.  When describing preferences for presentation 
style, interviewees both liked (19) and disliked (64) video methods, but were less keen when 
they had to read information themselves (51).  Inductions varied in length from thirty minutes 
up to two days on some of the larger aeronautical or petro-chemical sites.  For some 
interviewees, induction was reportedly one of their only sources of safety training (34).   
 
Induction was recognised by some as training (17, 61) but not by all (24).  Issues such as Weil’s 
disease, needle-stick injuries, and fire and muster points were remembered content (17, 18, 51).  
Others found inductions to be too long or difficult to take in (17, 19).  Some interviewees 
reported that the induction contents were not appropriate for their work, such as those 
undertaking delivery driving or who were specialist tradesmen (2, 11, 18). 
 
… They’re not any value when you’ve had so many –  I just need to know if the site varies 
from others.  They’re not really to do with scaffolder’s work …  
Toolbox talks 
Many of the operative interviewees received toolbox talks and there were varying views as to 
the value of these.  Positive comments were received, although it was acknowledged that it was 
difficult to try to make these stimulating for longstanding employees (36).  More negative 
reports concerned inability to remember the topics that had been addressed in toolbox talk 
training (40, 62), use of tool box talks as a way of controlling misdemeanours (such as going 
home early) or as a reprimand for a failure or accident (22, 36). 
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Determining competence  
All the sites visited for the research were managed by members of the Major Contractors Group 
and it was policy that appointees at trade level should be holders of a CSCS card.  The company 
Head Office occasionally made this verification (22, 60, 61), or otherwise it was undertaken on 
site.  Nonetheless, supervisor/manger interviewees, when asked how they determined 
competence of new appointees on site, reported a range of additional approaches.  These 
included review of where applicants had worked before or obtaining an opinion about them 
from a previous employer (19, 36).  Alternatively, they reached a decision by talking with them 
at induction (19) or by watching and reviewing workers once they had started work.  An 
impression would often be reached within the first few hours on site, with at most up to a week 
or two trial (17, 19, 20, 33, 37, 63).  A principal contractor interviewee indicated that it was the 
responsibility of the sub-contractor to ensure appointment of competent personnel (22).  
4.5.7 Operative health 
Interviewees variously reported both good and bad health.  Where there were reports of 
previous or existing health conditions these included musculoskeletal injuries (4, 13, 17, 21, 22, 
23, 28, 29, 40, 48, 60, 63, 64), respiratory problems (23, 53), eye problems (23) and feelings of 
stress or anxiety (1, 25).  In most cases these did not appear to be directly relevant to the 
accident being studied, however, in accident 37, a pipe fitter caught his foot in trailing cables 
and aggravated an existing problem with his knee.  In another case, accident 48, an operative 
was laying out Geogrid membrane.  The operative over-exerted himself when the membrane 
became snagged, causing a musculoskeletal injury at his shoulder.  This was the site of an old 
injury, sustained whilst playing sport. 
 
Supervisor/manager interviewees were asked to describe arrangements for pre-placement health 
screening.  Some interviewees thought that nothing existed (63), although others reported that 
health requirements were stipulated for working in confined spaces (38, 62).  Otherwise, there 
appeared to be no formal processes.  Usually, it seems that decisions about fitness for work are 
made by the safety officer, contracts manager or director (40, 50, 60), or are dealt with by 
whoever provides the site induction (40, 50).  
 
Some interviewees described the health surveillance available through provision of an annual 
medical (36, 51, 61).  Mention was made in one case of the availability of discounted rates for a 
local gym (37).  
4.5.8 Working hours 
The average working hours of each employee group have been given previously in Table 13.  
Interviewees in many of the accident studies reported long working hours (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 19, 
21, 22, 23, 25, 33, 36, 37, 50, 61, 64, 99).  Weekend work was undertaken by many 
interviewees and appeared to be accepted practice.  In one case it was seen as beneficial to 
spread the workload over seven days rather than five (61).   
 
Many employees worked in excess of 40 hours per week and working hours, on average, were 
greater among those in safety/managerial or supervisory roles (5, 20, 23, 61, 62, 64).  Whilst 
safety and managerial staff appeared less likely to undertake ‘overtime’ as such, they also 
described additional working hours as being an inherent part of their workload, perhaps 
completing paper work at home at the weekend or, especially for managerial staff, feeling the 
need to be on site whenever operatives are working (64).   Few described their additional hours 
as overtime as they felt that such arrangements were inherent to their appointment and salary 
agreements. 
 
Interviewees in the operative or supervisory grades saw overtime as distinct from their formal 
working hours.  In a small number of cases, operatives undertook supplementary work away 
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from the site.  In some instances, interviewees felt that overtime was pressed upon them and 
something that they could not decline (11, 25, 40, 50, 60).  Another respondent suggested that 
undertaking overtime was habitual rather than something that he really needed to do (13).  One 
interviewee described the ability to undertake up to 30hrs overtime per week, beyond which the 
pay incentive was reduced (21).   
 
Interviewees also reported the requirement for considerable flexibility in working hours, if this 
was dictated by the process (a concrete pour for example) (11, 12, 40).  The need for flexibility 
meant that the provision of breaks was not always honoured.  Lengthy work periods without rest 
were reported (especially in the afternoon).  Interviewees occasionally accepted (21) or more 
usually showed dissatisfaction with this arrangement (11, 12, 21, 22, ,23, 24, 25, 33, 40).  On 
other occasions, however, interviewees were happy to forfeit their break in order to complete 
work and leave earlier at the end of the day (4, 12, 34, 37, 64).   
 
Many interviewees also reported working long distances from home (2, 4, 7, 9, 20, 21, 22, 40, 
52, 53, 65).  A number of interviewees started their day and commenced travel to work between 
04.45 and 06.00, to arrive on site at any time from 06.45.   
 
Reports also varied when interviewees described their arrangements for sickness and holiday 
pay.  A number of operatives said that there had been occasions when they had taken sick leave 
and had not been paid for this.  This acts as a disincentive to take rest in the case of minor 
illnesses (34).  Unpaid holiday was also reported by those in both labour and trade positions.  
Even among those who received paid holiday, labour, trade and ganger grades took the least 
time off on average, with some taking little or no time off at all (18, 33, 40, 50, 53). There were 
some reports of taking pay in lieu of holiday (50, 52). 
4.6 WORKPLACE FACTORS 
The workplace was judged to be a causal factor in almost half of the accidents.  Workplace 
factors influence safety through the presence of local hazards, adequacy of working space, 
environmental aspects such as lighting, noise, vibration and impact of the weather.  These, in 
turn, are affected by constraints of the particular site, consequences arising from work 
scheduling and effectiveness of housekeeping procedures. 
4.6.1 Site layout 
Insufficient working space was a problem reported in a number of the accident studies (2, 7, 11, 
17, 25, 53, 62, 85).  In one case it was felt that the space allocation was hindered by 
commencement of the build prior to the completion of demolition.  This resulted in a number of 
later reorganisations of site layout to accommodate the changing plan of the build.  More 
general discussion highlighted how space constraints restrict the allocation of floor area for 
workshop placement, footpaths, storage (especially important in winter when work is rained-
off), parking provision, and adequacy of space for transport routes.  It was reported that the 
latter manifests itself in constricted room for vehicle manoeuvrability and difficult access to 
drop-off points, Figure 5.  This has a knock-on effect on the ease of receiving deliveries and can 
result in a subsequent need for double handling of materials.  Problems with transport routes 
between different levels were described, involving narrow routes for lorry access or lack of 
lifting equipment to hoist smaller items between levels (11, 50).  
 
With regard to local working space, problems arose from limitations of the area available for 
movement and manipulation activities (2, 3, 12, 20, 60, 85, 86, 91), inadequate working height 
or inappropriate work surfaces for materials or equipment placement (7, 39).  Alongside space 
limitations were the presence of structures, such as scaffold bracing and protruding structures, 
impeding free movement (18, 36, 50). 
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Figure 5  Dangerous occurrence involving access and space constraints (11) 
 
The need to accommodate the space requirements of other workers caused problems in several 
instances (4, 5, 13, 23, 24, 25, 36, 51, 52, 53, 60, 93).   
 
… Most jobs are fast track programmes and you end up working on top of one another … 
 
The descriptions provided by interviewees indicated that this was an accepted and normal part 
of their work, yet the impressions of the researchers were that this affected ease of access and 
induced operatives to increase their work pace if others were waiting for them to finish or to 
gain access to an area (5, 23, 24). 
 
Another problem that can arise from the site layout is difficulty communicating due to the 
physical distance between a group of co-workers.  Examples included coordination of concrete 
pours between different levels (12) or negotiating the desired delivery quantity when the outlet 
was at some distance from the flow control source (40). 
 
Interviewees also mentioned problems arising from the provision of incomplete drawings for 
external services such as electricity.  This was said to be a common problem, with live cables 
often unmarked and hazardous during groundwork (52).   
4.6.2 Ground conditions 
Interviewees reported many situations where ground conditions were a contributory or risk 
factor for accidents (1, 17, 22, 37, 47, 51, 52, 62, 63, 64, 67).  Common problems were raised 
structures on the walking surface, creating trip hazards.  In accidents 17, 37, 51 and 64 for 
example, the trip hazards were electrical cables (Figure 6), ply board used as a temporary 
manhole cover and raised setting out points.  These items were coloured either black, (steel) 
grey or brown and protruded less than 50mm above the surrounding floor surface.   
 
… If the points had been marked or coloured then I could have seen them better, but they 
are steel discs, which is like a camouflage… 
 
In other areas, terrain was more uneven and precarious for walking over, such as when working 
on reinforcement mats, loose ground or brick rubble (1, 53, 73, 75, 88).  The condition of traffic 
routes and walkways were also frequently mentioned as being hazardous (eg 51, 76).   
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… There is always brick dust, which is a slip hazard, but when block work is cut the debris 
is like roller-balls under your feet … 
 
Problems mentioned included partial obstruction of access areas or footpaths with debris, 
deliveries or traffic cones (17, 62, 64).  Allied to concerns about pedestrian movement was the 
effect that ground conditions have on the safe movement or stability of mobile equipment, such 
as lories, hoists or scaffold towers (11, 50, 60).  Surface hazards such as spilt oil, mud, cement 
or wetness were also reported (22, 40, 52, 62). 
 
 
Figure 6  Presence of trip hazards (17) 
   
4.6.3 Environmental conditions 
Although many operative interviewees mentioned poor weather (eg cold, wet or windy) as one 
of the worst parts of their job, they rarely appeared to see this as having any direct implications 
for performance or accident risk.  Accident-involved interviewees were asked about adverse 
environmental conditions and mention was made of poor lighting and dusty working conditions.  
There was one report of distracting glare from sunlight reflecting on concrete (18), with other 
instances involving inadequacy of lighting in terms of availability and task illuminance  (2, 37, 
50, 51, 63, 64).  Excess dust was said to be a problem during general clearing up and by 
interviewees involved in ductwork. 
4.6.4 Housekeeping 
Poor housekeeping was raised as an issue by many interviewees (2, 22, 23, 24, 50, 51, 61, 67, 
70, 81).  Allocation of responsibility for clearing up was seen variously as something they 
would expect other gangs (who had created the problem) or the principal contractor to 
undertake.  Situations were described where rubbish was pushed to one side or work schedules 
delayed due to a need to clear up after others (24, 51, 53, 64).  Some highlighted that the weekly 
delivery of an empty skip provided the opportunity for a clear up, its predecessor being too full 
to take any further material long before it was exchanged.  One interviewee, however,  felt that 
he was less careful when the work area was overly tidy.  
4.6.5 Welfare facilities 
Responses were mixed when describing the provision of welfare facilities.  Many were happy 
with the facilities, but a number of operative interviewees expressed dissatisfaction.  Most 
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complaints concerned the provision of insufficient numbers of toilets (22, 25, 60, 61, 64), and 
their dirty and smelly condition (22, 24, 62, 64).  Shortcomings with washing facilities were 
also discussed, including inadequacies in water pressure, supply of grit soap (5, 6, 9), and a lack 
of shower facilities (11, 25, 37, 52).  Whilst complaints about changing room facilities were 
fewer (9, 37), there was concern about lack of security, with reports of lockers having been 
broken into (65). 
 
With regard to refreshment provision, most seemed satisfied with availability of food and drink, 
but there was a complaint about access to fresh drinking water (8).  This is an issue due to health 
risks associated with regular dehydration.  Dissatisfaction was expressed concerning pressures 
on use of the canteen at break times, with queuing reducing break allowances, and lack of space 
resulting in some having to eat in the changing rooms (23, 52, 39, 64).    
4.7 MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT 
Material and equipment characteristics considered by the research included their suitability, 
usability and condition (including maintenance).  Factors influencing these are the 
material/equipment design, specification and their supply and availability.  Material and 
equipment design are also considered further in sections 4.9.2 and 4.9.4. 
4.7.1 Materials 
Issues with construction materials featured in 27 of the accident studies.  One problem was 
variability in the quality of materials.  The following interview extract relates to accident 1, 
where an operative suffered an eye injury when engaged in rebar tying work. 
 
… When the coils of tying wire are heated in the vat (annealing process) the ones at the top 
don’t get heated so much – this makes them stiffer and more springy … you can’t really tell 
what its going to be like until you start to use it … 
 
Another aspect concerns hazards present in the way materials are received for use.  In 
accident 9, for example, steel banding securing a delivery of plywood caused a laceration.  This 
type of packaging can also be a fall hazard if not disposed of adequately (88).  Cut hazards were 
also reported in connection with metal ducting, with the problem made worse by the material 
being slippery due to a protective oil coating (34).  Heavy loads were a factor in several 
accidents (eg 1, 5, 18, 22, 33, 50, 84).  While interviewees made occasional comments about 
this problem, there seemed to be general acceptance of heavy lifting as part of their work. 
 
… There were ten steel angles to be unloaded from the forklift truck onto the storage point 
on the floor… with a man at each end we expected to take about 20 minutes to do this…  
 
In this accident (5), for example, each angle was 9m long and weighed 140kg, an inappropriate 
load to be moved manually.  In some other incidents, the presentation of materials did not lend 
itself to good handling practice, perhaps due to slipperiness of the product (as described above) 
or with inadequate contact area for grasp or purchase (1, 33).   
 
Interviewees were also concerned about the limited information from manufacturers concerning 
use of the product (2, 13, 22) and, on one occasion, of the possibility of contamination of 
materials with rat urine (1). 
 
In one case (71) an electrical pump being installed within a heating system was faulty, resulting 
in an electrocution. 
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…basically, it was a wiring problem – a design fault that was overlooked by the 
manufacturer – the push-in electrical socket was put in the wrong way by the apprentice 
electrician, making the appliance ‘live’… 
 
The use or introduction of new materials was discussed in follow-up interviews with material 
designers /suppliers.  It was apparent that on some occasions, differences arise between material 
designers’ anticipated application of their products and how they actually get used on site.  In 
accidents 2 and 39, for example, cavity closure window frames and a slewing ring were 
fabricated or used in a manner not intended by the designers.  From another perspective, it was 
suggested that there is sometimes a rejection of innovations by site foremen, due to a reluctance 
to change. 
4.7.2 Tools 
An assortment of tools featured in the accident studies, ranging from simple hand tools through 
to more sophisticated or powered tooling.   
 
Shortcomings in function or performance were reported by interviewees (2, 52, 98), with further 
problems with tool design observed by the researchers.  Typical failings included poor grip 
characteristics, undesirable pressure at skin contact points and, for powered tools, frequent use 
of finger trigger operation (1, 7, 35, 65, 99).  Some tools also appeared heavy, given the 
situations in which they were being used (95, 97).  For example, the petrol saw and torque 
multipliers used in accidents 20 and 39 each weighed 11.5kg and 8.9kg, heavy loads when used 
in awkward postures.  It was observed that attempts to reduce problems with tools had been 
made by users through the addition of padding or tape on handles.  Bladed tools required 
frequent unprotected handling of the cutting edge to change blades (7) or to remove obstructions 
(2).  One accident involved an electrocution due to problems with the performance of a CAT 
scanner (52).  Time saving seemed to be an issue in tool use for other accidents (20, 33, 50).   
 
… A kerb lifter is available, but by the time you go and get it it’s easier to use two people at 
each end … 
 
…The saw was quite a heavy and bulky tool for cutting the pipes, but a handsaw would 
have taken forever … 
 
Interesting comments were made about criteria for tool purchasing.  The self-employed often 
provided their own tools, although it was also reported that self-purchase was sometimes 
preferable anyway due to the poor quality and condition of equipment supplied on site (13).  In 
describing factors affecting their purchase choice, most interviewees seemed to aim for a 
‘middle of the road’ price (13, 51) and selection according to manufacturer (35).   
 
… Tools in the £15-40 price range are all pretty much the same … 
 
Tool pricing was a concern for many, especially when the tools were vulnerable to theft, or had 
a short life-span (3, 61).  In one case the tool performance (non-rusting) was referred to as a 
purchasing criterion (18).   
 
Interviewees obtained their tools from a specialist supplier or through mail-order catalogues (18, 
51).  Some interviewees had received training in use and care of their tools, but rarely since 
initial or apprenticeship training (61).  Others felt that they had just picked it up as they went 
along (20, 22, 35, 65) or relied solely on suppliers information (38).  Instructions were 
sometimes considered unhelpful and left unread (2).   
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4.7.3 Equipment 
Equipment, including machinery or plant brought onto site, was identified as directly involved 
and deficient in more than half of the accident studies.  Failures relating to equipment included 
problems resulting from inadequate consideration of user anthropometry (body dimensions) or 
with the user interface.  These were also shortcomings in performance, safety-related features 
and maintenance.   
 
Inappropriate physical dimensions of some equipment resulted in user interaction, such as 
physical or visual access, being hampered.  In accident 6, for example, a jump was required to 
climb off a scissor lift.  Inspection of the equipment revealed that there were no distinct 
handholds on this equipment to support the user in this action, Figure 7.   
 
… We’re taught to come down the scissor lift steps backwards, but the last step is about 2ft 
from the ground, so you have to jump the last bit … 
 
 
 
Figure 7  Poor foot and handhold provision on scissor lift (6) 
 
The safety cage on top of the scissor lift offered the most convenient points to grasp (at 2.2m 
from the ground), yet fixing bolts here were left exposed, compromising the only handhold 
available.  A related problem existed in accident 21, in connection with the length of ladder 
attached to the side of a rail wagon (Figure 8).  Elsewhere, use of split or cut down ladders was 
reported (25). 
 
In a similar context, problems were identified with the use of scaffold towers.  In some instances 
difficulties may be experienced in achieving a desirable scaffold and handrail height for the 
work requirements, given the fixed height scaffold components available (36, 62).   
 
Another example, commented upon spontaneously by interviewees in a number of accident 
studies (but only immediately relevant for accident 50), concerned the small size of access 
opening between different scaffolding levels.  This access space is frequently too small for 
larger individuals, or those carrying items about their person. 
 
Problems had also arisen with operations involving manual movement of loads (22, 38, 60).  In 
one case, load instability existed due to free movement of fuel within a bowser (38).  In accident 
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22, problems occurred manoeuvring a laden plasterboard trolley (Figure 9).  The trolley had 
directional wheels at one end only (the other end having fixed forward facing wheels).  While it 
was not known which end of the trolley was leading, difficulties were to be expected moving a 
full load with this particular trolley design. 
 
 
Figure 8  Ladder access to rail wagon (21) 
 
 
 
Figure 9  Plasterboard trolley (22) 
 
Equipment maintenance deficiencies featured in several accidents, especially with respect to 
steel parts (such as scaffold clips, concrete pipe clams and extendable steel props) (8, 18 and 4 
respectively).  Weathering and concrete were reported as the main antagonists.  Although 
‘regular cleaning and maintenance programmes’ were in place, overcoming rust and similar 
problems added to the physical effort required to use equipment.  Failure to detect equipment 
damage contributed to some accidents.  In accident 47, for example, an operative maintaining a 
crawler-mounted crane, fell from the running boards as the handle from the maintenance hatch 
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gave way.  In another accident (94), a fire was caused by an electrical fault on a pneumatic 
breaker, which the supervisor thought had been caused by misuse of the equipment, but this 
damage had not been obvious to the operatives involved. 
 
Examples were found where the design of equipment gave little heed to its usability or how the 
user might detect and monitor different states.  Lack of status feedback (eg visual, auditory or 
tactile information to the user) was a factor in several accidents (4, 19, 38).  Usability issues 
were reported in accident 11, involving the overturning of a delivery lorry.  In this case, the 
interviewee described the wide range of lorry types he used in his work.  There were common 
features however, such as the crane controls, but it was apparent that their design contravened 
user expectations (pushing the lever down raised the crane and vice versa).  It was also reported 
that safety protection features built into the equipment did not anticipate this particular accident 
event.   
 
Suitability of equipment was an issue in a number of accidents, where machines were being 
used for activities other than their primary purpose, eg excavator and forklift used instead of a 
crane (29, 74, 85). 
4.7.4 Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)  
Use of a safety helmet, high visibility vest and safety boots was mandatory on all sites visited, 
with supplementary use of protective eyewear, gloves, harnesses and respiratory protective 
equipment (RPE) expected depending on the work.  Adverse comments were made about PPE 
in a large number of the accident studies.  Criticisms related to poor fit and comfort; 
inappropriateness for actual task requirements; poor quality, care or condition; problems with 
availability and excess cost. 
 
Comments concerning ‘hard hats’ focused on their frequent poor fit and comfort (5, 20, 24, 52, 
63, 64, 82).  Remarks were made about the lack of lining or padding, insecurity (due to lack of a 
chinstrap), poor ventilation (especially in summer) and being too small.  Interviewees reported 
that hard hats were regularly dislodged or fell off (5, 63, 82), induced headaches (24) and 
interfered with work on looking up (23, 24).  In accidents 27 and 82, for example, the injured 
persons’ hard hat fell off when they bent down, both then struck their head on something when 
they stood up. 
 
Many interviewees accepted or were resigned to wearing a safety helmet, regarding them as a 
necessary evil and, in a number of the accidents, helmets helped to reduce the extent of the 
injury (72, 91).  However, it was also said that they are not always needed, with some 
frustration at the lack of flexibility over when helmets must be worn (22, 52, 64).   
 
… With the hat you’re more likely to hit your head, as you don’t account for the extra 
height when walking underneath different structures … 
 
In many of the accidents where the hands were at risk, the injured person was not wearing 
protective gloves (52, 66, 80, 83, 95).  There were complaints about the comfort and fit of 
gloves (1, 5, 33), with operatives not wearing them as they interfere with their ability to operate 
tools and the speed with which they can undertake their work (52, 95).  Operatives reported 
inadequate supplies of gloves (necessitating use of worn out protection), poor durability and 
lack of a suitable size range (17, 18, 40, 52, 62).  There were also reports that gloves are 
frequently mislaid with constant taking off and putting on (61, 62).  In some cases the gloves 
worn were inadequate to provide protection from the risk (84, 86). 
 
Fall arrest harnesses were discussed in a small number of accident studies (only specified trades 
require use of this PPE), yet among those who were in a position to comment, there was a 
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consensus of criticism about the equipment (4, 6, 17, 18, 36, 79).  These included complaints 
about comfort and fit (especially when used for longer than 30 minutes), concerns about 
restriction of mobility and inadequate supplies (leading to harness hoarding among site 
operatives).  Interviewees were also worried that the 2-metre lanyard length was inadequate or 
that they would experience physical injury from the harness itself should they experience a fall.  
As with other PPE, it was acknowledged that harness use was necessary, but interviewees felt 
that they should be permitted greater discretion over when to wear fall arrest equipment. 
 
With regard to other PPE, protective eyewear was said to steam up and cause difficulties when 
performing certain tasks and under particular lighting conditions (20, 34, 35, 49, 63, 73).  There 
were problems with protective eye-wear for those needing to use prescription spectacles (45), 
although suitable prescription safety glasses are available.  Respiratory protective equipment 
(RPE) users mentioned problems with fatigue and being impeded when undertaking certain 
operations.  There were some complaints about high-visibility vests, concerning the obstruction 
they pose when trying to access tools from waist belts (4, 8, 9) and a lack of fabric breathability, 
causing discomfort in hot weather (4, 8, 9). 
 
Many interviewees reported having to buy their own protective footwear and in one case 
another reported purchasing his own protective eyewear.  Interviewees reported receiving little 
instruction as to the maintenance of their PPE (18, 20, 24, 25, 34, 52), although when asked 
about this respondents thought that care was ‘down to the individual’, or instruction unnecessary 
as they had used it for a long time.   
 
Interviews with supervisor/managers indicated that PPE and its availability were viewed 
differently than by those in operative grades.  These respondents were concerned about the lack 
of care given to PPE, with reports of finding new and expensive PPE treated badly, left lying 
around or improperly looked after (36).  Ordering and choice of PPE was in a number of 
instances undertaken by ‘Head Office’ (61) although in other cases supervisors/managers were 
involved.  Only a few had tried ordering new styles, prompted by recommendation, observation 
of use by other construction teams, or through information provided in supply catalogues (40, 
50, 51, 62, 63).  One interviewee reported working with glove manufacturers to trial new 
products and another, in the case of a new short peaked hat, had tried it themselves to assess the 
product.   
4.7.5 Materials and equipment supply 
Interviewees reported the adverse effects of managing with insufficient quantities or having to 
work with incorrect materials or equipment.  In some instances this was because of cost 
restrictions (4, 17, 38, 62).  Supply inadequacies included missing, late or incorrect deliveries 
and also the delivery of materials where pre-fabrication had been expected but had not been 
fulfilled (22, 36, 40).  Interviewees reported trying to reorganise work to accommodate this, but 
inevitably time was lost (40).  In another case, it was felt that there had been a considerable 
increase in manual handling due to inadequate craneage time allowances.  This was managed 
informally with cash payment for assistance from other contractors on site. 
4.8 ORIGINATING INFLUENCES 
This section reports findings from the accident studies concerning possible underlying or root 
causes of the accidents, here called ‘originating influences’ to emphasise their foundational role. 
4.8.1 Permanent works design 
Design of permanent works are an important influence on presence of hazards and exposure to 
risk on site.  An analysis of design factors in the 100 accidents suggests that approximately half 
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of these incidents could have been prevented by a design alteration.  This is discussed further in 
section 4.9.1. 
Design revisions 
Design revisions as construction progresses can lead to scheduling problems and project delays 
(9, 25).  Changes may occur due to clarification of client requirements or as a result of architects 
being consulted over detail.  Sometimes, original designs include incompatibilities between  
different construction elements.  It was indicated that problems can be made worse where there 
is disagreement between those responsible for design choices.   
 
… We’ve had over a thousand architect instructions on this site because of disagreements 
within the outside design team.  A good design should normally have no more than 300.  
The changes were for a range of reasons  ….  the area was not properly designed in the first 
place.  The design didn’t work or they had changed their mind from the original 
specification .… 
 
This has implications for project management, including scheduling of resources, such as 
material supplies, labour provision and sub-contractor service providers. 
 
The need to accommodate late requests from clients to develop or revise their work appeared 
relatively common from the architect interviewees.  Such requests induced intermittent and 
considerable time pressure.  The architects indicated that avoidance of architect instructions was 
preferable for project success. Their perspective, however, was that requests often originate 
from contractors, who use this method to increase time and financial allowances.  However, 
information from senior site manager interviewees contradicted this, with the view expressed 
that extension claims and design revisions derive from client requests almost all of the time.  In 
reality, the position is likely to be somewhere in the middle between these two positions. 
Fine detail 
It was apparent from the interviews that designers assume fine detail or specification of 
technical solutions to be the remit of the principle contractor or, more likely, located within the 
sub-contractor chain.  Designers are wary of providing excessively prescriptive instructions as 
building tolerances are too great and greater precision incurs additional time and cost.  From the 
site perspective, however, the perception was of having to perpetually seek clarification from 
architects because of inadequate or anomalous information.  
 
Design ownership, from the site perspective, appears to have become blurred with the 
increasing prevalence of substantive sub-contractors.  From the sub-contractor viewpoint, 
design ownership was seen as the domain of whoever had appointed them to undertake the work 
(5).  Sub-contractors develop and undertake the portion of work that they have been contracted 
to fulfil, yet at times have little knowledge about the context of this or the interaction with other 
service providers.  In accident 3, for example, which involved an extractor fan catching fire, the 
fan manufacturers were not involved in ducting and fire protection modifications.  
Responsibility for these aspects was taken by the employing contractor.   
Utility information 
Provision of incorrect drawings or information regarding utility services (such as underground 
supplies) featured in some accidents, resulting in the need for further liaison and revision later in 
the build process (9, 20, 52). 
Innovation 
Follow-up interviews with architects suggested there to be a small number of lead architects 
pioneering new practice or innovation.  Clients might encourage such developments for high 
profile landmark projects, with elements then finding their way into standard building practice 
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over time.  It would appear, however, that innovation tends to be motivated by considerations 
such as building aesthetics and functionality, or construction efficiency and cost, with any safety 
benefits being incidental.  
4.8.2 Project management 
Contractor arrangements  
Sub-contracting was a feature on all sites visited, with sites often retaining a list of tried and 
tested sub-contractors invited to tender for work.  A number of interviewees described 
themselves as self-employed, or as self-employed but linked to a sub-contractor employer (9, 
11, 65). 
 
Given the fluctuating skill and labour requirements on a construction project, the prevailing 
view is that use of sub-contractors increases flexibility and reduces costs over retaining 
permanent employees on full pay.  Some interviewees, however, expressed opinions regretting 
the loss of a directly employed workforce (1, 4, 21).  These emanated from interviews with 
principal contractor employees and related to problems with the performance and supervision of 
sub-contractors on site (4, 10), and a lack of initiative and decrease in ‘reaction time’ when 
something needs to be done (1, 10, 25).   
 
… The sub-contractors are working in isolation; they just consider themselves rather than 
the rest of the site … 
 
Responses from sub-contractor interviewees provided a different perspective on these issues.  
While there were similar reports of working in ‘isolation’ from sub-contractors, this was said to 
be in the context of lack of consultation and communication by the principal contractor (5, 38, 
62, 64).  Examples given were the failure of a principal contractor to hold daily meetings with 
sub-contractor supervisors and increasing displacement of formal communication channels the 
longer the time spent on site (5).  Where liaison did occur, it was reported that this was often 
without the inclusion of principal contractor workers or other teams on site, and that it was 
purely ‘task’ orientated (38, 62). 
 
… It’s frustrating managing practical matters with the principal contractor.  You get left to 
your own devices and the managers wash their hands of you … 
 
The consequences of these problems manifest themselves in confusion over ownership of 
responsibilities, especially (although not exclusively) in construction management (10, 50, 62, 
64); complaints that sub-contractors do not project manage or address safety issues adequately 
(10, 25); and problems with communication and accountability within lengthy sub-contractor 
chains (34).  In accident 51, for example, it was identified that liaison through a chain of four 
different sub-contractors was required in order to arrange for a work area to be cleared so that 
other work could start. 
 
Another aspect to contractor arrangements mentioned is that principal contractors may hand 
over responsibility for work organisation to sub-contractor supervisors (52), yet continue to 
instruct their operatives, confusing arrangements for overseeing their work (61).  On another 
point, interviewees reported poor liaison between principal and sub-contractors when procuring 
materials, supplies or PPE (1, 61, 62, 64).  
Labour supply 
Many supervisor/manager interviewees reported problems with labour supply, with respect to 
both volume and quality of workers.  It was remarked that selection sometimes depends on who 
is available rather than being able to pick and choose (3, 12, 20, 22, 23, 37, 62).  Poor 
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availability of labour appeared especially acute in the larger cities.  Interviewees also reported 
that they are sometimes required to appoint a designated quota of labour from the ‘local’ 
population.  At times they felt that this resulted in individuals undertaking tasks for which they 
were insufficiently qualified or experienced (3, 37).  A contact list of reliable workers was often 
compiled to help overcome these problems. 
 
Responding to absenteeism was also indicated to be a problem, sometimes resulting in 
tradesmen and operatives being asked to take on work outside their normal area of expertise (20, 
22, 23, 38, 39).  There were complaints that multi-skilled ‘modern day’ apprentices are lacking 
in work experience and are at times ‘more of a hindrance than a help’ (63). 
Work scheduling and time pressure 
Time pressure within site schedules was often reported (1, 2, 3, 9, 53), with concerns about 
financial penalties from project overruns a preoccupation for managers (25, 61).   
 
Follow-up interviews suggested that build scheduling and planning of the project timeline 
appear to be largely based on previous experience.  This needs to make allowance for elements 
such as time to go through the sub-contractor tender and appointment process; time lost due to 
inclement weather; time for closure and holidays; time to accommodate quiet periods (in 
residential areas); and time for materials such as plaster and concrete to cure.  There was no 
mention of any allowance being made to accommodate injury or sickness absence, however. 
  
Computerised packages (such as ‘SPODS’ or ‘ADEPT’) reportedly offer advantages with 
project planning, although it is not known how widely these are used or whether the perceived 
benefits materialise in practice.  Benefits from project management software were said to 
include being able to provide a client with cost estimates and management of workload where 
late or missing information is a factor.  Where no such tools were available, planning appears 
vulnerable to the nature of relations with the client; where these deteriorate, this in itself can 
carry a significant workload overhead.   
 
A tight build schedule leads to an increased workload, with weekend, late evening or night work 
sometimes necessary to accommodate this (21, 61).  Extended working hours may have 
implications for alertness and reliable decision making.   
 
Interviewees described a variety of influences that affect the pace of their work, such as delays 
caused by a need to check site conditions prior to proceeding with a task (60) or pressure arising 
from the limited handling life of materials, or a need to avoid obstructing other activities (8). 
 
… I had to be quick because the concrete was setting and because the lorry was blocking 
the road outside for the delivery … 
 
Other circumstances described as leading to time pressure included a need to complete work and 
vacate an area to give access to another trade; making materials and equipment available for 
others awaiting them (2, 4, 12, 19); problems arising from shortages or late deliveries of 
materials or equipment (9, 62); having to clear up or circumvent debris or the unfinished work 
of others (18, 25, 50); and slowness induced by another labourer or trainee (18).  Time pressure 
from being ‘rained off’ was also reported (9).  
 
A competitive element causing time pressure was sometimes apparent.  In some instances this 
occurred due to individuals undertaking priced work and needing to get as much done as 
possible (5, 13, 61, 63).  In other cases there was more of a leadership influence, with reports of 
competition between different work teams or because of the approach of particular site manager 
or sub-contractor foremen (1, 5, 50, 63). 
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… The charge hand wants a surge of work first thing in the morning.  The work’s not 
behind, its just his character … 
 
In some situations where a faster work pace had been required, it was thought that safe working 
practice would be maintained because of the supervisors’ request for it and by virtue of their 
presence (62, 64).  
4.8.3 Construction processes 
Method statements 
The manner in which it is envisaged site construction should proceed is documented in method 
statements, usually prepared as a project management function, off-site.  The content of these 
varies from a rudimentary process description of the construction stages, through to much more 
detailed instructions as to how the construction should be undertaken.  Invariably, however, site 
supervisors and trade workers are left to draw on their expertise and experience when it comes 
to common tasks, with the method statements remaining unread in the site office (73, 80, 82, 
92, 93). 
 
Job titles of those responsible for the preparation of method statements encountered in this 
research included contracts manager (1, 9, 13, 50), project/construction manager (2, 5, 9), 
facilities manager (3), civil engineer (4), or site/general manager (9, 11).  Often, new method 
statements were developed from existing statements or generic materials, sometimes converted 
to a style used by the site principal contractors.  Interviewees on site were occasionally 
consulted or involved in preparation of the method statements, although this appeared unlikely 
for operative grades (1, 22, 40) or sub-sub-contractors in the chain.  Those interviewees that 
were able to comment on the method statement development process indicated that the 
documents were often prepared before site work began (22, 50), commonly with inadequate 
information available (9, 22) or under time constraints because the statements were prepared as 
part of the bidding process for a contract (33).  
 
Method statements varied in length.  In some cases they were just a single sheet (38, 40), but in 
others the statement was up to 20 pages, with multiple process steps (forty four in one case) 
(39).  Asking operatives to read a method statement, or a supervisor reading it out to them, was 
sometimes used as a training medium.  Frequently, however, the language and presentation style 
of the method statement was complex and would be inappropriate for those with poor literacy 
skills (1, 33, 39).   
 
In any event, there were no applicable method statements for the activities being undertaken in 
many of our accident studies (6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 50, 51, 61, 62, 
66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 100).  Sometimes this was 
because the work in progress at the time of the accident was a generic operation, below the level 
of detail in the project method statements.  In accidents 10 and 51, for example, there was no 
specification for boarding (both quality and dimensions) to cover holes in the ground.  
Responsibility for such temporary works design appears unclear, with decisions taken regarding 
performance aspects such as board diameter/density/loading capacities probably left to the 
carpenter. 
 
… There is no culture of calculating ply requirements; the technical ability is not on site … 
 
In other cases, the absence of a method statement was because the accidents occurred while 
workers were not engaged in a defined construction operation, for example they were moving 
around the site or carrying out preparatory work.  Where method statements did exist, many 
  47
operative interviewees were unaware of them and were not able to recall any procedures or 
instructions for their work (11, 12, 22, 33, 34, 35, 52, 60, 63).   
4.8.4 Safety culture 
Generally, comments across the range of interviewees about site safety culture were positive, 
pointing to the greater emphasis on safety in the preceding five years or so.  Nonetheless, there 
were some adverse remarks to the effect that safe practice is overridden by production pressures 
(25, 37) and that, despite what is said in induction, ‘safety’ is more for appearances sake than 
actual implementation (11, 60).  Where interviewees provided positive feedback on safety 
culture, this was at times judged in the context of a safety failure (7, 63). 
 
… I couldn’t fault them – they took me to hospital when the accident happened … 
Responsibility for safety  
Supervisory/manager interviewees were asked about their responsibilities for health and safety, 
and any training and review of performance in this respect which they had received.  Only one 
interviewee indicated that a responsibility for safety was clearly defined within his contract of 
employment (63), with the position in the case of others less robust.  Some interviewees 
reported that health and safety responsibilities were part of their role, although not specified (23, 
40).  One interviewee had received an instructional folder from his safety advisor (61).  Others 
felt that various site documentation (eg site rules, codes of practice, scaffold register, method 
statements or risk assessments) defined their responsibilities (25, 33, 36, 37, 38, 50, 52, 60, 62, 
65).  In terms of safety management performance monitoring, some interviewees reported 
‘none’ (38, 50, 52), while others highlighted regular liaison with their safety advisors (61), 
reactive monitoring according to accident occurrences (17, 25, 62), or audit by the principal 
contractor (65).  
 
Training among these interviewees in safety related matters varied, with many unable to provide 
spontaneously details of training history and duration at the time of interview.  Although details 
were unavailable, the impression was that a majority had received some health and safety 
training in the preceding five years, although a sizable minority had received none.  For those 
that had undertaken some training, the duration was in most cases between one and six days.  
Some respondents viewed ‘First Aid at Work’ certification as health and safety training.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, an impression gained from the accident studies was that there is 
widespread disinclination among operatives, supervisors and site managers to take 
responsibility for safety.  Some respondents placed the obligation for taking action on safety 
issues squarely with the visiting safety adviser (51).   
 
This sometimes manifests itself in a failure to appraise alternative methods of working or in not 
putting new ideas into practice (17, 22, 35).  In accident 35, for example, an eye injury was 
caused by metal swarf during a drilling operation.  The drilling was being undertaken in 
preparation for use of pop rivets to join metal ducting.  During the interviews it emerged that 
self-drilling screws could have been used as an alternative to pop riveting in this situation.  As 
well as possible safety benefits through eliminating the need for pre-drilling, there should be 
time saving through using screws.  Although negative comments were made by others about 
equipment cost and screw-gun safety, it was not apparent that there was any process or 
encouragement at site level to weigh up the pros and cons of different ways of performing such 
tasks. 
 
It was also observed by the researchers that there seems to be an acceptance or ‘blindness’ to 
longstanding safety problems.  In accident 18, for example, protruding nails remaining as a 
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consequence of removing shuttering were unquestioned by site, office and training staff, yet 
potential for injury from these was significant.   
 
At the level of the organisation, there were suggestions from sub-contractor interviewees of a 
lack of responsibility and action from the big companies (64).  In accident 50, for example, the 
sub-contractor group felt that erection of safety barriers, rather than a board over a hole in the 
ground, would have been a more appropriate safety precaution.  Unfortunately, the sub-
contractors felt that a decision such as this was not within their remit on site.  Conversely, a 
principal contractor viewpoint was that sub-contractor groups had inadequate insight into how 
safety management should  be implemented in practice (2).   
 
… If it’s a cut it’s our fault and he gets a pair of gloves, if it’s a trip it’s not our fault as 
others supply the workplace … 
Safety personnel 
Interviewees having a safety role had a variety of backgrounds and training, ranging from trade 
to professional positions.  When referring to this position, ‘safety officer’ was the term most 
commonly used by site personnel, although the job holders themselves used the term ‘advisor’ 
or ‘manager’ in preference.  For those that were not called ‘manager’, there was some concern 
about reduced credibility (10).  Safety personnel interviewees had received a wide range of 
training, varying from short courses of less than one week (eg Safety for Supervisors training), 
through to NEBOSH Construction & Certificate training, NEBOSH Diploma or courses at 
degree level.   
 
The safety role often appeared to be seen as one of enforcement or policing by those on site 
(1, 9).   
 
… We were trying to get away without a handrail on the scaffold to save some time. We 
thought it was safe and were happy with it, but the main contractor saw us and told us off.  
We just had to put our hands up to it and say we’d done it … 
 
Most safety advisors seemed to think that they provided a valuable and worthwhile contribution.  
Some, however, indicated that their appointment was a second-choice option, away from a 
professional site position (eg Engineer) and something to which they were directed by their 
employer rather than choosing it for themselves (5, 9).  It was obvious in some instances that the 
safety advisor role and its incumbent were not viewed with a great deal of respect (10).   
Risk management 
The analysis presented in Table 15 identifies a failure in risk management in most of the 100 
accidents studied.  Given the legal obligation for risk assessment under the Management of 
Health and Safety at Work Regulations (HSC, 2000) and the requirement that a written record 
should be kept of the significant findings, it is noteworthy that there was no risk assessment 
available for many of the situations in the accident studies (6, 7, 8, 9, 17, 19, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 
36, 37, 38, 40, 50, 54, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 89, 95, 96, 97, 
100).  Most often this was because the accident activity was seen as a core skill of the person 
undertaking the task (1, 2, 33, 61) or because the accident did not occur during a task activity.   
 
Where risk assessments did exist, the hazards that contributed to the accident events were often 
excluded (2, 12, 34, 39, 52, 61), or control measures had not been enforced (35).  It was 
generally the case that operatives, and sometimes their supervisors, were unaware of the 
existence of the risk assessment (12, 22, 33, 34, 35, 52, 60, 61, 63). 
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In practice, risk assessments were commonly integrated into an accompanying method 
statement.  While the work steps were often carefully structured, these were generally in terms 
of the construction process rather than the tasks actually needing to be performed by workers (1, 
2, 5, 24, 35, 39, 40, 63).  In accident 5, for example, the work sequence and lifting equipment 
required to move the 140kg steel angles into the building were recorded, yet there was no 
description of the steps required to load or unload the angles between the different handling 
equipment.   
 
It is of course possible that the manual lift in accident 5 was an unplanned activity, highlighting 
a further area of concern.  Method statements are usually prepared well in advance of the time at 
which the operation is performed, and/or are generic documents for repeated application to same 
type situations (9, 10).  In either case the content describes a best case scenario, isolated from 
the circumstances prevailing at the time of execution, such as access to an area, or the 
availability of equipment and tools.  As such these documents may be useful for planning the 
build process, but are ineffectual in identifying and controlling risks.  Nonetheless, the 
documents are sometimes used as an audit tool to confirm safe working methods (11, 22). 
Accident investigation 
Effective accident investigation is a valuable means of learning from failure.  The thoroughness 
of accident investigation was examined where possible by comparing actual site accident reports 
with the descriptions of events provided by interviewees for the research.  It was often the case 
that accident reports gave only brief details of incidents.  At times, accident-involved 
interviewees were unfamiliar with the recorded description or their own account of events 
differed in material respects from that documented (13, 37).  In some instances, accident reports 
were being used as a forum to document complaints or requests for improvement to work 
circumstances (62).   
 
… Slipped on inside of scaffold, fell and twisted left knee. Mud on boots caused slip.  
Designated footpath was asked for in H&S meeting.  Item 15 in minutes …  
 
Although attribution of causes of accidents included some that were viewed as chance events (9, 
33, 36), many identified failings on the part of involved-persons, such as over-familiarity (2), 
carelessness (19, 24), complacency (22), negligence (24), rushing (24), lack of concentration 
and judgement (2, 11, 22, 24), or distraction (13, 22, 33, 37).  There seemed to be little 
appreciation that these are everyday human failings that ought to be anticipated in an effective 
safety management process.  
Identification of accident remedial action 
In the case of many accidents, there had been no remedial action after the event.  Different 
reasons were given for an absence of response, including the accident being caused by accepted 
hazards and being a routine part of the job (9, 33, 34, 50, 97); the activity being a one-off or 
involving temporary work (36, 60, 61), and that any action would have taken longer to carry out 
than the job itself (61).  Interviewees also reported that remedial measures were considered 
unnecessary because they were already following site rules (4, 22, 36), or because action was 
outside their remit and the responsibility of the principal contractor (22, 51, 64). 
 
Where measures were taken these fell into several categories of response.  A frequent approach 
was to review and reinforce guidance on work behaviour, such as advising people to get extra 
help when needed (39, 50), or to use less hazardous techniques (19, 23, 24).  In other cases, the 
response was to remind workers of the need to use PPE (33, 39, 63, 65, 92), to recommend 
improved housekeeping in the work area (25, 53, 62), or to install traffic cones over walkway 
obstructions (64).   
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In a small number of instances, the remedial action might have been expected to have more 
enduring consequences, either through the development and instigation of more robust 
procedures (20), or the consideration of safer equipment designs (12, 38).  
Consultation and participation 
Operative grade interviewees reported differing experiences of consultation.  Some stated that 
they are simply ‘told’ what to do and are not part of any consultation at all (10, 12, 22, 50, 52, 
60, 61).  Other interviewees were included in discussions about work organisation, but not about 
safety (20, 25, 52, 63) or vice versa (24, 37, 61).  Although most interviewees felt that they 
could initiate discussions or make suggestions if they wanted to, there was mention of inaction 
in response to concerns raised about inadequacies in the provision of facilities (2) and the 
quality and safety of materials and equipment (1, 4, 25).   
 
Interviewees often had useful ideas or experiences from previous work (often abroad) giving 
possible solutions to problems with tooling, equipment or materials design (1, 9, 18, 52).   
 
… The tying wire comes in a 25kg roll here, but in Germany they come in small cartons 
which is much better … 
 
… When I was working in the Bahamas they used to have proper nips for cutting steel 
banding, but I haven’t seen them here … 
 
… The sun bounces off the concrete and causes a lot of glare – perhaps adding some colour 
to the mix would reduce this? … 
 
Disappointingly, none of these ideas had been communicated to anyone in a position to evaluate 
and implement them.  Neither did there seem to be any mechanisms in place to encourage this.  
 
4.9 DESIGN POTENTIAL TO REDUCE RISK 
Additional analysis of the accident study data was undertaken to examine the possible 
contribution of design in each incident (analysis presented in detail in Appendix E – Design 
Prevention Analysis).  This was undertaken from the viewpoint of what could designers have 
done to reduce the risk?  Consideration has been given to both the options available to the 
designers and whether choosing an option would actually have reduced the risk.  Although such 
an analysis depends on subjective judgement, it does give a useful indication of the potential for 
design to improve safety. 
 
Alternative design options were placed in three categories by the analysis:  
 unlikely to have reduced risk 
 may have reduced risk 
 likely to have reduced risk 
 
Four types of designer have been considered:  
 permanent works designers (architects / civil & structural engineers / mechanical & 
electrical engineers etc) 
 materials designers (design of materials themselves and their packaging, delivery 
method etc) 
 temporary works designers (scaffolding / formwork / falsework etc) 
 equipment designers (tools, plant and equipment) 
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The design of the workplace, work task etc are also important considerations in accident 
causality.  However, these have not been included in this analysis as the construction sector 
does not typically regard these as ‘design’. 
4.9.1 Permanent works designers 
 
Permanent works designers could have reduced the risk in almost half of the accidents (25 
likely / 22 maybe – Figure 10).  One of the main decisions that permanent works designers 
could have taken to reduce the risk was to reduce the amount of work done on site, mainly 
through increased use of some form of pre-assembly.  
  
 
Unlikely to 
have reduced 
risk
53%May have reduced risk
22%
Likely to have 
reduced risk
25%
 
Figure 10  Permanent Works designers opportunity to reduce risk 
 
4.9.2 Materials designers 
 
Materials design may also involve the permanent works designers, but is often a separate 
operation, with the permanent works designers choosing from the options offered by materials 
suppliers.  Over time, permanent works designers and other specifiers in the project team can 
influence the materials designers by continually asking for certain materials, or by ceasing to 
specify others.  However, there does not appear to be much opportunity for effective 
communication and feedback between permanent works and materials designers.  The design of 
the materials themselves and also of the packaging and delivery method have been included in 
this category.   
 
Materials designers could have reduced the risk of more than a third of the accidents (17 likely / 
18 maybe – Figure 11). 
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Unlikely to 
have reduced 
risk
65%
May have 
reduced risk
18%
Likely to have 
reduced risk
17%
 
Figure 11  Materials designers opportunity to reduce risk 
 
4.9.3 Temporary works designers 
 
Temporary works traditionally include scaffolding, formwork, falsework and support structures 
for excavations etc.  Temporary works designers are often employed by the principal contractor 
or sub-contractor rather than the permanent works design organisation.  Designs are, however, 
often checked by the permanent works design engineer.  The temporary works designers could 
have reduced the risk of more than a third of the accidents (26 likely / 10 maybe – Figure 12). 
4.9.4 Equipment designers 
 
This research has found that there appears to be little feedback or communication between the 
designers of tools, plant and equipment and others involved in the construction process.  Many 
of the accidents studied involved tools or equipment, with personal protective equipment 
included in this category. 
 
It was judged that equipment designers could have reduced the risk in 60 of the 100 accidents 
(35 likely / 25 maybe – Figure 13) through improved design of the equipment being used.  In 
some cases, the equipment involved did not appear to be the ‘best available’ and therefore a 
straightforward approach to initial risk reduction would have been selection of the best 
equipment for the task. 
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Unlikely to 
have reduced 
risk
64%
May have 
reduced risk
10%
Likely to have 
reduced risk
26%
 
Figure 12  Temporary works designers opportunity to reduce risk 
 
 
 
Unlikely to 
have reduced 
risk
40%
May have 
reduced risk
25%
Likely to have 
reduced risk
35%
 
Figure 13  Equipment designers opportunity to reduce risk 
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5 UMIST MODEL AND ACCIDENT CAUSES 
5.1 BACKGROUND TO MODEL 
One of the intentions of this project was to apply a model of causal factors developed by Suraji 
and Duff (Suraji et al, 2001) to investigate the relationship of distal factors postulated by the 
model.  There were two objectives to this:  
 
1. To test the applicability and usefulness of the model. 
2. To make use of the model in guiding the investigation of possible distal factors in the 
accidents studied. 
 
The model describes the constraints and responses experienced by all the parties involved in 
project conception, project management, design, construction management and construction, 
which may impact on accident causation, and the interactions between the parties that provides 
the mechanism, or ‘domino effect’, of these sequences of constraint and response (Figure 14).  
These constraints and responses of participants ‘upstream’ of the construction process are distal 
(sometimes called latent) factors that contrast with the proximal factors that occur in the 
immediate environment of the construction process in which the accident took place and led 
directly to the accident. 
 
The analysis here has been confined to the thirty accidents for which the most detailed data on 
distal factors were available.  Appendix F presents a brief summary of the causes identified for 
each of these accidents, followed by a short list of key words, often related to the Constraint-
Response Model.  It should be noted that the distal causes identified in this way are, in the main, 
hypothetical and, in the great majority of cases, the most that can be said is that they may have 
increased the risk of the accident happening.  This is the very nature of the Constraint-Response 
Model, or indeed any type of latent factor model: a different response by the participant 
experiencing the constraint might very possibly have avoided the accident but may, in doing so, 
have introduced alternative risks to construction personnel. 
 
The analysis has been limited to the immediate constraints and responses identified, with no 
attempt to study the situation further upstream.  For example, a failure by a designer to use, or 
even consider, an alternative form of construction, thus providing a constraint to the 
construction process, may have occurred for a variety of reasons, eg time or cost constraints 
imposed by the client; lack of understanding of the construction process and construction risks 
etc.  Detail necessary to explore these issues was not available to the research.   
5.2 APPLICATION OF MODEL 
Whilst a sample of 30 accidents is not large enough to be statistically representative, it is worthy 
of note that the causal types that dominate were Inappropriate Construction Planning and 
Inappropriate Construction Operation, each occurring 19 times (63%) (Table 16).  Inappropriate 
Operative Action also occurred frequently, on 11 occasions (37%).  The results of the original 
research (Suraji et al, 2001), using data from the HSE Focus database, are also included in the 
table and, whilst demonstrating the same three major causal factors, provide a marked contrast 
in the relative frequency of Inappropriate Construction Planning.   
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Figure 14  Constraint-response model of construction accident causation 
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There are several reasons that might explain this, relating to the origins and methods of 
collection of the data.  The most credible of these is thought to be that the data collected in this 
research set out to embrace factors upstream of the immediate environment of the accident, 
whereas data from the HSE Focus database, provided by the investigating HSE Inspector, was 
predominantly concerned with safety failures in the activity being undertaken.  This would also 
help explain the higher incidence of Inappropriate Construction Operation. 
Table 16  Analysis of causal factor types 
Type of causal factor Frequency (n=30) % % from previous 
research 
Inappropriate 
construction operation 
(ICO) 
19 63 88 
Inappropriate 
construction planning 
(ICP) 
19 63 29 
Inappropriate operative 
action (IOA) 
11 37 30 
Inappropriate 
construction control 
(ICC) 
3 10 17 
Inappropriate site 
condition (ISC) 
3 10 6 
Designer responses 3 10 n/a 
ICO / ICP 12 40 n/a 
 
 
The last row in Table 16 shows the incidence of Inappropriate Construction Operation (ICO) 
and Inappropriate Construction Planning (ICP) together.  This accounts for almost two-thirds of 
the relative frequency of each factor on its own and suggests that the majority of instances of 
Inappropriate Construction Operation might have had their origin in Construction Planning, thus 
moving the responsibility for the operational failure into the pre-construction environment. 
 
Considering the Constraint-Response areas of distal accident causation, there were only three 
(10%) instances of building or engineering designer implication (Designer Response), although 
there were many more instances where design of equipment or tools featured.  To draw firm 
conclusions from this is difficult and has the potential to seriously mislead.  This is because 
collection of data from designers on issues such as the scope for designing out the task that put 
the operative at risk proved very difficult.  The culture of the design professions still seems to 
involve a denial of responsibility for careful analysis of the methods of construction implied by 
their designs, let alone investigation of alternatives to reduce construction risk.  So exploration 
of these issues in the data collection became all but impossible. 
 
The available data did not permit investigation of any other Constraint-Response routes through 
the model.  For example, though there were instances of time pressure, a clear link with the 
accidents concerned and the origin of the time pressure, such as constraints imposed by client or 
project management, were not established.  Statistical correlation, as undertaken for proximal 
factors in the original research (Suraji, 2001), which might suggest causal links, would require a 
much larger number of cases.  
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6 DISCUSSION 
This research used a combination of focus groups and studies of 100 accidents to explore the 
complex interactions of factors that compromise safety in the construction industry.  The focus 
groups collected opinions of industry stakeholders, while the accident studies sought to provide 
verification of the issues raised by the focus groups.   
 
Similarly to previous work (HSE, 1978, 1988; Whittington et al, 1992), the investigation has 
documented the pattern of involvement of the immediate circumstances in accidents, such as 
unsafe actions by workers, poor communication, problems with site conditions, and 
shortcomings with equipment and materials.  The project has gone further, however, in seeking 
to trace the wider influences determining the presence of these proximal deficiencies.  This was 
prompted by the increasing recognition over the past decade concerning the extent and strength 
of design, management, training, and safety culture effects on construction safety (Whittington 
et al, 1992; Gyi et al, 1999; Brabazon et al, 2000; Bomel, 2001; Carpenter et al, 2001; Suraji et 
al, 2001). 
6.1 STUDY LIMITATIONS 
The 100 accidents examined for this research were a convenience sample.  In several respects, 
the distribution of accident types and their circumstances may not be representative of the true 
pattern of accidents across the construction industry.  Through necessity, the study focussed on 
less serious incidents.  It was agreed with HSE at the outset of the research that it would be 
necessary to avoid accidents that were or might become subject to HSE investigation.  This was 
to make sure that evidence would not be contaminated and to avoid the possibility of the 
researchers being drawn into any legal proceedings.  Although the analysis discussed in section 
4.3 demonstrates that the outcome of many of the accidents examined could have been much 
more serious, it should be borne in mind that there may be differences in the pattern of causation 
between serious and less serious incidents.  Falls from height, for example, often result in 
multiple injuries.  Coupled with this is that working at height involves distinct work activities 
and equipment.  Through concentrating on less serious accidents, factors involved in accidents 
such as falls from height may not be fully represented in the present study findings. 
 
This research depended significantly on the goodwill of construction organisations.  This was 
firstly in their drawing accidents to the research team’s attention, and then in allowing access to 
sites and personnel for interview.  Efforts to interest smaller companies in the project had only 
partial success, the consequence of this being that most accidents available to the research came 
from larger sites, through the principal contractors.  While Table 10 and Table 11 indicate that a 
good spread of accidents was achieved across construction sectors and accident categories, there 
are areas of construction underrepresented in the study.  Although accidents to self-employed 
workers or those working for small sub-contractors were included, these were almost all within 
the context of the operations of a large principal contractor.  The study has not encompassed the 
small builders, working in isolation, generally regarded as having an especially poor health and 
safety record. 
 
A methodological difficulty encountered in examining off-site or upstream influences on the 
100 accidents was that key individuals, such as the relevant designers, other head office 
personnel, and equipment or materials manufacturers/suppliers proved difficult to identify and 
then to arrange to interview.  Where this was achieved, the interviews did not always reveal as 
much as might have been hoped for, due to defensiveness on the part of the interviewee or 
because they were surprised to be asked questions about an accident in which they did not 
perceive they had played any role.  While this lack of acknowledgement of influence is an 
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interesting finding in its own right, it resulted in a decision being taken mid-way through the 
research to move to more accident-independent investigation of the wider influences on the 
accident cases.  This entailed interviewing a range of individuals competent to comment on the 
issues that emerged from the accident studies.  This approach still provided valuable insight into 
accident causation, although the direct linkages between cause and outcome within each 
incident become lost.  Even where accident-dependent analysis had been possible, the nature of 
the off-site or upstream influences meant that suggestions of causation in individual accidents 
could usually only be speculative. 
6.2 NATURE OF CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENTS 
All accidents are multi-causal, with a rare combination of factors needing to coincide to give 
rise to an incident.  Underlying each of the causal factors are a range of influences determining 
the extent to which they undermine safety.  Operatives’ actions, for example, are influenced by 
their attitudes towards safety, their knowledge and skills, and their alertness and health.  These, 
in turn, are affected by peer pressure, education and training, working hours, payment schemes, 
previous injuries or ill-health, and so on.  The existence of hazards on site is a consequence of 
influences such as planning and preparation, supervision, housekeeping, project management 
and safety culture.  Considering materials and equipment, the suitability, usability, condition 
and ultimately safety of these are a result of their design, selection and then availability and 
supply. 
 
Figure 15 summarises the influences identified by this research which operate to cause 
construction accidents.  The diagram indicates that accidents arise due to a failure in the 
interaction between workers, their workplace, and the materials and equipment (including tools 
and PPE) that they use.  This immediate failure is precipitated by various shaping factors, which 
may be grouped under the headings of worker factors, site factors or material/equipment factors.  
These shaping factors are a result of originating influences, such as the permanent works design, 
project management, construction processes, safety culture and risk management.  Client 
requirements, the economic climate in which the construction takes place, and the construction 
education which all parties have received bear upon these.  The application of these factors in 
actual accidents is illustrated in Vignettes 1-4. 
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Figure 15  Hierarchy of influences in construction accidents 
 
accident
work team workplace
materials equipment
actions 
behaviour 
capabilities 
communication
layout/space 
lighting/noise 
hot/cold/wet 
local hazards
suitability 
usability 
condition 
attitudes/motivations 
knowledge/skills 
supervision 
health/fatigue 
site constraints 
work scheduling 
housekeeping 
design 
specification 
supply/availability 
Immediate 
Accident 
Circumstances
Shaping Factors
permanent works design, project management, construction processes 
safety culture, risk management 
client requirements, economic climate, construction education 
Originating Influences
Shaping Factors
permanent works design, project management, construction processes 
safety culture, risk management 
client requirements, economic climate, construction education 
Originating Influences
W
or
ke
r F
ac
to
rs
 
Si
te
 F
ac
to
rs
 
Material/
Equipment 
Factors 
  60
Vignette 1 – Accident 12 
 
 
Accident background and information 
An engineer’s assistant, aged 18, injured groin and back, whilst directing the end of a concrete pump pipe 
into a waste hopper during ‘blow-down’ at the end of a Saturday shift.  “Cleaning out concrete pump.  
Cleaning ball from concrete pump discharged rapidly and caused pipe to move suddenly”  
(quote from accident report). 
 
The key aspects of this accident map across the hierarchy of influences as follows: 
 Immediate Accident Circumstances  
 Shaping Factors  
 Originating Influences 
 
Work team  (Immediate Accident Circumstance) 
Actions and behaviours of IP and partner were mistaken.  Neither had the skills or knowledge required 
and the supervision seems to have been lax.  In particular, the IP was an engineer’s assistant who is 
unlikely to have had the capabilities, nor any experience or training in manual handling in any of the tasks 
involved with the concrete pump operation.  There was poor communication between operatives involved 
and with the supervisor who was positioned on another floor (where the concrete pour was taking place).  
The IP was unaware of the correct procedures.  These factors suggest that the supervision, project 
management and construction processes were not effective. 
 
As the work was being done on a ‘job-and-finish’ basis on a Saturday, there is a strong suggestion that the 
motivation was to finish quickly.  All involved with the pour had limited access to work breaks which 
may have caused fatigue and contributed to the incident. 
 
Workplace  (Immediate Accident Circumstance) 
There were restrictions in the working space in the task area.   
 
Equipment  (Immediate Accident Circumstance) 
The suitability of the concrete pump equipment may have been a factor as the pipes and the hopper 
appeared to be unstable during the ‘blow-down’ procedure.  The concrete pump manufacturers stated that 
the preferable method for ‘blow-down’ was to use water rather than compressed air although this was 
rarely done on site.  There was little consideration of human interaction in the pump design and the 
designers had no knowledge of accidents involving their equipment. 
 
The fitter/drivers of the concrete pumps were trained, and the pump supplier offers to stay on site during 
the first few hours to check that the operatives are competent.  However, it is not clear whether this offer 
had been taken up on the day of this accident. 
 
Risk Management (Originating Influences) 
There was no risk assessment for the ‘blow-down’ task. 
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Vignette 2 – Accident 36 
 
 
Accident background and information 
A plumber, aged 34, fell, whilst working above a suspended ceiling connecting pipe work.  “Whilst 
climbing down from a mobile aluminium scaffold the IP banged his left elbow on the aluminium 
strengthener around the access / egress hatch causing a fracture to the left elbow”   
(quote from accident report). 
 
The key aspects of this accident map across the hierarchy of influences as follows: 
 Immediate Accident Circumstances  
 Shaping Factors  
 Originating Influences 
 
Work team  (Immediate Accident Circumstance) 
Actions and behaviours of the IP mainly relate to his unfamiliarity with harness use resulting from a lack 
of knowledge and skill.  The supervisor was unsure of what the IP was doing. 
 
Workplace  (Immediate Accident Circumstance) 
Access for works above suspending services is a common challenge for fit-out works.  The scaffold tower 
platform level was incompatible with the ceiling level and services installation task.  Correct handrails 
could not be installed with the platform at the correct height.   
 
Equipment  (Immediate Accident Circumstance) 
The suitability of the access tower was questionable in that the platform and handrail could not be 
installed at the correct height to suit the task being done.  The platform manufacturer advised that towers 
with alternative module heights are available (so that different heights can be achieved), but are rarely 
asked for.  The suppliers claimed that there was no feedback from construction users on user issues or 
accidents that occurred.  There were some issues regarding the tower access hatch design and human 
interaction.   
 
There are also possible suitability, usability and design issues for the harness manufacturers to reduce the 
likelihood of the harness snagging on adjacent works.  It is questionable whether the harness and lanyard 
being used would have prevented injury had the operative fallen from the tower platform due to the fall 
distance for the restraint to be effective. 
 
Risk Management (Originating Influences) 
There was no risk assessment for this situation.  The harness had been worn as a response to the perceived 
risk after the handrail could not be installed. 
 
Permanent Works Design (Originating Influences) 
The design and use of pre-assembled above-ceiling services would have significantly reduced or even 
removed the risk of this accident. 
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Vignette 3 – Accident 75 
 
 
Accident background and information 
“IP trod on a half-brick and turned his right ankle, which has swollen.  The ground is made up with 
crushed brick material and it is inherent that these materials will be loose” 
(quote from accident report). 
 
The key aspects of this accident map across the hierarchy of influences as follows: 
 Immediate Accident Circumstances  
 Shaping Factors  
 Originating Influences 
 
Work Place and Materials (Immediate Accident Circumstances) 
Clearly the work place was a causal factor with a local hazard being the brick rubble that was the 
specified material for the hardcore fill.  The accident record commented that brick rubble is inherently 
‘loose’ and apparently, two other employees had fallen due to the nature of the brick fill that week.  The 
IP stated that there were “big lumps coming through the re-cycling system”. He also added: “the problem 
is not just on this site - I was on a site similar to this and the same thing was happening”.  
Notwithstanding this experience, nothing seemed to have been done about the risk. 
 
The IP was walking across site when the accident happened, he stated that there was “plenty of room” and 
considered that the housekeeping was “generally very good”, however, the trip hazard does not appear to 
have been covered in the risk assessment.  There also do not seem to have been any designated walkways 
across the site which could have reduced the risk of tripping. 
 
Design  (Originating Influence) 
The IP stated that “basically the machine doesn’t chop it up fine enough - perhaps the designers need to 
look at the specification for this type of recycled hardcore.”  It is unclear whether this characteristic is 
well understood by designers and therefore whether its suitability should have been considered in the 
specification.  The project was design and build so there would, in theory at least, have been the 
opportunity for construction input to the design.  It is acknowledged that the use of re-cycled demolition 
rubble as hardcore fill is considered very desirable from a sustainability point of view. 
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Vignette 4 – Accident 77 
 
Accident background and information 
“The IP was putting a roof-trussed rafter up.  He walked backwards along the working platform of the 
scaffold.  At some point he stepped into a void in the platform created by two missing scaffold battens.  
Unknown persons had removed these.  The IP knew they were missing and perceived this as hazardous 
but took no action to rectify it.  The IP fell through the void injuring his ribs” 
(quote from accident report). 
 
The key aspects of this accident map across the hierarchy of influences as follows: 
 Immediate Accident Circumstances  
 Shaping Factors  
 Originating Influences 
 
Workplace  (Immediate Accident Circumstances) 
The condition and usability of the workplace were major factors in this incident.  The IP, an apprentice 
carpenter, described the accident: “I was working on the scaffolding putting the roof trusses on with Joe  
(his mentor carpenter).  There were some boards missing.  I stood backwards and I fell through about 2 
feet, hurting my side.”  The remedial action was the safety manager had the boards replaced and the 
scaffold checked.  There were no obvious changes made to the construction processes. 
 
There were indications that the weather was wet and windy.  This task involved a complex crane lift and 
it is not clear whether the site conditions were a direct factor.  It is also not clear whether there was 
sufficient space on the scaffold for the operation. 
 
Work team  (Immediate Accident Circumstances) 
The site manager’s description was “in my opinion this was self-inflicted.  The system of work was not 
carried out, the scaffold boards had been moved by unknown parties which they (IP and mentor) knew 
about.  The IP fell through the boards - he was very lucky he wasn’t hurt more”.  In the interviews the 
whole issue of the boards being removed was passed from trade to trade and no one admitted to it.  These 
comments suggest deficiencies in communication, supervision and attitudes, which in turn illustrate a 
poor safety culture. 
 
The IP was being trained ‘on-the-job’ and his mentor was on piecework.  It may have been that he was 
tempted to work when unsafe, although there is no specific evidence to this effect. 
 
Risk Management  (Originating Influences) 
The IP stated that he had “never seen a method statement”.  The site manger said that “the safety manager 
prepared the method statement and risk assessment, normally as one document” which is then stored in 
the site office.  He added that the MS’s were typically “very generic” although the site operatives are 
“consulted over complex methods”. 
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6.3 IMMEDIATE ACCIDENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
The causal analysis presented in Table 15 demonstrates that, not surprisingly, the actions of 
individuals and site hazards featured in many of the accidents.  It was interesting, however, that 
many of the accidents occurred ‘off-task’, either during preparatory activities or when 
individuals were moving around site.  Also noteworthy was the high prevalence of material and 
equipment factors as accident causes, although it is possible the incidence of these within the 
sample may have been affected by the concentration of the research on ‘minor’ accidents.  In 
these cases,  deficiencies with material or equipment design, or their actual condition at the time 
of the accident, contributed to the failure.  In many situations, the safety of those needing to 
handle the materials or use the equipment appeared to have been given little consideration by 
those responsible for their design, supply or purchase.   
6.4 SHAPING FACTORS 
Figure 15 categorises the intermediate factors affecting the immediate accident circumstances as 
worker factors, site factors or material and equipment factors. 
6.4.1 Worker factors 
Attitudes towards safety 
Attitudes towards safety by those working in construction have no doubt developed over the 
past five years or so, with the increased attention there has been from regulatory authorities (eg 
HSE) and larger contractors.  On the one hand, workers do not want to be injured themselves or 
be responsible for injuring others.  On the other, the accident studies demonstrate that workers 
often engage in unsafe acts.  It is suggested that the reasons for this are three fold:  
 safety being overlooked in the context of heavy workloads and other priorities 
 taking shortcuts to save effort and time 
 inaccurate perception of risk, with feelings of invulnerability and ‘it won’t happen to 
me’   
Underlying each of these are inadequate safety knowledge, pointing to deficiencies with 
education and training. 
Developing safety knowledge and skills 
A distinction should be made between education and training.  Education imparts high level 
knowledge and skills, transferable to different situations.  Training is more context specific, 
dealing with procedures or rules for undertaking particular tasks or activities.  Effective 
education equips individuals with the ability to analyse a situation and respond accordingly.  
Training, however, provides more directive instruction as to how an act should be performed.  A 
combination of both is desirable.   
 
Training features widely in the industry at the moment, in varying forms and levels of formality.  
However, our interviews suggest the effectiveness of this is questionable when it comes to 
health and safety.  Safety training is delivered by rote, by trainers with a poor understanding of 
what they are doing.  Site inductions and tool box talks are examples of situations where this 
occurs.  It is no surprise that such training fails to engage its recipients and this may well be 
harmful in the negative attitudes instilled towards safety.  Where learning takes place ‘on the 
job’, this is likely to disseminate and perpetuate bad habits.  Little exists by way of health and 
safety education for those at supervisory, managerial or professional levels, let alone for site 
operatives. 
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Supervision 
Previous research has identified the important influence front line supervisors have on safety.  It 
has long been argued that the supervisor, or front-line manager, is a key individual in accident 
prevention, having daily contact with staff and the opportunity to control unsafe conditions and 
acts likely to cause accidents (Heinrich et al, 1980; Chew, 1988; Simard and Marchand 1994).  
The literature suggests that the important aspects of supervisory behaviour in this respect 
include: attitudes and approaches to safety and training, nature and extent of interaction with 
employees, and thoroughness and willingness to learn from accident investigation.  
 
The 100 accident studies suggest that front line supervisors in construction undertake very 
limited safety-related activity.  Indeed, it was apparent from the interviews that construction 
supervisors frequently have little safety awareness and a poor understanding of accident 
causation and prevention.  This is not surprising given the lack of safety education discussed in 
the preceding section.  Coupled with this is the perceived conflicting priority of meeting project 
deadlines and a lack of positive incentives for individuals in a supervisory role to give safety 
their attention.  In practice, working safely often means working efficiently and coincides with 
good project and work management (Strategic Forum for Construction, 2002). 
Health and fatigue 
The problems with the health monitoring of construction workers is widely recognised (Gyi et 
al, 1998; HSE, 2002).  For operatives, in particular, there is rarely any effective pre-employment 
screening or health surveillance.  This is in the context of physically demanding work, with 
inherent health risks.  As demonstrated by this research, the consequence of this is workers on 
site with health problems, having accidents because of this.  These accidents are then subject to 
inadequate treatment and rehabilitation before individuals return to work. 
 
It is also apparent from this research that construction workers work long hours (Table 13).  
This might be the result of paid overtime for operatives or, in the case of managerial or 
professional staff, regarded as necessary due to a high work load.  Although few direct linkages 
were found in the accident studies between tiredness or fatigue and specific failures, some 
accident-involved individuals had been working very long periods without a break, or several 
long days without a day off.  The consequences of tiredness and fatigue are reduced 
concentration, poor decision making and compromised safety.  This does not appear to be 
widely recognised in the industry. 
Communication 
Language difficulties were rarely an obvious factor in the accident studies (an exception being 
accident 22).  However, it does seem likely that a poor command of spoken English could 
impair safety (as well as productivity) in situations where coordination is required.  Language 
abilities appear to be assessed only informally (if at all) when individuals are recruited for work, 
with no explicit consideration of the implications for safety. 
 
In other instances, poor communication within work teams contributed to incidents.  In some 
cases this was due to the physical distance between work colleagues or high levels of 
background noise.  This is likely to be a function of work planning as well as education and 
training.  In situations where the importance of communication and coordination can be 
recognised in advance, technological solutions, making use of compact, wearable 2-way radio 
devices, might be worth trialling. 
 
Problems with communication also arose at an organisational level.  The fire in accident 23 
happened due to deficient communications with the gas supplier, who had apparently given 
confirmation that the gas supply was off in properties undergoing renovation.  The 
communication problems were compounded by poor safety procedures, which allowed the 
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communication failure to go unchecked.  An observation made here is that in some 
circumstances, undue reliance is placed on informal communication, when the safety risk is 
such that a much more robust safe system of work ought to be in place.   
6.4.2 Site factors 
Local hazards on site were a feature in many of the 100 accidents studied.  Problems included 
fall hazards, such as trailing cables, uneven ground or debris, and muddy conditions.  Other 
accidents involved injury from protruding hazards such as nails or scaffolding components.  
These were often coupled with a lack of clearly defined walkways and poor housekeeping. 
 
It was striking to the non-construction members of the research team how poor the situation is in 
these respects on most construction sites, even those considered to be ‘well run’ by industry 
standards.  Industry representatives respond to this criticism, arguing that difficult site 
conditions are inevitable given the constantly changing workplace and work activities that occur 
in construction.  However, pointing to the improved performance in site management on some 
engineering construction projects counters this perspective.  From the perspective of those 
familiar with safety in a wide range of other industries, the poor site conditions found in 
construction appear to be a symptom of the weak safety and risk management culture in the 
industry.   
 
Site constraints, typically inadequate space or difficult access to perform a task, were identified 
as a causal factor in some accident studies.  In one of the more serious cases (11), insufficient 
room to extend stabilisers led to a delivery vehicle overturning.  In this case, as in most of the 
others where site constraints were involved, inadequate planning coupled with poor local 
assessment of risk were probably key contributors to the incident. 
 
Problems associated with outdoor working are frequently cited as one of the unusual aspects of 
construction, affecting the safety record of the industry.  However, the weather appeared to be a 
factor in only a small number of the accident studies, despite the data collection for the research 
spanning the seasons. 
6.4.3 Material and equipment factors 
Materials 
Several of the accidents involved hazards connected with materials.  Hazards were either 
inherent to the materials, as with the extremely heavy 140kg steel angles in accident 5, or due to 
problems with the way the materials were supplied, for example the steel banding around 
plywood in accident 9.  The point has been made previously that materials packaging can also 
cause problems with disposal, leading to other hazards being introduced onto site (eg fall or fire 
hazards). 
 
Suppliers have paid attention to the manual handling requirements of some materials, through 
the introduction of smaller cement bags, for example.  Unfortunately, this approach does not 
seem to have extended far, even with widely used generic items.  There are situations where 
alternatives are available, but not in use due to reasons of custom and practice, cost or 
availability.  In accident 1, an operative was carrying a reel of rebar tie wire, which caught on an 
obstacle and hit the individual in the eye when it released.  The operative mentioned that he had 
worked on sites abroad where the tie wire came in convenient dispensing canisters, but that he 
had not seen these in the UK. 
 
There are many situations where modest changes to materials or the way in which they are 
supplied could improve safety.  However, at present, purchasers are not using safety as a 
criterion.  Without this, suppliers have no encouragement to be innovative. 
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Equipment and tools 
Similar issues exist with equipment and tools as with materials.  A number of the accidents 
featured scaffolding.  Some of the incidents involved falls through the scaffold, or problems 
when negotiating the opening from one level to the next.  It is interesting that injuries in several 
accidents arose from individuals striking their head or other body parts against scaffolding 
protrusions.  Scaffolding strike hazards arise from the manner in which scaffolding is 
assembled, either due to poor configuration, site constraints or equipment limitations.  Accident 
study follow-up work attempted to explore what scaffolding design alternatives exist or are 
under development that could alleviate some of the indirect hazards arising from scaffolding.  
Unfortunately, the research team was not able to obtain relevant information from scaffolding 
manufacturers or suppliers as they were either unwilling or unable to comment.  Although the 
design of scaffold towers, in terms of their convenience for erection and use, has received some 
attention, there is little evidence that ergonomics aspects of traditional scaffolding have been 
examined.  This is another opportunity for modest innovation. 
 
Discussions with interviewees in the accident studies revealed that tools are usually selected on 
the basis of price and performance.  Durability may sometimes be a consideration but usability 
and safety do not appear to be purchasing factors.  A number of the accidents featured tools or 
equipment that was in poor condition.  It is to be expected that shared equipment, having 
multiple users, will be subject to heavy wear and tear.  In such circumstances, scheduled 
inspection and maintenance are important, although there was little evidence of this in practice. 
PPE 
Despite a wide reliance on PPE as a control measure, this study again highlights the problems 
with such equipment.  Much of the PPE found in use on construction sites at present is 
uncomfortable and interferes with the wearer’s ability to perform their work.  It is incongruous 
that in some instances the PPE itself resulted in significant accidents.  In two cases (36 and 79), 
safety harnesses caught on surrounding items, causing an arm fracture in one accident and a 
back injury in another. 
 
Problems with PPE mean that it is often only used when compulsory and where this is enforced.  
There are improved designs available, but these can be difficult to obtain and carry a higher 
cost.   
 
A number of interviews raised the suggestion that a form of risk homeostasis might be 
operating, where provision of PPE, such as harnesses, makes workers feel safer, therefore 
leading them to take greater risk.  Although the nature and extent of this remain to be 
confirmed, there is anecdotal evidence that in some situations this might be happening.  This 
emphasises the important message that despite the current focus of risk management in the 
industry on PPE, it should only be a last resort.  Elimination or reduction of the risk through 
other means, eg design, should be the priority.  
 
There is a significant opportunity with the design of materials and equipment to improve safety, 
with many of the problems relatively straightforward to overcome.  However, this will need 
much better liaison within the supply-purchase chain.  The manner in which this operates at 
present appears to stifle developments. 
6.5 ORIGINATING INFLUENCES 
The originating influences in construction accidents are the high level determinates of the 
nature, extent and existence of the immediate causes of accidents.  Elsewhere, these influences 
have sometimes been referred to using terminology such as ‘root causes’.  It seems very clear 
that these influences do affect safety on construction sites.  However, this research has 
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demonstrated that the effects of these influences are subtle and that it is very difficult to trace 
through to these when exploring the causation of an individual incident.  Hence the different 
vocabulary used in this report. 
Permanent works design 
Since European Directive 92/57/EEC was implemented in the UK, giving rise to the CDM 
regulations (HSC, 2001b), construction design has been a focus for those concerned with 
construction safety.  Much of the attention, however, has been on compliance with the 
requirements of the regulations and the prescribed procedures.  This in itself has not yet 
delivered the significant safety benefits expected from the legislation.  There are of course 
complex reasons behind this. 
 
Elimination or reduction of risks through design or alternative methods of construction is highly 
desirable.  Frequently, construction design and construction process are interlinked, with the 
process being dictated by the design and decisions from the design team.  Taking this into 
account, this research has found that up to half of the 100 accidents examined could have been 
mitigated through a design change.  In many of the cases, this could have been by pre-assembly, 
with the construction work being moved off-site.  An example of this is accident 92, where an 
electrician was installing cables in a ceiling void and suffered a deep cut to his arm from an 
exposed metal ceiling grid.  An improved design would have avoided sharp protrusions, making 
allowance for installation and subsequent maintenance tasks.  Moreover, pre-assembly of the 
above-ceiling services would have allowed the operation to be performed at a more convenient 
working height, without the workspace limitations encountered on site.  It is recognised 
however, that pre-assembly may introduce risks elsewhere, and research currently in progress 
by the APaCHe team at Loughborough is seeking to compare and contrast these1. 
 
A significant finding from the follow-up investigations was that although some members of the 
construction design community are fervent advocates of designing for safety, these are the 
exception rather than the rule.  Many designers are still failing to acknowledge their influence 
on the safety of the construction process.  Where recognition of influence does exist, other 
conflicting priorities are cited, such as client requirements and cost.  Underlying this response 
by designers is deep-seated custom and practice and an absence of safety education and training 
(Carpenter et al, 2000).  Some interviewees mentioned that, in their experience, design and build 
project arrangements allowed many of the barriers to designing with safety in mind to be 
overcome.  This is because the contractual arrangements place the responsibility for both design 
and construction elements within a single project team, leading to shared goals, improved 
communication, and a better environment for new ideas to flourish.  Although it appears 
intuitive that such arrangements should help address some of the problems with the 
conventional project structure described herein, it was not possible to examine the detailed pros 
and cons of different contractual arrangement within this research. 
 
Although half of the accident studies might have been prevented by design, the corollary is that 
half could not.  The proportions here might be subject to sampling bias, due to selection of less 
serious accidents but, nonetheless, many of the incidents were caused by commonplace hazards 
and activities that will continue to occur on site whatever design changes might be made.  The 
widespread presence of the many generic safety risks accompanying construction needs to be 
tackled before the benefits of design improvements will be realised. 
                                                     
1 ‘The effect of standardisation and pre-assembly on health, safety and accident causality in the construction 
industry’, funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, due for completion summer 2003 
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Construction processes 
As a part of each accident study, the relevant method statements were requested, with 
consideration then given to how the incident mapped on to these.  It is interesting to note the 
significant proportion of accidents for which no method statement was applicable.  This was 
often because the accident happened away from any particular construction task, while the 
accident-involved individual was moving around site or engaged in an activity regarded as a 
core skill. 
 
As indicated above, construction processes are often a function of the permanent works design.  
There are many aspects of the construction process, though, which are left to the discretion of 
site personnel.  This is fine detail beyond that specified in the design instructions.  It was 
apparent from the interviews that tension exists over precisely where the boundary should lie in 
the division of responsibility between the design and contractor teams.  Whoever does assumes 
responsibility, an important finding from the accident studies is that safety currently does not 
receive adequate consideration in the decision making.  This research found no evidence that 
sources of advice which assist with risk evaluation had been used, for example guidance 
published by CIRIA on the risks associated with alternative designs and construction methods 
(Ove Arup & Partners, 1997). 
Project management 
A clear influence from problems with project management were identified in only a quarter of 
the accident studies, although this is likely to have been because the precise effects are difficult 
to corroborate.  This research supports previous findings (Gyi et al, 1999) regarding the negative 
implications for safety that arise from the sub-contracting arrangements within the industry.  
This leads to problems with blurred responsibility and difficulties with communication between 
one contractor and another.   
 
Current difficulties with labour supply for the industry were said to affect the ability to appoint 
appropriately skilled workers, this in turn affecting safety.  Although there were instances in the 
accident studies where workers had been reckless, there were few cases where it was obvious 
that the accident-involved individuals did not have the necessary skills for the work (although 
there were some).  Rather than deficiencies in the skills needed for their specific tasks, the 
problems appear to lie more in a widespread poor level of safety awareness.  Current methods of 
addressing this, for example site inductions and toolbox talks frequently do little to improve the 
position and in some instances may make matters worse, through cultivating a negative attitude 
towards health and safety.   
 
It is likely that the problems with labour supply account for the cases within the studies where 
accident-involved individuals had a poor command of spoken English, as discussed previously 
in section 6.4.1. 
 
Deficiencies in project management and planning can lead to difficulties with the project 
schedule.  These in turn result in time pressure on all involved within a project, with subsequent 
problems such as trade overlap, crowded workspaces and reduced attention to detail.  Around 
1 in 10 of the accident studies were in the context of project scheduling problems.  Although a 
feature of these incidents, the extent to which this may have been causal is uncertain. 
Safety culture and risk management 
It is not particularly surprising that Table 15 should identify deficiencies in risk management in 
most of the 100 accidents studied.  Accidents invariably involve an inadequately controlled risk, 
indicative of a management failing.  Echoing the findings of previous research, it is again 
noteworthy that most of the 100 accidents studied for this research could have been foreseen 
and were preventable. 
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Frequently, no risk assessment existed for the accident activities, despite this being a legal 
requirement, even for activities ‘off-task’.  Even where risk assessments did exist, these often 
formed part of a method statement, the applicability of which to actual work circumstances was 
often limited.  This is indicative of a poor safety culture within the industry. 
 
The evidence from the accident studies leads to the conclusion that there is a pervasive failure of 
the industry to engage in effective risk management.  Where risk assessment had been 
attempted, this was largely a paper exercise, unlikely to have any real effect.  Elsewhere, an 
over reliance on PPE as a control is used as a substitute for eliminating hazards and reducing 
risks through more direct means.  When accidents do happen, there is limited accident 
investigation, undertaken for the wrong reasons.  The findings of these frequently contain an 
over attribution to ‘chance’, and a tendency for over apportionment of ‘blame’.  Another 
important shortcoming of the accident investigation processes in the industry is an absence of 
effective remedial action. 
 
Achieving real safety improvements in construction will require effort at all levels directed at 
the active identification and control of risks.  Although risk management is not always 
undertaken thoroughly in other industries, the widespread deficiencies of this in construction are 
striking. 
High level influences 
There was little direct evidence of the influence of client requirements or the economic climate 
on the accidents studied for this research.  While these undoubtedly do affect construction 
safety, there was only one instance in our dataset where it seemed requests from clients might 
have led to an increased risk.  This was with respect to the high frequency of architect 
instructions in accident 25.  The economic climate in which construction activity takes place 
affects competition for projects, pricing, availability of labour and so forth.  All of these are 
likely to impinge on safety, but it proved difficult to make direct connections in the individual 
accidents examined by this research. 
 
Problems with education and training have been discussed in section 6.4.1, in connection with 
site-based personnel.  When it comes to the education and training of architects, designers, 
engineers and surveyors, other research commissioned by HSE (Carpenter et al, 2000) has 
identified that the provision of health and safety education in construction related university 
degrees is poor.  This was, however, in the face of inadequate requirements for health and safety 
education by the accreditation bodies which regulate the professions.  A need exists across the 
industry, encompassing designers and suppliers as well as site based personnel, to raise 
awareness and understanding of the generic health and safety risks that are commonplace in 
construction. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 FULFILMENT OF RESEARCH AIMS 
Accidents in construction, as with accidents elsewhere, are the multi-causal outcome of a 
sequence of events.  Acknowledging this complex aetiology, the aims of this research were: 
 
1. To collect rich, detailed data on the full range of factors involved in a large sample of 
construction accidents. 
 
2. Using this information, to describe the processes of accident causation, including the 
contribution of management, project, site and individual factors in construction industry 
accidents. 
 
A series of initial focus groups held with industry stakeholders allowed the wide range of issues 
considered by participants to be involved in construction safety to be identified.  These factors 
were then examined in detail through studies of 100 accidents.  The accident sample 
encompassed a broad range of construction activities, site conditions and accident types.  For 
pragmatic reasons, the accident studies had to be confined to less serious incidents, although the 
analysis presented in section 4.3 and Appendix C demonstrates that almost all of the accidents 
had the potential to be much more serious. 
7.2 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
This research has demonstrated how construction accidents arise from a failure in the interaction 
between workers, their workplace and the materials and equipment they are using (Figure 15).  
Each of these elements is affected by various shaping factors, varying the extent to which risks 
may be present and controlled in the work activity.  For example, the design, specification and 
supply/availability of materials and equipment affect the suitability, usability, condition and 
ultimately safety of items and supplies that find their way into the hands of operatives.  In turn, 
originating influences, including the permanent works design, construction processes and safety 
culture bear upon these shaping factors.   
 
The research has found that: 
 
 Problems arising from workers or the work team, especially worker actions or behaviour 
and worker capabilities, were judged to have contributed to over two thirds (70%) of the 
accidents.  This points to inadequate supervision, education and training. 
 
 Poor communication within work teams contributed to some accidents, due to the physical 
distance between work colleagues or high levels of background noise. 
  
 In many cases, the accident occurred when those involved were not actually performing a 
construction task, but moving around site, for example.   
 
 Workplace factors, most notably poor housekeeping and problems with the site layout and  
space availability, were considered to have contributed in half (49%) of the accident studies.  
Standards of housekeeping and workplace layout with respect to safety are low in 
construction when compared with other industrial sectors. 
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 Despite poor weather often being cited as one of the reasons for construction having a poor 
safety record, this research found little evidence in support of this. 
 
 Shortcomings with equipment, including PPE, were identified in over half (56%) of the 
incidents.  Poor equipment design and inappropriate use of equipment for the task were 
prominent aspects of this.  Designers, suppliers and purchasers of equipment appear to give 
insufficient attention to the safety of users. 
 
 Deficiencies with the suitability and condition of materials, including packaging, featured in 
more than a quarter (27%) of incidents.  The operation of the supply/purchase chain at 
present appears to act as a barrier to innovation as far as safety is concerned.  
 
 Originating influences, especially inadequacies with risk management, were considered to 
have been present in almost all (94%) of the accidents.   
 
 Frequently, no risk assessment had been undertaken covering the circumstances involved in 
the accident.  Where a risk assessment had been carried out, it was often found to be 
superficial and unlikely to have prevented the accident.  
 
 It appears that PPE is relied upon habitually as a substitute for risk elimination or reduction 
at source. 
 
 It was judged that up to half of the 100 accidents could have been mitigated through a 
design change and it was found that, despite CDM, many designers are still failing to 
address the safety implications of their designs and specifications. 
 
 Accident investigation by employers or supervising contractors is frequently superficial and 
of little value as far as improving safety is concerned.  It appears that HSE investigations 
generally focus on safety failures in the activity being undertaken, without capturing the 
upstream influences upon these. 
 
 The influence from clients on safety appeared limited in the construction sectors 
predominant in this research (civil engineering, major building, residential).  This was, 
again, despite the responsibilities on clients imposed by CDM. 
 
 Many of the incidents were caused by commonplace hazards and activities that will 
continue to occur on site whatever design changes might be made.  The widespread 
presence of the many generic safety risks accompanying construction needs to be tackled 
before the benefits of design improvements will be realised. 
 
Together, these factors point to failings in education, training and safety culture in the industry.  
A large majority of those working in construction, both on and off site, continue to have only a 
superficial appreciation of health and safety considerations. 
7.3 WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
Achieving a significant and sustained reduction in accidents will require attention at all levels of 
the hierarchy of causation described by this research.  Important points are: 
 
 Responsibility for safety needs to be owned and integrated across the project team, from 
designers and engineers through to skilled trades personnel and operatives.   
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 Other research has shown how the lead given by front line supervisors has a strong 
influence on safety performance.  Worker participation in managing safety is important, to 
generate ideas and to build ownership and responsibility. 
 
 Where safety depends on communication and coordination, it is important that a robust safe 
system of work is established. 
 
 A step change is required with standards of site layout and housekeeping.  principal 
contractors should raise expectations of what constitutes acceptable practice. 
 
 Greater attention should be given to the design and selection of tools, equipment and 
materials.  Safety, rather than price, should be the paramount consideration. 
 
 There needs to be greater sophistication with the design and use of PPE.  Current PPE is 
often uncomfortable and impedes performance.  Forcing workers to wear PPE when risks 
are not present is counterproductive.  PPE should be a last rather than first resort for risk 
management. 
 
 There is a need across the industry for proper engagement with risk assessment and risk 
management.  Emphasis should be on actively assessing and controlling risk, rather than 
treating risk assessment as merely a paper exercise. 
  
 Construction should be encouraged to benchmark its safety practices against other 
industries.  The excuse that construction is ‘different’ in some way does not stand up to 
scrutiny. 
 
 Greater opportunity should be taken to learn from failures, with implementation of accident 
investigation procedures, both by employers and HSE, structured to reveal contributing 
factors earlier in the causal chain. 
 
 It is important that ‘safety’ is disassociated from ‘bureaucracy’. 
 
 Frequently, safety does not have to come at a price.  Where there are cost implications, 
however, regulatory bodies and trade associations should work to make sure there is a level 
playing field. 
 
Most of these changes depend on achieving widespread improvement in understanding of health 
and safety.  Education is needed over training, so as to promote intelligent knowledge rather 
than unthinking rule-based attention to safety. 
 
Since this research commenced in the autumn of 1999, there has been welcome progress 
addressing some of these matters (eg Myers, 2003).  However, much remains to be done before 
we can expect to see a significant and enduring reduction in the number of people killed and 
injured by construction operations. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
ACCIDENT STUDY PROFORMA 
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ACCIDENT NOTIFICATION – PROFORMA 1 
 
Contact person name Telephone & fax 
number 
Email  Site / contact 
address 
    
 
Avoiding overlap with HSE investigation 
Was the accident reportable? Yes/No* 
Has HSE been notified (if applicable)? Yes/No* 
Has any HSE investigation begun? Yes/No* 
We wish to avoid overlap with 
ongoing HSE involvement.  If you 
have answered ‘YES’ to any of 
these questions, please contact us 
before completing the remainder 
of the questionnaire. 
About the accident – duplicate the record from the accident book 
  
 
Who (discipline) made the entry:  
Details of incident conditions 
Job title of IP - 
Time, month and day of week –  
Task / activity –  
Tools / materials / equipment –  
Environment – 
(conditions of light, noise, temperature etc..) 
Site location –  
(Level / area) 
Build data 
Contract type –  
(Design & build , Construction management etc..) 
Project value –  
Build type and phase* -  
Principle contractor - 
Numbers on site –  
Brown / Greenfield site -  
Site start and finish dates - 
Timeliness of build –  
(late, on-time, ahead etc..) 
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Access to accident involved personnel 
Are operatives from the accident vicinity 
available for interview?  
 
Injured party contact details 
How can we get in touch? 
 
Please provide the hospital contact details or 
name and address for further contact 
(Employer, home or new work address) 
 
 
 
Site resources  
Can copies of the following resources be provided  
(anonymise by ‘blacking out’ any detail such as names etc.. if you prefer) 
 
 The accident report 
 Method statement  
 Risk assessment  
 Site organisational chart 
 Other relevant procedures / documentation 
 
 
*BUILD TYPE  PHASE 
Engineering construction START - Demolition, site clearance, excavation,
substructure, drainage, ground-   works etc.. 
Rail and Civil Engineering MIDDLE - Structure, superstructure, cladding 
Major build END - Finishes, M&E (mechanical and
electrical), commissioning, snagging 
Residential AFTER - Maintenance 
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History of accident victims direct employer / appointer   
Is the employer: 
- a PC  
- a major SC  
- a sub-sub 
contractor  
- other 
Please specify place in chain Nature of 
business / 
speciality 
 
Number of 
employees in 
company  
 Who 
contracted the 
employing 
company 
 
Length of time 
employing 
company on this 
site 
  Has employing 
company 
previously 
worked with 
this Principle 
contractor 
 
Is there a 
history of 
previous related 
accidents and 
any subsequent 
changes? 
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Accident involved personnel – Proforma 2 
 
Accident involved profile: 
Job title: 
 
What does 
your job 
entail   
 
 
Accident data 
Accident summary: Describe what happened 
 
 
 
 
 
What action was taken afterwards to prevent recurrence? 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Environmental    
2.
1.1
 What were the site conditions at 
the time of the accident 
(ie: temp, light, noise, vibration, wet) 
 
2.
1.2
 Any measures to compensate for 
adverse conditions (ie: task lighting / 
platform etc..) 
 
 
2. Task details 
2.
2.
1 What work were you doing 
(Task description(s)) 
 
 
 
2.
2.
2 Were you undertaking a number 
of tasks simultaneously  - what 
was the time proportion at each  
 
2.
2.
3 Rate difficultness of 
this task 
1(v easy) – 2 (fairly easy) – 3 (average) – 4 (quite difficult) – 5 (v difficult) 
2.
2.
4 Did you have the skill and 
experience to undertake this task 
 
2.
2.
5 When was task training last 
received & how 
 
  82
2.
2.
6 Were there any task 
interruptions? 
 
 
2.
2.
7 Were there any known risks in 
task? (e.g. chemical, electrical, 
mechanical) 
 
2.
2.
8 Were there any unusual events or 
changes (eg. in schedule / design / 
improvisation) 
 
2.
2.
9 Was apprentice training / 
supervision in progress? 
 
2.
2.
10
 Was lone or gang work being 
undertaken 
 
 
3. Describe task / work area & interaction  
2.
3.
1 
Do you have any comments on 
height / space / movement / 
placement aspects for: 
 operatives 
 plant & material 
movement 
 
2.
3.
2 Describe plant / materials / 
tools / equipment being used: 
 
 
2.
3.
3 Which were your own and which 
were provided? 
 
2.
3.
4 
How do chose your own 
equipment ? 
* Is there a range available for 
your work task 
* Have you always used this 
product 
* Has anyone advised you that 
this is good 
* Are there specific features 
that you like 
 
2.
3.
5 
Have you ever received 
instruction / training on the 
use and maintenance of your 
own tools 
 
2.
3.
6 
Do you have any comments upon 
preferences, quality, 
maintenance, availability, 
interface, usability 
(of plant / materials / tools / equipment) 
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2.
3.
7 
Have you had specific 
information related to what you 
were using 
 Training in use 
 Information from 
suppliers 
  
2.
3.
8 
Do you have any comments on 
housekeeping: 
(standards, management, 
responsibilities for) 
(General and at time of accident) 
2.
3.
9 
Have you ever reported any 
problems about your work 
relevant to this accident? 
 
2.
3.
10
 
(i) Do you know if anyone else 
has had a similar accident 
(ii) What action was taken 
 
 Comments  
 
 
 
 
 
4. PPE 
2.
4.
1 
What protection do you use at 
work? 
 
 
 
2.
4.
2 Is it specific for this task  
 
2.
4.
3 Who provides this equipment?  
 
2.
4.
4 Have you had training in use & 
care of this equipment? 
 
2.
4.
5 
Any comments on availability, 
range for fit and function, 
comfort, usability, condition, 
storage, maintenance 
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5. Procedures / MS’s / RA’s / (PTW’s) 
2.
5.
1 Were there procedures / 
instructions for this task? 
 
 
2.
5.
2 
Concerning procedures / 
instructions  
* How did you learn about these? 
* When and where did you last 
view them 
* Did you read them in detail 
* How long did it take 
 
 
 
2.
5.
3 
Did the procedures / instructions 
tell you: 
 What to do 
 What techniques to use 
 What risks there were 
 
2.
5.
4 How easy were they to 
understand 
1(v easy) – 2 (fairly easy) – 3 (average) – 4 (quite difficult) – 5 (v difficult) 
2.
5.
5 
For your work was the 
information: 
 helpful 
 appropriate  
 
2.
5.
6 
Were procedures followed or 
were other work methods 
necessary 
 
 
Comments  
 
 
 
 
 
6. Work scheduling  
2.
6.
1 
How frequently do you 
do this task? 
 
2.
6.
2 
Did you have 
sufficient time to 
do this task? 
 
2.
6.
3 
How long had you been 
doing this task before 
the accident 
happened? 
 
2.
6.
4 
How long had you 
been working 
(general) since 
your last break? 
 
2.
6.
5 When was your last 
day off work prior to 
the accident day? 
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7. Welfare  
2.
7.
1 Are your breaks 
adequate? 
 
2.
7.
2 
Are comfort breaks 
permitted (ie: toilet 
/ drink of water)? 
 
2.
7.
3 
What do you think of 
your welfare facilities 
(ie: food, drink, loos, 
changing)?  
 
 
Comments  
 
 
 
 
 
8. Work organisation   
2.
8.
1 
At the time of the accident was 
there any trade overlap – (ie: 
yourself and different trades 
people working together / close 
by)? 
 Was this planned / 
unplanned 
 Were you consulted about 
this? 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
8.
2 Were your co-workers / other 
trades people known to you? 
 
 
 
2.
8.
3 
Were adequate personnel 
available for the task? 
 
 
 
2.
8.
4 
Have there been any recent 
changes in the way that your work 
is organised? 
 
 
 
2.
8.
5 Who sets-up your work 
arrangements 
 
 
 
2.
8.
6 
Are you consulted / included in 
discussions about  
 your work organisation 
 safety related issues 
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2.
8.
7 
Is there a production target to 
meet? How is it 
 determined,  
 overseen 
 rewarded 
 
 
2.
8.
8 
Were there any time / production 
pressures  
 how  
from whom 
 
 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Work pace 
   
   
   
  2
.9
.1 
How do you decide how to 
pace your work rate? 
 Decide yourself 
 Someone tells you 
 Gang decided together 
 Other 
 
 
   
   
2.
9.
2 
Does it make a difference if 
a gang member is slower / 
faster than the others? 
 
 
Comments:   
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10. Target / Payment issues 
What is your payment method 
 Fixed wage  
 Priced work (note criteria 
for this) 
 Pay based on experience or 
training 
 Other 
 
Do you receive any incentives to 
increase your pay? 
 
2.
10
.3
 Which payment and or incentive 
methods do you prefer and why? 
 
 
 
Comments  
 
 
11. Supervision / management 
2.
11
.1 
Was the Supervisor or Manager 
 Present when the accident 
occurred OR  
 When were they last seen 
prior to the accident? 
 
 
 
2.
11
.2
 
Do you think that you were 
adequately supervised 
 
2.
11
.3
 Do you know your supervisor well?  
2.
11
.4
 
Do you find your Supervisor  
 Approachable  
 Receptive if you wish to 
report a problem  
 
 
Comments:  
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Individual details – Proforma 3 
 
It would really help us to know more general things about you, as this too will help us to 
learn more about the people who work in the construction industry and the problems that 
you face 
 
1. Personal details 
3.
1.1
 Job title  
 
3.
1.2
 Gender  
3.
1.3
 Age  
3.
1.4
 
First language & 
fluencies 
 
3.
1.5
 
Accommodation 
arrangements 
during work time 
(home or away) 
 
3.
1.6
 
What are the 
work hours (& 
breaks) per week + 
overtime? 
* for yourself  
* others from 
your company on 
site  
 
 
 
3.
1.7
 Are you able to 
chose if you do 
overtime or not? 
 
3.
1.8
 
How much time 
off have you had 
in the past 12 
months for? 
 Holidays 
 Sickness 
 
3.
1.9
 Were you paid for 
these absences? 
 
3.
1.1
0 
Do you do any paid 
work outside of 
your job here? 
 
3.
1.1
1 
What are your 
daily travel times 
and distances? 
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2. Accident history 
 (Accidentee 
only) 
Previous 
accident dates 
and 
consequences: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Employment history 
3.
3.
1 
Are you self-employed, 
employed by PC / Main 
sub-Contractor / sub-
sub contractor / 
other? 
 
3.
3.
2 
What is your length of 
service on this site? 
 
3.
3.
3 
What is your 
length of service 
with this 
employer? 
 
 
3.
3.
4 
What is your length of 
service in this job and 
industry? 
 
3.
3.
5 
Do you have other 
previous 
employment? 
(type & duration) 
 
 
 
 
3.
3.
6 
Do you feel that your 
employment is secure 
* With this company 
*In the industry 
 
3.
3.
7 
Do you belong to a 
trade union? (if 
so, which) 
 
3.
3.
8 
Do you feel that you 
have an appropriate 
level of 
responsibility in your 
work? 
 
3.
3.
9 
Do you have 
opportunities to use all 
your skills and 
abilities? 
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4. Training history 
 
3.
4.
1 
What is the original 
baseline training that 
you had for your work? 
(ie: apprenticeship / 
professional training) 
 
 
3.
4.
2 
In the last 5 years 
have you attended 
other shorter (1-2d) 
training courses?  
Please record 
 Area covered 
 Duration 
(eg: machine operation, 
supervisory skills, health and 
safety) 
 
3.
4.
3 
What and when was 
your most advanced 
training in safety 
related aspects? 
 
 
 
3.
4.
4 
(This Q not for 
accidentees) 
Have you had any 
training in human 
capabilities and 
performance? (and 
when) 
[Physical & mental capacities, 
such as strength, endurance, 
work over/under load, social 
factors etc…] 
 
3.
4.
5 
(Accidentees only) 
What tool box talks 
have you have had in 
the last 3 months? 
 
 
3.
4.
6 
Do you consider the 
training and 
apprenticeships (and 
access to these) 
adequate? 
 
 
 
3.
4.
7 
Concerning site 
inductions: 
 Estimate the 
number you have 
had 
 Do these offer 
value to you 
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3.
4.
8 
How do you perceive 
the safety culture on 
this site 
 
 
 
 
Comments 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Health related issues  
(Q’s for accident involved personnel only) 
3.
5.
1 
For someone of your age, 
how would you describe 
your general health? 
 
 
 
 
3.
5.
2 
Have you suffered or do 
you have any ongoing health 
problems 
(Briefly describe) 
 
 Has this had any 
implications for your 
work and how? 
 
 Have you sought 
assistance / advice 
(what? and from 
whom?) 
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6. Work perception 
 
3.
6.
1 What are the best 
parts of your job 
 
 
 
3.
6.
2 
What are the worst 
parts of your job 
 
 
 
 
Below are statements which will help us understand how you perceive your general work situation.  Please answer ALL statements 
and indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree by circling the appropriate number on the scale. 
 
 Completely  
disagree 
 Completely 
agree 
I enjoy my work 1 2 3 4 5 
My job meets my expectations 1 2 3 4 5 
I can turn to a fellow worker for help when I 
have a problem 
1 2 3 4 5 
I get satisfaction from my job 1 2 3 4 5 
I like most of my fellow workers 1 2 3 4 5 
My job is mentally demanding 1 2 3 4 5 
I enjoy the tasks involved in my job 1 2 3 4 5 
My fellow workers talk things over with me 1 2 3 4 5 
My job involves a great deal of mental 
concentration 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am happy with my job 1 2 3 4 5 
My job involves a great deal of responsibility 1 2 3 4 5 
I would recommend my job and place of work to 
a friend 
1 2 3 4 5 
My job causes me worry 1 2 3 4 5 
I would chose the same job in the same place 
again 
1 2 3 4 5 
My fellow workers accept and support my new 
ideas 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Symonds, et al, 1996) 
Comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FINALLY - Is there anything that you would like to say about your work or workplace or can 
you suggest how your work or workplace could be improved ?  (Record overleaf  ) 
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Site Supervisors / Managers / Safety personnel – 
Proforma 4 
 
1. Baseline data 
4.
1.1
 
Job title 
 
 
What does your job 
entail * 
 
4.
1.2
 
If you have 
knowledge of the 
accident, what do you 
think caused it? 
 
4.
1.3
 
What action was 
taken afterwards to 
prevent recurrence? 
 
 
2. The work in progress 
4.
2.
1 Was there anything 
difficult about this 
task 
  
 
 
4.
2.
2 
Were there any 
aspects concerning 
tools, equipment or 
materials that made 
this task difficult  
 
 
3. Managing design revision (as appropriate) 
4.
3.
1 
Were there any 
recent design 
revisions relevant to 
the work in progress? 
 Temporary 
works 
 Permanent 
works 
 Other 
 
4.
3.
2 
If you were required 
to make the above 
design revisions how 
did you handle this? 
(ie: procedures used  and 
disciplines involved) 
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4.
3.
3 
Were there any 
problems with getting 
design drawings 
revised 
 
 
 
4.
3.
4 
Were site staff 
involved in revision of 
design drawings (ie: 
record relevant 
disciplines) 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Scheduling the work 
4.
5.
1 
If there were any 
delays what caused 
them? (eg: starting the 
task, the schedule or work 
in progress),  
 
4.
5.
2 
Were the skilled 
people required for 
the accident task 
available when you 
needed them? 
 
4.
5.
3 
Did any unexpected 
work have to be 
absorbed into the 
existing work 
schedule 
 
4.
5.
4 
Were there any 
unplanned changes? 
(eg: in work sequence, 
trade overlap* etc..) 
 
* trade overlap – two or more trades in the same work area simultaneously 
 
6. Organising the work 
4.
6.
1 
In general, how do you 
assess the 
competence of new 
starters? 
 
 
4.
6.
2 
 
(i) Do you do anything 
to ensure health 
status of new 
starters 
(ii) Do you offer any 
health surveillance 
for your operatives 
 
4.
6.
3 
Are the operatives 
employed or self-
employed to your 
company 
 
  95
4.
6.
4 
Do you discuss trade 
overlap directly with 
the trades 
themselves? 
 
 
4.
6.
5 
What arrangements 
are there for worker 
consultation or liaison 
with: 
 Trade Unions 
 Safety 
representatives 
 
4.
6.
6 
In planning team work, 
do you have any 
criteria for putting 
together your choice 
of people into a gang? 
(eg: previous knowledge of 
character, performance 
etc..) 
 
4.
6.
7 
Were you able to 
meet these criteria 
when putting together 
the gang in the 
accident? 
 
4.
6.
8 
Have you ever felt 
pressured to proceed 
without the correct 
materials or 
equipment? 
 
 
 
4.
6.
9 
If you organise sub-
contracting, how do 
you identify when you 
need to do this?  
 
 
4.
6.
10
 
For the accident task 
were / are any of the 
SC skills available 
among your own 
operatives? 
 
4.
6.
11
 
How have you co-
ordinated activities 
and communication 
among the 
contractors 
 
4.
6.
12
 
How have you ensured 
compliance with the 
site rules and H&S 
plan 
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4.
6.
13
 
How did you provide 
training and 
information on risks 
to: 
 Contractors 
 Operatives 
 
4.
6.
14
 
(i) Does you 
appointment specify 
any responsibilities 
for the H&S of people 
you oversee? 
(ii) Are there any 
written standards / 
instructions for you 
to follow? 
(iii) If so, is your 
performance in 
achieving these ever 
reviewed?  
 
 
7. Work pace 
4.
7.
1 
Do you do anything to 
motivate your 
operatives to 
increase 
productivity?  
 
 
 
4.
7.
2 
How do you ensure 
that this does not 
compromise safety? 
 
4.
7.
3 
If there were time 
pressures at the time 
of the accident were 
there any 
consequences to this? 
 
 
 
 
4.
7.
4 
Is there any 
competition among 
contractor teams on 
site, to complete 
work quickly? 
 
 
8. Pay related issues 
4.
8.
1 
Is there any conflict 
between working 
safely and 
maintaining earning 
potential? 
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9. Supervision / management 
4.
9.
1 
During the accident 
task was there 
adequate:  
 Supervision 
 Project 
Management 
 
 
 
 
4.
9.
2 
In hindsight, and in 
relation to the 
accident task, were 
there any hazards 
that should have been 
acted upon or 
reported 
 
 
4.
9.
3 
Have you ever 
previously received 
complaints relating to 
the accident tasks & 
what action was 
taken? 
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10. PPE 
4.
9.
1 
 Who (which 
discipline) chooses 
the PPE range 
 
4.
9.
2 
 
What attributes 
leading purchase 
choice (perhaps good 
feedback from users, 
price, function etc..) 
 
 
4.
9.
3 
When did you last 
select a new product 
or style & why 
 
 
11. Information transfer – paper based 
4.
10
.1 
Which disciplines 
prepared the 
 Method 
Statements 
 Risk assessments 
(In general & for accident task if different) 
4.
10
.2
 
Were the MS and RA: 
 Different 
documents 
 Integrated 
together as one 
document 
 
 
4.
10
.3
 
What is the sequence of 
processes to prepare 
the: 
 Method Statement 
 Risk assessment 
 
 
4.
10
.4
 
What materials do you 
need to prepare these 
(eg: drawings, information 
from managers etc..) 
 
4.
10
.5
 
Were these materials 
suitable for their 
purpose? 
 
4.
10
.6
 
If any, which disciplines 
at site level were 
consulted about content 
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4.
10
.7
 
How is the information  
 Stored  
 Made available to 
all personnel 
 
4.
10
.8
  When did you last read 
the materials?  
 
4.
10
.9
 Is the information ever 
reviewed and evaluated 
 
4.
10
.10
 Are there any additional 
resources to instruct 
people? (procedures, 
posters, notices etc..)  
 
 
 
12. Information transfer – practical 
4.
11
.1 What did the site 
induction entail? 
 
4.
11
.2
 
What instruction or 
training was provided 
to undertake the 
accident task? 
 
4.
11
.3
 
Has the accident task 
ever been the subject 
of a tool-box talk & 
when 
 
4.
11
.4
 
Have the induction / 
instruction / training 
methods been 
reviewed and evaluated 
 
4.
11
.5
 
Would you improve the 
above, given the 
opportunity and how 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
ACCIDENT SUMMARIES 
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Accident Summaries 
 
Case study 01 
Construction type2 Major Building IP Role3 Steel Fixer 
Construction phase4 Middle Employer status5 SC 
Timeliness6 Unknown   
 
Accident description7 
Steel fixer was tying and carrying wire across top reinforcement mat of a concrete pour.  End 
dragged behind him, snagged, he pulled it and it sprang back and hit him in the eye causing a 
laceration needing surgery.   
 
Emerging Issues8 
 Poor material (quality / presentation for use / weight / storage / resolution of known 
problems) 
 Poor work environment - No shelter from weather 
 Walking across mat - Balance and concentration issues  
Were walking boards available?  Convenient?  Being used?  Properly supported/fixed? 
 Inadequate supply / communication re. PPE 
 Long work hours and overtime plus travel 
 Time pressure 
 Safety culture problems 
 Poor method statement preparation and info transfer (consultation confused and 
information read to new operatives) 
 High dependence on core skills (refresher/management supervisory skills not 
happening?) 
 Some dissatisfaction among mid-level management grades re - communication and 
fulfilment 
 Poor tool usage (inadequate design, not supplied, not PPE compatible) 
 Planning issue – provision of equipment (weekly planning meeting) 
 Unclear arrangements for prescription of technical solutions by designer or selection by 
PC 
                                                     
2 Construction ‘Type’ 
Eng Construction   Engineering Construction - Petro-chemical / Power generation etc 
Residential  Residential both low and high-rise 
Civil Engineering   Road / rail / bridges etc) 
Major building  (MB) Commercial / Industrial building 
Refurbishment  Refurbishment / renovation 
3 IP Role 
Role of involved / injured person as given at the interview 
4 Construction Phase 
Start Site set up / preliminary works 
Middle Main construction work 
End Finishing works / ‘snagging’ / commissioning 
5 Employer status 
PC Principal contractor 
SC Sub-contractor 
6 Timeliness 
Progress on site relative to planned programme 
7 Accident Description 
Taken from accident book and interviews with IP and supervisor 
8 Emerging Issues 
Taken from consideration of the interview and project data collected by interviewer and additional expert reviews 
(construction and human factors) 
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 Time pressure when designing concrete frame 
 No risk assessment from designer to PC about this concrete frame work 
 Designer training in H&S limited 
 Prefabricated reinforcement? 
 
 
Case study 02 
Construction type Residential IP Role Joiner 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
Joiner was using a mitre saw to cut diagonal braces for window sub-frames.   After making a cut 
he raised up the control handle of the saw and went to turn over the wood to cut mitre the other 
end of the piece.  Although in a raised (non-operational ) position the mitre saw guard had 
jammed (fragment retrieved – 35mm x 2mm deep) .  This went unnoticed and the operative 
experienced a severe hand cut from the still spinning blade as he reached towards the wood 
piece. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Indication that not much induction required for 2nd fix joiner – IP not finding 
inductions relevant to self 
 RA/MS used as a training method  
 Technique not reviewed or considered as an influencing factor 
 Respect for previous skills / experience over-road supervision / training  / TBTs / formal 
H&S Mgmt measures - Several references to reliance on core competencies (such as 
contractor and carpenter skills) 
 No training in human capabilities and performance 
 Un-stimulating task 
 Fairly low tolerance of people who aren’t on the ball / sharp. 
 Job satisfaction appears high 
 Long work hours and driving +++ 
 Poor mitre saw design 
 Slither jamming saw implicated as joiners fault and not a saw shortcoming 
 No instructions about using a circular saw? Is this appropriate? 
 Poor / absent purchasing policy (saw) 
 Indication of poor manufacturers instruction concerning temporary frame for window 
 Impact of PPE unknown 
 Work area not as desired by joiners - Joiners workshop not allocated in site plan 
 Time pressure—due to unexpected demand and prospective loss of employee 
 Unsupervised work - information about sudden workload not conveyed to Supervisor / 
Mgr by joiners 
 Thoroughness / range of safety management not necessarily perceived by SC firm 
 SC Manager workload appears quite stressful 
 No distinction between RA /MS 
 Felt that this method of cavity closure was a ‘design innovation’ &superior to former 
method, as this avoids the need for scaffolding & ‘timber handling’ 
 Original design was revised for cost reasons, but this was deemed acceptable (from a 
safety perspective ) by Architect 
 Architect not aware of bracing requirements for window build 
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 Liaison with window & cavity closure manufacturers was undertaken but it seems that 
the issue of window bracing requirements was not addressed 
 It was the contractor that chose this window type - does ownership / responsibility get 
lost / blurred, the more people are involved?? 
 Client had quite a lot of impact upon the design – time pressure upon designer, choice 
of window style, cost aspects BUT would window build  have been much different even 
if there had been a more free reign? 
 There was no formal design development for the windows – they just followed ‘off the 
shelf’ protocol 
 Window build has no safety specification as it is standard building practice 
 Expects contractor to safeguard Safe Working Practice of ops (carpenter) 
 If the cross-bracing had been undertaken in a factory, would the carpenter then start to 
loose his mitre saw skills & become more vulnerable? 
 He showed a clear preference for ‘design and build’ and ‘partnering’ where the 
Architect & contractor are involved from an early stage improving buildability. The 
alternative sees contractor developing a lot of ‘un-drawn design’ on their own initiative. 
 PS role seems to have been ‘juggled about a bit’ – Architects were PS until PC tender 
accepted.  After this the detailed drawings were developed for the design – did PC 
exercise their PS role adequately re. the window design OR has nobody considered the 
task of bracing? 
 Not that happy about usability of CDM and guidance from HSE 
 
 
Case study 03 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Fitter 
Construction phase Decommissioning Employer status ?? 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Decommissioning phase. Operative were using an angle grinder in a small room (Size 
Reduction Area) within a radiological decontamination area (Dismantling area).  It is thought 
that sparks flew off and ignited the filter of an extractor fan unit causing a fire.  No injuries to 
personnel.  As fire was being extracted from the work area it, the alarm was raised by Ops in the 
room next to that where the work was carried out. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Ops not familiar with operating fan / emergency switch 
 Switch on outside of work area only 
 Position of smoke detector inappropriate? 
 Fan filter inadequacy – Manufacturers unaware 
 Adequacy of in-house fan cover design questionable 
 Attempt to evade responsibility – blame culture 
 Cost implication of tooling – all to be disposed of 
 Fire watch inhibited by PPE 
 Unanticipated and additional training demands of local labour for PC 
 Adequacy of risk assessment 
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Case study 04 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Frame construction 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
A sub-contract scaffolder was picking up steel wedges (at a lower level ~ 3 ft) by a column that 
was being struck by a carpenter.  Whilst he was doing this a loose ‘acrow’ prop fell onto his 
lower back 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The 2nd scaffolder started being interviewed but withdrew half way through as he 
thought interviewer was asking too much about his job, which he felt was irrelevant to 
the accident & misleading.  He felt interviewer should be asking why the carpenter had 
not followed procedures? 
 The carpenter stated that he had followed procedures – contradicted by scaffolders and 
Safety Officer  
 There was trade overlap relevant to accident, but both employee groups felt justified in 
being there 
 Both employee groups were overseen by a foreman, but otherwise organise their own 
work pace 
 The Safety Officer had not identified that the scaffolders were there to erect a handrail 
behind the column, just that they shouldn’t have been there 
 The carpenter works on a price per column worked – time pressure implications 
 The carpenter seems to work on a job and finish scheme (60 miles each way - home to 
work) 
 The carpenter was reluctant to take time out for an interview- would lose work time 
 Time pressure not perceived by either employee discipline 
 Scaffolder felt that the prop should be fixed top and bottom, but this was not reported 
by the Safety Officer – apparently no industry-wide accepted method 
 PPE seems to be a source of discomfort for scaffolder 
 Carpenter has previous musculoskeletal injury to back and elbow which, he feels, are 
work related?  
 Rudimentary design of materials involved 
 NB: Company were unwilling to ask the Foreman to be interviewed as they felt he 
would probably be too busy / not keen to participate 
 
 
Case study 05 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Panel fixer 
Construction phase  Employer status SC 
Timeliness    
 
Accident description 
A panel fixer was working with his supervisor (also his Uncle) moving steel angles that had 
been delivered to the work area by others.  Movement was achieved by carrying an end each; 
laying down was achieved by crouching down and then each person drops their end down in 
turn.  This time both dropped their end together – IP somehow had his fingers beneath the 
falling material causing a wound to right middle finger 
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Emerging Issues 
 IP had no experience of manoeuvring steel angles 
 MH trainer (also 2nd person) 300mm taller than IP – shows a fundamental lack of 
understanding of a 2 person lift 
 Load also greatly exceeds guide load in MH (Manual Handling) Regs. 
 Technique could have been done using a sling & MH could have been avoided / greatly 
reduced 
 Described non use of sling as had always managed before, but had also stated that this 
is first time with steel angles 
 Would half size steel angles been appropriate for the build, but would that then make 
people even more likely to MH them 
 Impression of time pressure from brickies, but no perception of this by site supervisor 
 Impression from Site Supervisor that there is generally insufficient consultation re build 
with Management Contractor 
 Also seems that culture is that SC goes ahead with decisions that earlier in project might 
have been made by PC Mgr 
 IP couldn’t keep up with speed of  taller co-worker 
 IP described lack of consultation / opportunity to contribute in decision making 
 Both interviewees happy with task supervision – but supervisor seems to have failed in 
MH training and in realising that trainee needs more time/ opportunity to communicate 
 IP not sure about whether MS followed, but thought that MS was appropriate in any 
case – institutionalisation re this process 
 Countersignature to defer responsibility from SC to individual? Any legal grounding at 
all. 
 General MH was a previous TBT, but learning from this as a not applied for this task 
 MS – no reference to possible consequences of  handling requirements 
 
 
Case study 06 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Cladding 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
A fixer / glazer was descending a scissor lift.  In descending the platform, he mistakenly caught 
his wedding ring against a protrusion at the side of the handhold area.  Not realising this he 
jumped down from the final step to the ground causing lacerations. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Seems to be a 'manufacturing' issue. 
 Not much attention had been made re-human contact with the equipment  (foot 
placement possibly, but certainly very little on handholds) 
 Accident accepted as ‘one of those things’ as seen by IP as not really specific to 
construction – no consideration by anyone that the equipment design may be a 
contributory fault 
 ... It is common site policy to 'ban jewellery' but I reckon that it is rarely enforced (a bit 
like the speed limit on motorways - it is a cop out though in the end) 
 SC action was to circulate a memo to all personnel reminding them that wearing of any 
jewellery is forbidden – each operative had to countersign and return. 
 Also an issue for Tool Box talks re jewellery? 
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Case study 07 
Construction type Residential IP Role Floor layer 
Construction phase ?? Employer status SC 
Timeliness ??   
 
Accident description 
IP was working at the side of the road behind his van.  With a knife he was cutting out the 
opening for a toilet pan from 4mm ply-wood.  Ply is supplied as a 1.2m  x 2.1m board  He 
normally stands and makes the cut to one side, but on this occasion he stood behind the 
direction of the blade. When blade came out it continued to travel and went into his leg. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 This seems to be a case of use of an inappropriate method/tool. 
 Tool is bare steel – looks a pretty slippery surface (grasp and handling force?).  IP 
chooses this tool especially for the blade stability and the need for this is an indication 
of what is necessary for the task.  IP also happy about the way the tool fits into the palm 
of his hand. 
 Does tool manufacturer recommend knife is used for this purpose? 
 Alternative tool designs for this task? 
 Change of technique – IP could not really describe why he had altered his technique for 
this particular cut, but had indicated that he was probably rushing and that’s what 
caused it 
 A cut to the side (apparently normal technique) would have quite a high asymmetrical 
loading - standing behind the blade would offer more control whilst making the cut.   
 The blade, having just been changed, must have been at its most efficient.  As blades 
are changed regularly they must be of a constantly changing efficiency during their use 
– therefore quite difficult to anticipate how much force to apply to each cut. 
 Working in the road – in this case, offered a flat surface & he was not interrupted.  
Unsure of arrangements during busier traffic 
 Were contractors happy with method used?  If yes, does this extend to their H&S 
people? 
 If they frown upon cutting holes this way, had this ever been communicated to site 
manager?  
 IP doesn’t ever seem to have received any formal training.  Why hadn't IP had a tool 
box talk on this site? 
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Case study 08 
Construction type Residential IP Role Concrete labourer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
A concrete labourer was connecting pipes to extend a concrete pouring operation.  The pipes 
push together and then a rubber seal and clip are applied over the join.  He had trouble 
compressing the clip, so was using his foot to try and secure it.  For additional force he hit 
against his foot with a scaffold pipe and hurt it!  IP was very embarrassed about this and had 
told the Safety Advisor that the foot injury was sustained by something in the area of the clip 
piercing his boot. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Language problems made this a very long interview and some issues were only vaguely 
understood. 
 Time pressure from both concrete setting rate and from need to move lorry 
 Some contradiction in whether the work is arranged by the supervisor of whether the 
rest of the group get involved 
 Supervisor reportedly present at time – not clear if he saw what happened 
 Was the accident story concocted just for the Safety Officer, or for all? 
 IP had no knowledge of procedures –site induction / training? 
 Comment from ‘expert’: ‘Being a bit of a concreting expert myself, I'm not surprised 
clips get stiff due to concrete adhering.  Once it even begins to set, it's a real *** to get 
off’. 
 Design of system – (equipment manufacturer/supplier) 
a) are clip/pipe manufacturers aware of the problem?  Do they offer anything better?  
If not why not?  If yes, are there obstacles to the better connectors being used on 
site? 
b) what are the designer expectations of the site pipe fitting process? 
c) what sort of loads are the operators expected to apply? 
d) what maintenance is expected of the site fitters/mechanics - is the equipment 
expected to be clean (spotless) to function correctly? 
e) what guidance is given in supplier literature? 
f) if guidance is given, how does this get accommodated in training or other? 
g) what happens about user instruction? 
 Equipment maintenance (site/head office/plant hirer - plant department manager or 
supervisor of plant fitters): 
a) what is done to ensure that pipe fittings are clean enough to function correctly? 
b) what inspections are carried out to repair/scrap damaged fittings? 
c) what contingency provision is made for spare fittings, so that they are available as 
replacements in case of difficulty with ones being used?  
d) what site provision is made for easy cleaning of pipe clips etc.? - e.g. was a high 
pressure water or air hose available to the operatives? 
 Other issue is responsibility for housekeeping/maintenance on site.  Who responsible 
for this?  Why hadn't they picked up on this problem? 
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Case study 09 
Construction type Residential IP Role Formworker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was cutting the steel banding of a bundle of plywood, using a pair of nips.  He cut first from 
one side and then the other, and although he thought he was standing out of the way, the steel 
band flew back and cut his arm.  Resulting in hospital A&E. Returned to work the following 
day. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Supervisor not aware that IP had used nips and not claw hammer to make break 
 Contracts Mgr (also responsible for safety) didn’t know about the accident 
 Do the safety advisors recognise the hazard?  If not why not (attitude/training issues)? 
 If hazard appreciated, what have the tried to do about it? 
 Other tie method (using nylon) is available and in spite of everyone’s knowledge about 
hazards in this task ply is still secured together in this manner 
 Why hasn't supplier used a safer alternative to steel banding?  As well as springing back 
when cut, it also forms a hazard when lying around or being folded up for disposal.  
Difficulty with disposal means it is likely to be left lying around for longer (fall hazard). 
 Although it would seem that a better cutting tool is available, the cut hazard remains 
even after the break is made. 
 S/C no opportunity to contribute to the Safety Committee – Site S.O. noted that these 
meetings are held every 2weeks - communication issue 
 Supervisor thinks Safety person visits every 2 weeks – actually he’s been there full time 
for the past month 
 Indication of time pressure affecting the atmosphere on site – all experience it in 
different ways  
 Concern by supervisor about trying to see what lads are doing – thinks trades are worse 
nowadays 
 Some mixed messages about who prepares the MS’s – indicating communication not 
effective for these 
 Also indication by Supervisor that MS’s need to be followed only if new task type to do 
 Method of transferring the RA/ MS info (wall display) seems a little uninviting 
 Site based staff perceive little value in induction 
 Training for all is distant and little / nil related to H&S (in spite of job responsibilities) 
 
 
Case study 10 
Construction type Residential IP Role Formworker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness Ahead   
 
Accident description 
Operatives were on level one striking out shuttering from a hole next to a column. They knew 
that the formwork would drop a single level and as per procedures they cordoned off the area 
below.  The area directly below was of the same design, but the shuttering to the hole had 
already been knocked out and a board placed had been placed over the gap.  As the formwork 
was knocked out if fell down onto the board on the ground level, went straight through it and 
landed in the basement.  Two brickies and the S.O were 1m away from the falling debris in the 
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basement (brickie sustained a slight scratch as the boarding dropped flat to the floor, but this has 
been recorded as a dangerous occurrence) 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Risk of ply cover damage not anticipated in the risk assessment – procedures had been 
followed 
 Risk assessment - would this have been judged adequate (without our benefit of 
hindsight)? 
 The RA and MS had been done, but not in the level of detail to identify the risk of the 
ply cover breaking.  There is a case for a generic assessment to cover the standard issue 
of protection of holes through floors.  However, these may be so numerous and 
extensive, to cover the required level of detail, that they would simply gather dust.  This 
sort of information would be best dealt with through training, both basic site craft 
training and refresher training such as TBTs, where the possibility of a hole cover 
(normally a plywood sheet) breaking under a falling load could be raised.  It could also 
be a standard issue raised, where appropriate, at weekly short-term planning meetings, 
where an updated, detailed RA can be carried out. 
 Need generic MS 
 Why were changes to procedure not been written into the MS? – does this reflect a lack 
of priority OR are written methods a formality superseded in reality by verbal 
communications? 
 Unlikely that it could have been ‘designed out’ by the design engineer, although there 
are alternative methods of construction, such as lift slab (forming the floor slab at 
ground level and jacking it up into position).  This would be a very big change to deal 
with a fairly small risk, and brings its own risks anyway.   
 Permanent formwork (i.e. formwork left in to form a permanent facing to the hole edge) 
may have been feasible – may be costly and may have other problems in the installation 
of the services passing through the hole. 
 It seems that a plywood sheet was provided and a batten (presumably to support the 
sheet half way along) was nailed on.  It would take a very competent engineer to 
calculate whether this was sufficient to take a falling load; so the only way to ensure 
that such protection is adequate is to provide a protective cover to the hole that is so 
strong that it could not possibly fail, and so well fixed in position that it could not 
possibly move (bounce) away when struck. 
 Ply ‘lying around’ is used for covering holes - is it quality assessed? 
 Specification dimensions to cover openings – do they exist?   S.O. did not appear to 
consider ply board dimensions as a hazard in the accident 
 Some conflict in roles – as a Construction Management contract the roles of S.O. / 
Supervisor lack clarity 
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Case study 11 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Driver 
Construction phase  Employer status SC 
Timeliness    
 
Accident description 
A ‘Hiab'9 delivery driver was delivering scaffold poles to a site.  As he was trying to manoeuvre 
the load towards the drop zone the lorry tipped over (no damage caused).  The stabiliser feet 
(outriggers) had been put down to the ground, but had not been extended beyond either side of 
the lorry beforehand.   
 
Emerging Issues 
 Restricted area for lorry to park – inadequate space for driver to move forward for 
preferred parking position – permanent works layout design implications?. 
 Driver then tried to manipulate the load to the drop point without passing it over 
walkway – the foreman was there, but how could he stop pedestrians from each 
direction? 
 The opinion is that multiple manoeuvres of load made the lorry less stable – Outrigger 
presumed unnecessary if just a single movement? 
 One wheel also on railway sleepers – possibly contributory to topple? 
 Neither safety devices were relevant to the accident-causing conditions 
 Driver couldn’t see foreman? -  possible impact on accident 
 Driver felt work area and access was tight, but continued with the job in any case? 
Manual extension of rigger relevant?  
 Crane controls (as described) appear to contradict population stereotype of lever 
operations (ie up means down) 
 No perception of ‘time pressure’ 
 Accident occurred at 13.30 – no indication of lunch / break in last 3hrs  
 Very long working hours for driver with indication of pressure to do overtime and to 
breach HGV driver rest allowances 
 Perception of opportunities to communicate/contribute perceived very differently by 
interviewees - Site safety culture not perceived very highly 
 Driver quite unhappy overall with work conditions 
 Not really sure if there was a MS / RA.  Plenty of documentation available, but not 
much distinction within this.  Driver unaware of any written materials 
 High reliance on own core skills. Refresher training up to date. 
 
 
Case study 12 
Construction type Residential IP Role Chain boy 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
Concrete-pump pipes were being blown through (a wet foam ball is placed inside the pipe and 
with pressurised air propelled to other end) at the end of the workday.  The accident report states 
that an operative was standing over the pipe (at the exit end) and that with the force of 
propulsion as the last of the concrete and wet ball came through, this threw him backwards 
(onto a column).  He sustained a groin and back injury & was off sick for a week. 
                                                     
9 The ‘Hiab’ term was used by the interviewees in this accident study as a generic term to describe self-unloading 
lorries – The lorry may not have had a off-loading device manufactured by Hiab. 
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Emerging Issues 
 Experienced operatives not available for task – indication of an ongoing problem 
 Inexperienced operative undertaking task and 2nd operative not undertaking normal 
task 
 Is it usual to have 2 people doing the operation? Did they distract each other? 
 Each person has given quite a different account of the accident - reluctant to ‘grass’ on 
each other to the safety officer? 
 Men at ground level seem to have given the OK with the pipe when it was a full 
container – transfer to empty seemed to be an afterthought - Mixed story re whether 
man at top requested permission to blow down or called out to them that he was doing it 
 Seems that there was a fairly explosive response at the bottom of the pipe, not expected 
or previously seen by even the more experienced operative. 
 Would the pipe fixed to the floor really resolve the whiplash action? – Could the pipe 
break and cause even more potential damage? 
 Indication of restricted work area 
 Possibility of ‘time issues’  – trying to finish for the day, ‘Bobcat’ driver waiting, not 
fluent at doing these tasks. 
 IP’s poor attitude to PPE? Relevant in considering his attitude towards risk / safety 
 Long hours of all concerned - IP at work 5hrs with no break 
 IP felt his co-worker was inexperienced? Was he right or wrong to try to move the pipe 
(if this was the case) – lack of teamwork /co-ordination may also be a factor. 
 IP indicated that there is just one-way to do things right? How receptive to new ideas. 
 Concrete takes priority and this seems to be reflected in work breaks and pressure upon 
operatives to perform 
 Nobody on site was able to provide training for this task – is this usual for an activity 
undertaken daily 
 Foreman does site safety work –Doesn’t seem to like the weekly safety inspection 
 
 
Case study 13 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Carpenter 
Construction phase  Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Using a drill with a screwdriver bit on it, the IP ‘lost concentration’ and screwed through wood 
and into left forefinger.  Operative was putting up a new doorway in the walkway leading to the 
canteen entrance.  He was trying to get the work done before the men started to turn up for their 
break (imminent). Some men already wanted to come by and as he had to twist to move aside 
for them he drilled into his finger by accident 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Accident area is quite a busy stretch and if people had turned up before 10.00 am it 
would have become very congested 
 Does the absence of a flex make the task acceptably less risky- and not to cordon off the 
work area? 
 Safety officer doesn’t have a lot of knowledge about task (i.e. roof work and step 
ladder), but has made recommendations nonetheless 
 Interesting comments about IP’s undertaking of overtime- feels he doesn’t really need 
to do so much OT now, but has just got used to doing it. 
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Case study 14 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Partitioning 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SSC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
Cutting cord on sash window, cutting towards self and stabbed self in left finger (touched bone), 
using a Stanley10 knife. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Repetitiveness of task 
 Ops not changing knife blades regularly enough – (from foreman) 
 Apparently no MS and RA 
 Little safety training, No TBT 
 Working with labourer, on steps, alternative way of carrying out task? 
 Was Stanley knife was correct tool for the job?  This points the finger at the method 
statement and risk assessment.  Given this was a task with some risk, why hadn't this 
been picked up?  Given use of knife, should he have been wearing gloves? 
 Could the window not have been securely propped, to ease the difficulty of holding it 
and allow easier access to the point of task operation?   
 Training for operatives and supervisors? - to see whether there could/should be general 
training in having work pieces securely held/supported etc. before beginning the task. 
 MS’s/RAs/Short-term planning and safety RA associated with this activity?  
Could/should this type of awkward task be considered, in detail, and advice given on 
provision and use of appropriate temporary support and safe working method?   
 
 
Case study 15 
Construction type Major Building 
Demolition 
IP Role Partitioning 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SSC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
Hand cut when removing a concrete slab from wall when dropped, initially thought to be a 
lintel, then found to be part of old floor. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Limited time to plan task 
 Inadequately trained personnel assisting (2nd labourer was not available for interview) 
 Work area unsuitable, ground uneven, awkward for reach  
 No gloves available, when gloves available considered inadequate 
 Expected to be lintel, was actually part of old concrete floor 
 Lifting heavy lintel, unexpected load 
 Inadequate safety training, no TBT 
 MS and RA? 
 Lack of reconnaissance prior to starting the work, ie they didn't know what they were 
dealing with, possibly due to time pressures.  What does the company do to ensure 
adequate time is allowed for work tasks? 
                                                     
10 Not necessarily manufactured by ‘Stanley’ – term used to describe generic knife with retractable blade. 
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 Problems with the PPE - perhaps also ties in with 014.  Why do the glove manufacturers 
supply such poor gloves?  What have the eye protection suppliers done to stop them 
misting up? 
 In demolition or renovation it is often impossible to plan the detailed procedure weeks, 
or even the day before.  It is possible for operatives, however, to reflect on exactly how 
they are going to function, as a team, when the task is before them.  Was there any 
training to do this? 
 Was lifting equipment or small plant (FLT, JCB) available and could it have been used? 
 It is possible, though unlikely, that the designer (architect) could have provided 
information that this was part of a floor, rather than a (presumably) lighter lintel.  If so 
this should be made clear in the drawings or specification of the project, and the 
information have been provided to the site engineers, supervisor and gang.   
 
 
Case study 16 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Partitioning 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SSC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
Taking measurement on ceiling within building, steps gave way and fell straight to floor, injured 
upper body, bad grazing on both legs and left elbow. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Step ladders failed, twisted, operative fell - Difficult to comment on suitability as not 
able to inspect step ladders – Step ladders have a bad reputation. 
 At first sight, this seems a very straightforward equipment failure, through poor design 
and/or manufacture or misuse.  Were the steps the most appropriate ones to use for this 
job?  If not, then why were they selected?  Who/what had input or influence with 
respect to this?   
 Is this method of measuring a floor to ceiling distance is necessary?  Are there tape (or 
measuring rod) designs which make it easy to measure the height, without leaving the 
floor?  If not, a) why not? or b) could a rod be designed and made (on site, if necessary) 
which would attach to the zero end of the tape to allow it to be raised to the ceiling.  
Given that the task is done "every day, all day", it would seem to offer significant time 
savings as well. 
 What about providing a temporary staging at a height that puts the ceiling within reach?   
 It is not clear whether the measurement being taken is to an existing ceiling, prior to 
fixing a new (suspended?) ceiling, or to the new ceiling.  If the latter, there is also the 
question of product design.  Is there a way of manufacturing the product so that it can 
be levelled or adjusted from the floor, assuming that this was the purpose of the 
measurement? 
 Apparently no MS ad RA 
 Limited safety training 
 
 
Case study 17 
Construction type Residential IP Role Scaffolding 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SSC 
Timeliness On time   
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Accident description 
An operative was carrying 4 brick guards in each hand.  As walking along he stepped onto an 
electrical cable, slipped and twisted his ankle.   
 
Emerging Issues 
 No risk assessment for power lines 
 Tolerance of power lines strewn over floor – is it possible/feasible to raise them as 
suggested or is there another measure? 
 Indication of earlier problems with the state of the floors 
 IP was not overly happy there and felt isolated.  Not helped by communication 
problems with his supervisor 
 IP was dissatisfied with his ‘trainee’ status – perceives it as labouring work with 
sporadic instruction. 
 Tool box talks do not seem to be acknowledged as training – all that is acknowledged is 
‘sit down training’ 
 Different perception of lifting training – safety officer sees it ‘covered’ in induction, IP 
noted only being lent a booklet 
 Indication of inadequate carrying time therefore a high dependence upon manual 
handling on site 
 H&S responsibilities of supervisor not explicit in contract and his appraisal appears to 
be based on failures (accident book) 
 Supervisors perception of fault for accident –ownership /blame 
 Supervisor states safety not compromised by encouraging work pace among the men as 
‘regulations are still in place’ (belt and braces approach) – then goes on to say that 
‘safety’ has compromised earning potential.  Some conflict here. 
 Indication of lack of patience & entrenched ideas among older men as co-workers 
 
 
Case study 18 
Construction type Residential IP Role Scaffolding 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SSC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was erecting scaffold on a cantilever over the canal and caught right arm on a nail protruding 
from the concrete leaving a puncture wound on right forearm 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Extruding nails from concrete is an ongoing site problem 
 Issues about beam weight, working alone etc. that are supplementary to this accident 
 Sunlight distraction / glare at time of accident 
 Supervisor distracted him – insight into task requirements? 
 Scaffold solutions (to avoid working directly on tube) seem to be more trouble than 
they’re worth?  
 Scaffold fitting maintenance appears very important? Time pressure responsible for 
extruding nails not being knocked off 
 Inadequate PPE - No training in PPE use / care Harness dissatisfaction and mistrust 
 11- 12 hr day for IP  
 No procedures / instructions 
 Dissatisfaction with inductions 
 IP aware of responsibilities in job, but seems to feel powerless in some situations 
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Case study 19 
Construction type Residential IP Role Labourer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was moving falsework tower.  He failed to remove a cantilever prop at the top and it became 
dislodged during the operation and fell 3m hitting the IP on the left side of his back. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 How could cantilever have become dislodged and fallen? Previously dislodged before 
trying to relocate the frame – if so how and was it ever properly inserted into the 
mainframe groove in the first place?  
 No apparent procedure for this activity – should there be? 
 Frames required earlier than expected? Relevant to accident.  An unplanned activity. 
 IP had no training in doing this task or in use and care of PPE 
 IP had poor English – does this influence training / communication etc provided? - 
policy on language/cultural issues etc? 
 Site training heavily dependent on tool box talks perceived as training by IP 
 IP’s work is reactive to instruction by supervisor – little perception of ‘consultation’ by 
IP, but supervisor thinks they do 
 Competence assessment of new starters a bit unregulated  
 Project manager has no specified / appraisable H&S responsibilities in his contract.  
Performance dependent upon ‘force’ of safety officer 
 IP had a similar accident some months ago – but didn’t change his practice.  
 Falsework would have been a 'trade-mark' propriety system c/w catalogue and 
assembly/striking instructions – what info is provided? 
 
 
Case study 20 
Construction type Residential IP Role Cutting gas pipe 
Construction phase End Employer status PC 
Timeliness Behind   
 
Accident description 
An operative was removing what he mistakenly believed to be a redundant gas main from an 
under-stairs cupboard during the restoration of a group of housing association properties.  He 
used a petrol saw and this resulted in a 1m flame and burns to under stairs and plasterboard.  No 
explosion. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Muddled story re which houses were still live and which weren’t – poor communication 
with power company 
 Power company record and notification system not overly clear 
 Indication that records, if on site, were not clear.  Relatively new General Foreman – 
why did he think supply was halted the previous month?  
 Task was unplanned/ scheduled – just did it because they could carry on? Would gas 
records have been rechecked if this had been a planned task, or would they still have 
been wrong anyway? 
 No training by IP in use of saw – not realised by foreman / S.O. - or is training just 
required to change the blade? 
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 Large heavy tool for a relatively small task in awkward conditions - alternatives 
available? 
 No use of gloves /goggles for task - ? HAVS risk or possibility of particle release during 
cut 
 Supplies own boots – should be provided.  Rest of PPE sounds a bit minimal 
 Arrangements for setting up a gang and liaison for safety / Union consultation – all 
reactive 
 Training courses - seen as method to comply with H&S rules rather than as a skill 
transfer (by Foreman) – ‘boring’ 
 Job & finish used to motivate speed, but speed not seen as a possible safety 
compromiser 
 Priced work & need to finish seems to influence competitive element and time pressure 
 Process of inductions / task training / TBTs seems to have been overlooked / not 
perceived as occurring 
 Indication that housing has lower safety ‘level’ nationally 
 Fairly low morale among site based interviewees 
 Risk assessment / training issue (of both operative and site manager).  Gas is dangerous, 
so working with gas pipe work obviously something that should be risk assessed.  Also, 
it seems complacent of the operative and site manager to be happy to proceed solely on 
the basis of paperwork when the site manager himself indicated the long history of 
problems with the ‘gas board’.  What training had these guys received?  What was the 
PC/SC's attitude to training? 
 What processes can be used to find out if a gas pipe is live? - would a gas engineer 
working for a specialist sub-contractor, or the main contractor, could carry out any of 
these tests on site before the particular pipe, or group of pipes, is removed (even a non-
specialist engineer?) 
 Not covered in any of the MS, RA, short-term plans, Safety Plans. 
 What generic procedures exist that would have picked up the necessity to treat 
potentially live mains, gas or electric, as serious risks? 
 Was this issue recognised in the early CDM documentation, safety plans/safety file etc. 
 What training is given (courses, induction, TBTs) covering specific procedures for 
dealing with potentially live mains.  Given the risk some sort of double checking, fail 
safe procedures, embracing the power company, main contractor or both.  There clearly 
needs to be a rigorous signing off or permit-to-work procedure. 
 What general management and safety training is given to combat the low safety culture 
here, and what have the people on this site received? 
 
 
Case study 21 
Construction type Rail IP Role Management 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
A senior supervisory manager was climbing a rail wagon to see whether contents were fit to 
leave the site.  A piece of wire was hanging over the top edge and he wanted to see if he could 
push it back in.  As he climbed up the wagon he put his hand onto the top rim of the wagon (to 
haul himself up high enough) and inadvertently caught his hand onto a 9 x 3cm metal slither, 
which pierced his thumb.  It is thought that the slither is likely to have been generated from 
damage by a digger as it loads the wagons. 
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Emerging Issues 
 No device to look into wagon without climbing up the side 
 Side ladder and handrail arrangements doesn’t seem to facilitate usability 
 Little confidence in contract labour 
 Time pressure- does it need to be like this or has it become the accepted norm? 
 Time pressure encourages undertaking of unusual activities by supervisory / 
management staff 
 Was consideration of human interaction considered during wagon redesign – Are 
viewing, handhold and foot placement areas designed or ad hoc and just where they 
happen to fit on? 
 Excessive working hours and infrequent days off – but impression that this is self-
generated and he cant stop 
 Task commonly undertaken, but excluded from method statement or risk assessment 
 If people need to get up to the top of the wagon (and inside as the notes suggest), then 
provision for this should be designed into the wagons.   
 Why wasn't the wagon rim sufficiently robust to take foreseeable wear and tear.  Who 
makes these things?  Who buys them?  What attention to they give to human factors 
aspects?  Point that ladder provision on wagons is being improved is noted. 
 
 
Case study 22 
Construction type MB Refurbishment IP Role Ceiling fixer 
Construction phase  Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst removing plaster board from a trolley the persons hand was crushed against a scaffold 
tube hand rail. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Recorded accident cause does not closely reflect events described by IP 
 H&S Manager speculation of ‘cause’ very blame orientated 
 IP had been reluctant to cite the communication problem for fear of being accused of 
being racist 
 Scaffold design – Is it best practice for the clips to be positioned like this and to be 
uncapped?  
 Remedial action seen as PC responsibility by SC – indication of lack of communal 
ownership in safety management 
 Unclear whether pushing plaster trolley is ceiling fixers job or not – IP only one who 
thought not 
 Is reluctance to push trolley a status issue or is it not actually scheduled into work in 
progress 
 Plaster trolley seen as helpful - comparative competitor product for the job & design 
variation? 
 No one seems to have considered that the trolley might be an aspect in this accident 
 One man down on accident day – issue to IP, but not noted by others 
 Decisions / opinions of competency seem to be repeatedly conferred to ‘a.n.other’ 
(previous experience of a company, responsibility of men to supervise labourers).  What 
do we know of the skill & ability of the person making these decisions & do they realise 
how their decisions impact others 
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 Try to use certificated schemes for competency too, but need for labour seems to be an 
over-riding factor 
 ‘Don’t discuss safety unless get hurt’!! 
 Indication of low level consultation in work organisation – liaise on a job by job basis 
only 
 Perceived difference in how internal / external H&S people assess safety with internal 
appraisal seen as less judgemental OR this might also reflect level of safety training 
too? 
 Site Mgr saw supervision as a responsibility of PC – PC (H&S Mgr) described 
supervision as a SC issue. 
 Dissatisfaction with welfare facilities 
 No RA for product transport on site 
 Mixed story re. training in plaster trolley transport –( IP no, Site Mgr –yes) 
 Very long hours by H&S Manager + long travel time by him & Site Mgr 
 Skill training for ceiling fixer seems a bit ad hoc – ‘sitting with Nellie’ for an 
unspecified period of time 
 Little in way of short courses for SC personnel 
 No specific safety training for any of these men 
 TBT perceived by IP as a stick wielding exercise, yet desire for formal training is there 
 IP young and suffering long term back injury – no sickness absence pay.  Employer 
aware - no construction assistance 
 
 
Case study 23 
Construction type MB Refurbishment IP Role Ductworker 
Construction phase ?? Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was descending the stairs carrying a toolbox.  He slipped on an oil patch which had been 
covered with paper resulting in a bruised elbow & hip. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Recorded accident cause does not reflect events described by IP- paper or plastic oil 
covering described by Foreman / H&S Mgr 
 Was there a pipe fitting machine with an unsealed oil reservoir or not? If so, would it be 
better to seal the oil tank rather than introduce yet more guidance on a work technique. 
 Incorrect action was taken after oil spill –what inhibited correct action? 
 Complaint re non-user friendliness of PPE 
 Alternative helmet designs available - criteria for selecting these?  
 Foreman determines competency by work performance – no impression of using any 
criteria prior to being exposed to ‘a risk‘ 
 First-aid training seen as ‘safety rep’ activity 
 Can 99% of people get on with everyone ?? optimistic or reality 
 Impression that IP works largely unsupervised 
 Indication of genuine need for formal training in this trade 
 Perceived difference in how internal / external H&S people assess safety with internal 
appraisal seen as less judgemental OR this might also reflect level of safety training too. 
 Job and finish w/end only (nobody watching work methods?)   
 Safety seen by Foreman as an Operative responsibility 
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 Does poor planning encourage different contractor teams to make haste to obtain access 
to install different services?  Is this particular to refurbishment? 
 Safety culture viewed by IP as good ‘when unnecessary safety is cut’ – frequent 
impression that safety is OTT 
 IP welcomed opportunity to discuss concerns that he has about the industry (safety 
culture comments) 
 Minimal formal training by both Main SC personnel 
 No specific safety training for any of these men 
 Induction and TBTs relied on heavily as a training method to ensure compliance with 
site rules / plan – induction though not really seen as valued by either Main SC 
personnel 
 Dissatisfaction with welfare facilities 
 Very long hours by H&S Manager + long travel time by H&S & Site Mgr 
 Indication of significant work related health problems among duct worker – not 
apparently being managed. 
 
 
Case study 24 
Construction type MB Refurbishment IP Role Fitters mate 
Construction phase  Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was cutting a threaded rod out of the ceiling.  Hacksaw slipped out of hand and sliced 
through top of left thumb above nail resulting in a cut. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 IP indicated that he had been trained to use a hacksaw, but not technique to cut off the 
stud. 
 Others attributed accident to carelessness / negligence by IP, but he had never been 
shown correct technique and indicated that all colleagues worked in same manner 
 Alternative and safer technique was known but this had not been communicated until 
the accident event. 
 Task considered a basic trade activity – indication that when considered ‘basic’ or 
‘trade’ it is incumbent upon operative / Fitter to oversee work practice – these are the 
baseline skills that they are expected to have  
 IP seen as a skilled fitter - awkward phase being towards end of supervisory period but 
not finally ‘approved’ 
 Indication of tolerance of poor housekeeping 
 Accident late in day – possible fatigue issues 
 High dependence on inductions & TBTs to ensure compliance with site rules / plan 
 Indication of low level of consultation in work organisation , but TBTs give feeling of 
involvement in safety related issues 
 Minimal formal training by both Main and SC personnel 
 No specific safety training for any of these men 
 Induction and TBTs relied on heavily as a training method – but not perceived by IP as 
‘training’ 
 Is there a design alternative to using this approach (over-length threaded stud cut to 
length after installation. Is it usually in TBT’s; MS? Could a special tool be developed? 
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Case study 25 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Surveyor 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
‘Climbing down external scaffolding and a piece of roofing material cut the back of my 
hamstring’. (Quote form accident report).  NB: Roofing company had since left site with the 
impression that they would not be appointed again. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Project Mgr didn’t know about accident 
 Housekeeping issues related to the roof company working under time pressure / delay? 
 Does sole occupancy of a work area by an SC offer some endorsement of ‘own rules’ 
storage / space use (Regularly tolerated on sites?) 
 Accident reported to Site Mgr and not (apparently) the roofing company - feedback 
failure 
 Young employee with high safety motivation, but feels there is lack of interest among 
his seniors and his concerns seem to be ignored 
 No apparent avenue for young employee to apply and perhaps take some leadership 
with his knowledge and enthusiasm 
 Project Mgr appears torn with time pressure and the need to keep accident levels down.   
 Effectiveness of communication between Site and Project Mgr? - OR was there an 
informal / unregulated standard of safety / housekeeping that is taken as ‘norm’ but 
which is out with the best practice that the IP would have learnt. 
 Interesting comment about small scaffold aperture between level change – any formal 
criteria for this? 
 Seems as if the project design was constantly up in the air – ‘too many cooks’ 
(Architects / client /tenant) 
 Financial compensation for work acceleration – presumably project work plan evolving 
day by day.  Also ?? is there an issue of site size – is there ever a limit as to how many 
people can be working on one area at a time (per m2). 
 Criteria for apportioning extra time to a project questioned – how would 6½ weeks be 
identified as the right time (ie. Does it include undoing of work completed or is it just 
the time to redo the new requirements assuming a ‘blank canvas’ prep? 
 IP no training in use c/o PPE 
 IP expected a fleece to be provided – is this PPE and how do people generate their 
expectations? 
 At least 11hr day for each employee.  OT taken for granted?  Taken as read that it will 
be provided & that breaks will be worked through  - culture 
 IP experienced supervision problems – clash with one of them 
 Project Mgr performance monitored by re-active (rather than active monitoring) 
 Client pressure upon work schedule – Project Mgr trying to juggle with this and worries 
of operative fatigue etc.. 
 IP – no safety related training on degree course 
 Emphasis on gaining signature in site induction  - paperwork orientated 
 First –aid seen as ‘safety training’ 
 Was anyone clearly identified as responsible for housekeeping on the site, either within 
the PC or SC?  If so, did they acknowledge this responsibility?  Why was HK 
neglected? 
 Problems with the quality of work of the roofing SC. 
  121
 Given the IP was photographing defective works by the SC and the injury arose from 
their materials, this doesn't give a good impression of the subcontractor. .So how did the 
PC come to appoint a ‘cowboy’ roofer?  What are their procedures for assessing 
'quality' when appointing SC's?  Whatever these are, it sounds like they failed on this 
occasion.  Why? 
 IP recorded housekeeping as "poor" with "debris and materials lying around".  Although 
there seems to be an effort to blame the SC, generally SCs will follow the general 
example set by the rest of the site, particularly if it is poor.  There is a wider issue of 
general safety culture, which also seems poor, based on the total lack of support to the 
IP, when he tried to raise safety issues.   
 There is mention of a £100 'prize' for the best SC each month - how was this measured 
and how objective did the SCs consider it to be? Was it just a sop to management who 
wanted to think that they had a good safety culture? 
 There is also the issue of time pressures, penalties, >1000 AIs (Architects Instructions), 
habitual overtime etc.  Were the client/architect (or the MC, for that matter) aware of 
the consequences for safety of this sort of project management; had they considered this 
issue in any RA? 
 
 
Case study 26 
Construction type Rail IP Role Sheet piling 
Construction phase  Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst knocking in a sheet pile with a sledge hammer, he missed which resulted in him pulling a 
muscle in his back 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Rushing slightly to get job done 
 Difficult to do with machinery because of trackside location 
 Hot day 
 No task training 
 Was taken off another job to help complete this job 
 Task carried out regularly 
 Back injury wasn’t apparent straight away until after IP had driven home 
 Although assured of safety on rail, section engineer hadn’t done any safety related 
training until recently. 
 Did MS actually cover manual installation  
 
 
Case study 27 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Safety controller 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
While bending down to pick coat up hard hat fell off.  Operative picked it up and as he stood up 
he hit his head on the stanchion and sustained a cut. 
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Emerging Issues 
 Possibly a combination of badly designed hard hat (which is a constant complaint for all 
sorts of reasons) or carelessly worn hard hat, and, possibly, excessive haste. 
 IP's hard hat ‘fell off’ when he bent over - Complaint re non-user friendliness of PPE, 
especially difficult to wear in heat. 
 Who was responsible for purchasing such PPE in this case?  How much thought and 
effort did they put into this?  What do manufacturers do to ensure wearers will be 
comfortable (and protected)?  Hard hat design issues - particularly protection against 
falling off, protection against improper wearing and comfort (to dissuade improper 
wearing); 
 Although reported not to be hurrying, was trying to avoid delay in work as men are 
required to leave track when COSS is not supervising. 
 Conflict between pressure to get job done and behaving in a considered way, 
particularly the way that this issue is dealt with in training - Training may well 
emphasise safety first, second, and last (particularly on the railways now) - but how 
much time is devoted to real behavioural training to reinforce a 'think before you act' 
culture – simply conveying the information that this sort of culture is required is not 
enough. 
 Exposed stanchion - is this something that should have been picked up by a risk 
assessment?  Often, protrusions are either padded or wrapped in high visibility tape, to 
reduce risk.  Would this have been appropriate/ feasible in this case? 
 Difficult area to work in, restricted space, no area for possessions. 
 Underfoot conditions difficult, moving ballast. 
 The physical working environment (space, footing etc.) may well be an issue but it is 
difficult to see how this can be designed differently, given the nature of railway work, 
unless work is prohibited without total line possession - an expensive possibility which 
would probably have repercussions for the safety of the travelling public by delaying 
necessary maintenance etc. 
 Given restricted space, congestion and adequate supervision could be issues mitigating 
against safe working of large gangs, with not enough to keep them all focussed on the 
task in hand. 
 Job entails high level of responsibility 
 High risk area, risk from overhead lines, trains and high voltage cables at side of track. 
 Weather changeable 
 Had been working for 8 hours prior to accident. 
 Very ‘heavy’, stringent safety culture. 
 
 
Case study 28 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Lorry driver 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst operative was standing on the ground unloading sheets of plywood from his lorry, his 
glove became trapped by one of the sheets.  Because of this his hand slipped out of his glove, 
causing him to fall backwards onto his arm, resulting in a fracture to his left wrist. 
 
  123
Emerging Issues 
 Gloves slippery when wet - is there a better design of gloves? 
 Adverse weather (rain) prolonged job and made wood wet 
 Leaves on ground may have made ground slippery 
 Working at dusk, reduced lighting levels 
 Sometimes required to work until 19.00 to fit jobs in working day 
 Unable to plan jobs, done as able to fit in 
 Sometimes wood still has nails in (not a problem at time of incident) but could have 
been in mind of IP when handling wood 
 Lack of procedures for task 
 Job causes worry to IP 
 Training in MH - firm grasp of item, particularly in wet, slippery conditions (both of 
item and floor) was not good - probably positioning of body and feet also poor - height 
of plywood sheet on lorry (Assume that the IP was on the ground and reaching up) also 
would cause a problem - Was there someone (of the other two operatives) on the lorry 
helping to hand down? 
 Someone trained to fall properly would probably not have suffered a broken wrist - 
could this be included in general training?  
 
 
Case study 29 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role JCB driver 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP injured back whilst lifting ‘forks’ onto ‘JCB11’. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Forks very heavy 
 Awkward to lift as need to support forks while lifting and lowering 
 IP – no real safety training 
 IP never seen MS or RA 
 Feels supervisors will not act on any problems, don’t listen, not receptive 
 Fork lift truck would have been more appropriate for job - not available 
 Issue of lorry body blocking access, appears to occur frequently 
 No investigation into alternatives to having to do this task 
 No task training, despite fact that foreman states TBTs have been given on manual 
handling many times, no task training 
 IP unsure if adequate personnel, may be beneficial to have another Op to assist 
 No remedial action 
 Foreman felt there was nothing difficult about the task as it had been done hundreds of 
times before and no problems before 
 Foreman reports that safety is never compromised - so accepting that this must be ok 
because it is done lots of times 
                                                     
11 ‘JCB’ term used by interviewees in this accident study to describe multi-functional back-hoe excavator – The 
excavator may not have been manufactured by JCB. 
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Case study 30 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Sheet piling 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Adjusting level of sheet pile with a sledge hammer (Not installed at correct level by machine). 
IP missed pile and pulled a muscle in his back. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Similar to accident 26 
 Machinery used originally to knock in sheet piles had not achieved correct height 
 Hitting piles lower than foot level with sledgehammer 
 Helping to complete this task, was supposed to be doing something else 
 IP rushing to go to next job although indicated no time pressures 
 Had been doing similar job on day before and for 1 hour before incident 
 Ground unstable 
 Weather warm 
 Good safety culture on railway 
 Was MS for the SPECIFIC activity or was it a generic machine installation MS? 
 Sounds puerile but do they have specific 'training' on how to use a sledge hammer - 
general view seems to be 'experienced therefore okay'  
 
 
Case study 31 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Loading HIAB 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst placing a platform on the rear of a Hiab12 wagon, which was in the up position, the driver 
who was holding the platform let go before the IP had pulled his hand clear. This resulted in his 
left hand being trapped below the platform. The injuries were a closed fracture of the index 
finger and laceration of the middle finger. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Very awkward task 
 IP was not experienced in doing this task, was helping driver 
 Nothing to take hold of to pull platform up 
 Extremely heavy and having to support while lock is put in to keep platform in place 
 IP feels that always expected to rush but do first class job 
 No safety training  
 Not rushing at time of task but wagon could not be loaded until this task was completed. 
 Not happy with remedial action – addition of rope handle, not satisfactory 
 Not consulted regarding safety 
 Feels others take risks when the ‘boss’ is not there to watch over them 
 No MS/RA 
 Good study for general issues on training/motivation/method statements etc 
                                                     
12 The ‘Hiab’ term was used by the interviewees in this accident study as a generic term to describe self-unloading 
lorries – The lorry may not have had a off-loading device manufactured by Hiab. 
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Case study 32 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Concrete work 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Moving pipes for concrete pump - pipe was full of concrete - dropped pipe on right foot. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Awkward location of area where concrete being poured – inside building but also 
having to get pipe over shuttering 
 Had to be completed later than other pours because of check for water tightness 
 IP inexperienced, no task training 
 No toolbox talks or MS/RA. Learn by doing. 
 Concrete pipe heavy 
 Clips difficult to remove 
 Not usual job of op, will be training to be an engineer, brought onto job to get 
completed. 
 No knowledge of MS/RA by op. 
 Site engineer writes MS and RA - rarely/never read by ops. 
 Thinks accident was caused by lapse in concentration 
 Clips on pipes often difficult to undo, become clogged up with spillage of mortar which 
seeps out, unless totally clean will be difficult to take clips off. 
 Paid a fixed wage so if gets work completed early can still earn full wage  
 Considers there to be a clear conflict between maintaining earning potential and 
working safely 
 Considers form of inductions inappropriate, would prefer a ‘guardian’ scheme 
 
 
Case study 33 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Laying Kerbs 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was laying a kerb - as he lowered the kerb he caught his 2nd finger on his right hand between 
the block and the stone bed cutting the tip of his finger by his fingernail’. (Quote from accident 
report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 Why were the gloves provided poor?  Who specified their purchase in this incident?  
Company purchasing manager?    
 Glove design - is synthetic material selected on cost grounds - are there better gloves 
available, which would be less "sweaty"?  Glove manufacturer? Assurance from the IP 
that gloves would not have protected him on this instance is questionable. 
 Have the kerb manufacturers considered handling issues with respect to how they are 
supplied?  Has anyone within IP's employer ever raised the handling of kerbs with their 
supplier.   
 The main problem seems to be inappropriate handling, method and PPE.  The sections 
of kerb, in this case, do not seem to be over heavy or large.  
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 Training in lifting and placing is an issue, perhaps to prevent people lifting 4 at a time!  
What expert training is available?  
 This may be the sort of very general risk that does not need to be in a RA.  If RAs are 
extended to this extent, then do they become so bulky that nobody looks at them 
anyway? 
 
 
Case study 34 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Ductworker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SSC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was ‘un-stacking ductwork.  Pulled duct and caught (hand?) between 2 bits of duct. (Quote 
form accident report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 Seems to be a function of no gloves, difficult handling, no appropriate training in 
general manual handling techniques and risks, possibly poor stacking, possibly 
inadequate consideration of handling problems during design. 
 Ducting was metal (lightweight).   
 IP wasn't wearing gloves.  Why not?  Were gloves available?  Use 
encouraged/enforced? 
 To what extent might deficiencies in site supervision have tolerated lax practices?  How 
interested is the PC in site safety?  
 Designers of ducting - what do they take into account, in relation to ease of handling, 
stacking, holding and fixing, during their detailed design process.  Do they have any RA 
checklist or pro-forma to use? Do they have interaction with the erection 
gangs/supervision to discuss 'buildability' and handling, in particular?  Do they get any 
feedback on site experience with their designs? 
 Training in manual handling, including materials stacking/storing; and managers [as 
above] contacted to see why such training is not used or other provided. 
 Low visibility of such accidents when compared with the cost of doing most of the 
above.  The fact is that such accidents are frequent but the, probably quite considerable, 
aggregate costs go totally unrecognised.  Evidence shows that productivity on an 
activity after disruption of more than 30 minutes is reduced, typically, by 30% for the 
rest of the working day - and this is only one of the possible additions to the direct cost 
of delay to the activity. 
 
 
Case study 35 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Ductworker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SSC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
‘Drilling ductwork and swarf went into eye. (Quote form accident report). 
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Emerging Issues 
 Many similarities between this incident and number 34.   
 Non-use of eye protection Why?  Uncomfortable?  Hinders work performance 
(gets steamed up)?  Not available on site?  Poor supervision?  Training/supervision/site 
safety culture 
 Alternative method of fixing, without drilling and pop-riveting (but possibly with its 
own hazards) - was it considered / why not? 
 Method of reducing swarf (e.g. better designed/sharper drill bits or shields on the drill 
itself?) What about reducing drill speed to prevent swarf being projected away from the 
work piece? 
 Is there a way of fabricating ductwork so that jointing on site does not require ANY 
tools or metal fabrication? - e.g. push fit connectors – now common in plumbing with 
plastic pipe work 
 Pre-assembly would reduce need for on-site connections. 
 How do innovations or new methods of working that improve safety get communicated 
across the industry.  What means are there for spreading the word with small changes 
such as the one arising here?  If a mechanism does exist, why didn't it work in this case? 
 Operative training, particularly unskilled/semi-skilled operatives who would be unlikely 
to experience any sort of 'apprenticeship', not even 'sitting by Joe' in most cases.  There 
are probably real productivity gains to be made from expert training in handling 
materials, hand-tools, PPE etc, as well as from accident prevention.   
 
 
Case study 36 
Construction type Major Building IP Role SC 
Construction phase End Employer status Plumbing 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
‘Whilst climbing down from a mobile aluminium scaffold [the IP] banged his left elbow on the 
aluminium strengthener around the access / egress hatch causing a chip / fracture to the left 
elbow. (Quote form accident report).  IP was wearing a harness that became caught on the 
tower. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Human interaction – access hatch size/functionality 
 Design of scaffold to avoid ‘sharp’ things to hit 
 Harness – why was it worn?  Problems with safe access – handrail not possible due to 
clash with ceiling and services. 
 Why did harness ‘snag’ (big buckle at back) – harness and tower design 
 Tower level & safe access – re-designed or selected to suit working height and adjacent 
works 
 IP erected own tower – Issues of ‘self-erected’ access towers – training? – Risk 
assessment? 
 IP had previously been stopped from working as had no harness on and tower handrails 
were not fitted – difficulties in then locating a harness 
 Why was harness not mentioned in accident book? 
 Concentration 
 Nil remedial action – ‘IP was already following all site rules’ 
 Pre-assembled services to reduce above ceiling work 
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Case study 37 
Construction type Major Building IP Role SC 
Construction phase End Employer status Pipefitter 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
‘Walking through ground floor link - Knee wasn’t 100% anyway, it had been giving him 
problems previously & the turn into the link twisted it’. (Quote form accident report).  IP said he 
caught his foot on cables. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Housekeeping – lighting / tidiness issues 
 3 lux lighting standard considered too dark by IP 
 Cable management – cables were for power tools 
 Safe access ways not in place or not enforced 
 Why the discrepancy between accident book and IP version? 
 IP had ‘other things on his mind’ – otherwise would have avoided the cables  
 ‘Job and knock’ as no bonus scheme 
 
 
Case study 38 
Construction type Eng Construction IP Role Driver 
Construction phase NA Employer status PC 
Timeliness NA   
 
Accident description 
‘Whilst moving fuel bowser from one vehicle to another. Jockey wheel slide on clamp and 
wrenched left arm and shoulder’. (Quote form accident report). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Inherent design inadequacy in the jockey wheel mechanism, exacerbated by the 
operator having received only limited safety advice for this operation.  Presumably 
because the risk here had not been picked up by a risk assessment. 
 Is the jockey wheel mechanism really standard, with no variation in either design or 
instructions provided, from one implementation to another? There are better 
implementations - why was this one used? 
 How did the bowser manufacturer envisage this risk would be controlled/avoided? 
 To what extent was safety a purchasing/hire criterion? 
 Was the level of risk assessment undertaken sufficient in terms of coverage and detail to 
identify risks such as this.   
 Has there been effective learning from this incident?  Does the contractor have any 
formal mechanisms in place to advise site personnel elsewhere of such risks?  Has the 
contractor contacted the bowser supplier to inform them there has been an incident? 
 Is there (should there be) any obvious warning on the equipment? – And would it have 
any impact, without specific training, anyway? 
 What training had the previous user (as well as the IP) had in how to handle and leave 
(park) the equipment? 
 Could the equipment be designed with a more secure form of support, either 
replacement or supplementary.  (Caravans have retractable, screw operated corner 
stays.)  For example, this could not happen with a tow-bar support operating like a 
scissor jack. -  
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 What about the possibility of temporary blocks under the tow-bar, as standard practice 
for parked trailers? 
 The bowser probably could have been parked so that it was accessible to the towing 
vehicle, without man-handling; but this is really asking a lot and may not have obviated 
the need to slacken the clamp or lift the tow-bar. It seems that there are no obvious 
secondary handholds on the bowser, to encourage two-person handling.  The facility 
and training to do this may have helped. 
 
 
Case study 39 
Construction type Eng Construction IP Role Maintenance inspection 
Construction phase NA Employer status PC 
Timeliness NA   
 
Accident description 
‘Whilst torquing ‘bolts’ on a gantry - IP strained his back’. (Summarised from accident report). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 It would appear that IP would not normally do this task and had the discretion and 
responsibility to make this choice. 
 Operation should have been subject to a more detailed MH risk assessment, according 
to the MHO regs (in addition to the risk assessment required under the MH&W regs).  It 
seems this didn't happen.  Why?  How does the contractor comply with the 
requirements of the MHO regs in general? 
 Is the design requirement for this task to be done at all.  Are there engineering solutions 
that would avoid the need for this torque checking operation?  If yes, why was it 
implemented in the way that it was? 
 Absenteeism may have been a factor, i.e. the maintenance inspector mentioned 2 fitters 
being off sick and being behind with the work.  Why hadn't replacement staff been 
brought in?  Was the staffing level adequate?  Who are the decision takers in this 
respect?  Are they best placed to make judgements over this?  Do they explicitly 
consider health & safety? 
 
 
Case study 40 
Construction type Eng Construction IP Role Laying concrete 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
‘[IP] was placing concrete throughout the day and suffered burns around the ankle area.  He was 
not wearing wellingtons at the time of the incident.  Swelling and burning was noted at the end 
of the shift on [following day]. (Quote form accident report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 Primary aspects are the actions and training/induction received by IP, ganger and site 
manager. It seems reasonable to assume that if the IP had realised the consequences, he 
wouldn't have stood in the concrete without adequate footwear.   
 Given that concrete handling is such a common activity in construction operations, it 
seems fundamental that everyone, at all levels, working in the industry should receive 
some formal instruction in procedures and associated H&S issues.  Why hadn't this 
IP/ganger/site manager received this?  Why does the PC tolerate this? 
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 Who should have spotted the IP not wearing boots?  Does this lie with the ganger or site 
manager?  Were they aware of their responsibilities?  Why did the supervision fail?  
What do the people at the top (i.e. head office managers) do to ensure procedures are in 
place and operate correctly?  i.e. do they do anything to check up on supervisory 
arrangements?   
 
 
Case study 41 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Labouring 
Construction phase ?? Employer status SC 
Timeliness ??   
 
Accident description 
Passing vehicle caught tractor winch cable, which was positioned, across road junction.  Cable 
came under tension, striking IP across upper leg. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Working at junction of road 
 No third person to watch for traffic 
 Had signalled to start winching but not sure if was in progress 
 Long hours to complete work to minimise disruption to water mains 
 Lack of acknowledgement of men at work signs by public 
 IP working away from home, has long journey and early rises to travel to work 
 Foreman feels under stress, dislikes amount of paperwork he has to do 
 No appropriate RA/MS for a potentially very dangerous activity.  Any winch pulling of 
steel (presumably) rope can be lethal (rope under tension breaking or slipping free), if 
not properly organised, even without potential external interference from traffic.  The 
whole approach to RA/MS development and dissemination, from planning office to 
induction/TBTs, needs tracking, to establish exactly where the system failed to get 
appropriate risk and method information to the operatives. 
 No training of operative and foreman to recognise the generic dangers of this type of 
operation.  Quite incredible that neither see the possibility of any remedial action.  
Check training plans/provision - MC and SC. No specific responsibility for keeping 
traffic well away from operation in progress - should be referenced in both generic and 
operation-specific short-term planning and, if training (what happens at road junction, 
when it was, presumably, essential to pull rope across live carriageway). 
 The combination of performance-related pay and no formally monitored breaks also 
seems to be asking for trouble.  Advice/instruction/training not given to Foreman on this 
aspect of human capability - why not?   
 Could the task method have been designed to avoid the cable crossing the carriageway, 
for example by pulling it through the pipe from the other end? 
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Case study 42 
Construction type Major Building IP Role WATER MAIN 
REHABILITATION 
Construction phase  Employer status SC 
Timeliness    
 
Accident description 
IP was using a boring machine with steel flails at the end (these spin round in the main to clean 
mains pipes).  These steel flails occasionally catch something and bend but tend to keep their 
spring.  IP was using two fingers to put a pin in from the side - when put pin in it spun round 
and caught glove and dragged hand into flails.  Because the rods spin they heat up and this can 
grip the rubber gloves. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Rack feed borer inherently dangerous machinery to use 
 Using incorrect gloves, but this was because hands get wet using correct ones 
 Design of machinery, lack of guarding, although indication that guards are annoying 
 IP very experienced 
 Pins difficult to place/remove, changes shape as a result 
 Regular tool box talks 
 Pressure form 36hr programme of closure 
 Very long working hours 
 IP had worked night shift, only 4-4 and a half hours between shifts and 2 hour travel 
time so no more than 2 hours sleep. 
 Have had task training 
 Task has been subject of a TBT 
 Site agent feels does not get enough responsibility 
 Ops al directly employed 
 Foreman blames operative error, repetitiveness of task, taking things for granted. 
 Site agent suggests motivating ops by using pay incentives. 
 
 
Case study 43 
Construction type Residential IP Role Electrician 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP began ‘dressing in’ armoured cable to flat, when debris lying on cable fell into face and eyes 
(accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Seems to revolve around debris on the cable and failure to wear eye protection.  
Whether the operative was drilling or not is hardly relevant, other than that instructions 
re. wearing eye protection may be more rigorously enforced. 
 Difficult to see how debris could be eliminated?  Sites are dirty places, even when 
housekeeping is good.  It might be recommended to keep cable rolls protected until in 
use, and clean and straighten cable before lifting into position, as standard practice.  
Could this be done?  How would it impact on the efficiency of the task, as well as 
accidents? 
 Cable in a flat coil which collects dust and debris - a common occurrence 
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 Difficult component to work with, stiff, have to draw out and unravel 
 Awkward job requires two persons, one to hold cable in tray and another to drill and 
fasten cleats 
 With tighter specification of cable runs (and pipe runs) in new-build, to be able to 
define standard lengths, they could be cut to length off site and even the ends stripped 
for easy connection, or away from the work place. This would probably pay for itself in 
waste reduction, as well as changing the task method to be safer.  Pre-fabricated wiring 
'looms' has been standard in car manufacture for years and is also being used in 
construction. 
 Electrical supervisor thinks IP was drilling without goggles but denied by IP 
 Supervision of PPE wearing, the site rules (as specified and as enforced), any difference 
perhaps in advice/rules when working above eye level (i.e. beneath the task), the 
application of the points system (when was the last time anyone was removed from site? 
what do the current records show about points accumulated?) 
 IP was given separate TBT on use of safety glasses/goggles when started on site as only 
has one eye 
 Not clear if wearing hard hat at time, mentioned makes access difficult despite this 
being a two point offence (three points = off site) 
 No task training 
 Working at height, restricted space 
 IP earning lot less as self-employed previously was directly employed.  
 Difficulty enforcing wearing of safety glasses/ goggles 
 This project requires regeneration of local unemployment but this makes it difficult to 
ensure quality and experience of ops 
 Electrical supervisor says all ops see MS at induction and sign to say read 
 Supervisor thinks too much responsibility for his pay (gets £1 an hour more than ops) – 
states only comes to work for the money 
 
 
Case study 44 
Construction type Residential IP Role Scaffolding 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst walking through site a piece of timber from upper level fell and struck the left forearm of 
the IP. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 May be key that he was on a pedestrian walkway so standards should have been higher 
 Lots of unknowns 
 Untidy housekeeping 
 Unable to establish who may have dropped timber suggests poor safety culture with 
SCs  
 IP feels too much responsibility in job 
 Barriers in place where timber was thought to have dropped from 
 Edge protection / debris netting etc - but pretty hard to comment without being there 
and seeing the situation 
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Case study 45 
Construction type Residential IP Role Plumber 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
While IP was soldering copper pipe, he removed glasses to scratch eye, had flux on fingers, 
which went into his eye. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Not able to wear goggles, wears spectacles, hard hat with visor not available but has 
since been ordered. 
 Appropriate PPE not available and wearing of what was available not insisted on - 
problem of glasses not recognised by supervisor - hard hat probably made risk worse.  
General problem of PPE design/ availability/training/supervision etc. 
 Hard hat makes more difficult, reduces height for access 
 Indicates hats with visors are available but says that goggles are not normally worn for 
this task. 
 So many things about this accident suggest a poor safety culture – clearly NOT top 
priority, whatever the people concerned say.  Top down leadership not evident.  
Training of managers, not just in what needs doing but also HOW, is required - I/P 
skills. 
 Site manager regarded cause as carelessness  
 Site manger suggests flux was on finger and wiped eye whereas op reported flux spat 
directly into eye.  
 Plumbers should be educated /trained in using brushes for applying fluxes etc instead of 
using their fingers- is this a COSHH item? They need to be taught how certain 
substances can cause long-term health problems  
 IP has had little or no training in 30 years  
 Site manager had attended very few training courses. 
 Not seen method statement or RA for task.  
 MS in place for some time for repetitive tasks, only shown to ops if a new task. 
 What should be in RA/MS?  They can't cover every task or they become so large that 
they will never be read - they must focus on residual, out-of-the-ordinary risks; so 
general training, TBTs etc. must cover the common risks. 
 IP experiencing ill health which he is very concerned about, has side effects from 
medication. 
 IP enjoys working on this site, good safety culture and good welfare facilities. 
 
 
Case study 46 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Piling 
Construction phase Start Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was the driver of a crawler mounted piling rig – he was carrying out routine maintenance on 
his rig standing on the running boards – he pulled open a door to gain access to the machinery – 
the handle of the door came away in his hand and he fell (approx 1.7m) to the ground…. He 
landed ‘on his feet’. He had a little pain for the rest of the shift… He reported the incident 
because he thought that it could have been worse. 
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Emerging Issues 
 Routine task – not really considered as a risk 
 Old equipment (door handle and piling rig – commonly 10 years old or more) 
 Access needs conflict with operation of plant 
 IP and others reckon hand rails are not practicable 
 ‘Small’ distance to fall therefore not seen as an issue 
 Evidence of company ‘ad-hoc’ ‘improvements to plant (addition of access steps) 
 Newer plant access may actually be worse 
 
 
Case study 47 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Piling 
Construction phase Start Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was installing ‘bentonite’ pump pipes (as part of a piling operation) as he was walking across 
the site he fell down a shallow hole that was submerged beneath the overall site water ‘puddle’ 
and therefore not visible – the hole surrounded a ‘piezometer’ which was used to measure 
ground-water pressure (i.e. it had to be there) but was not marked, nor cordoned-off, nor back-
filled – injury was slight cut to hand and twisted knee. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Relatively inexperienced although well educated IP 
 Why did ‘mate’ step over the puddle & he step IN? 
 Water and mud are ubiquitous on civil engineering sites – is this a ‘too hard’ issue? – Is 
it reasonable to assume that the site could have been clearer 
 Basically, if the piezometer installers had back-filled the hole (as they were supposed 
to) then accident would not have happened 
 Also if de-lineated walk paths had been identified and marked out they would not have 
gone over ‘holes’ 
 No apparent ‘design’ (permanent works) issues here 
 IP VERY positive about H&S on this site 
 
 
Case study 48 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Labouring 
Construction phase Start Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP had a previous shoulder injury (boxing-related) – He was installing a ‘Geogrid’ membrane – 
He pulled it and it snagged on something – and he ‘pulled his shoulder out’ thus aggravating the 
previous injury. 
Accident record added: Pulled Geogrid to level – some hardcore on top – when ripple came out 
became slack & stumbled back – aggravated old boxing injury – right shoulder. 
 
  135
Emerging Issues 
 Non-work injuries affecting work 
 ‘They want you to hurry without saying so’ 
 Very different views on ‘pressure’ from Op and Super 
 Older guys have their own ways – younger guys are more safety focussed 
 Manual handling over-exertion – was no training given? 
 General operative not particularly motivated to do anything 
 No apparent ‘design’ (permanent works) issues here 
 Definitely a work method issue though 
 Good use of worker instructions as well as MS/RA 
 
 
Case study 49 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Cladding fixer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was cutting cladding panels with a jigsaw and a piece of metal went into his eye. He went to 
the doctor because of shard of metal went into his right eye (from accident report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 Work position was "above eye level". Was this necessary or could the work have been 
better organised for ease of access? 
 Why was the operative required to cut the cladding panel whilst on the scissor lift? 
 Did the design require the panels to be cut? If so, why were they not cut during 
manufacture, or at least at ground level on the site? 
 Why did the MS allow this? 
 Could a guard be fitted to the jig-saw - e.g. a clear plastic screen - to allow the work 
piece to be seen but preventing swarf flying into face? If not, why not? Same issue 
featured in Accident 62. 
 The IP acknowledged the fact he should have been wearing goggles for the operation, 
but the issue here is why does the panel need to be cut at all? But if it needs to be cut 
this must be done in a safe way, at ground level not off a scaffold. 
 Why was eye protection not being worn - availability to hand; comfort; suitability for 
task; etc.?  
 There had been no training with jig-saw or, it appears, with any power hand-tools.  
 The risk perception seems to be very low - "no known risks with this operation".  
Clearly IP does not see electric powered hand-tools as potentially dangerous.  Why not? 
- This is another training issue. 
 
 
Case study 50 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Cladding 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
‘While passing a bucket full of tools (approx 20kg) from one deck of scaffold to the next lift, IP 
felt pain in the top right hand corner of his back. Sustained pulled back.  The discomfort was too 
bad for IP to carry on with his work and was taken home.  Injury caused by twisting when 
lifting bucket. (Quote form accident report).   
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Emerging Issues 
 Restricted space and attempting an inappropriate task or action - change scaffold design 
to increase space might help, if feasible.  Any alternative to cross-member scaffold for 
load bearing and people passage. 
 Formal guidelines for aperture size in scaffold – rather than just being determined by 
size of the boards, or the width of the pavement outside - Aperture within scaffold for 
ladder seems inadequate even for a man on his own – let lone carrying anything 
 But, even with more space, climbing a ladder with a bucket on the shoulder does not 
seem sensible - general work methods need review as this is a more detailed (mundane) 
issue than normally dealt with in MS.  However, there probably should be a method 
statement covering the way of getting tools (beyond the odd hammer) and materials up 
onto the scaffold.  Short-sighted approach to transport method of moving hand tools 
around the site. 
 Bucket = ad hoc arrangement.  Make do by the men – no formal method for tool 
movement on site e.g. what would happen if he fell with this bucket, or there was 
weight shift – injury potential and no protection from the contents - Foreman has not 
considered alternative to bucket for tool movement around the site 
 IP described bucket as quite heavy. Not especially heavy when weighed in isolation, but 
not considered in the context of the environment or circumstances = no MH assessment 
 It is certainly a training issue and should be followed up not only by TBTs but also by 
properly trained (in manual lifting methods) supervisors (and managers) also trained to 
intervene when seeing this kind of action. It is an unsafe act and should be treated as 
such.  IP had some relevant training over two years ago but was clearly not convinced 
of its value. Either the training was inadequate or it is not being followed up, or both. 
 Company train people themselves – time generated, although older / experienced ops 
(??such as IP) may join them 
 Combination of low temperature, cold operative and awkward movement is a possible 
cause.  No professional sportsman would attempt extreme movement without warming 
up thoroughly, first.  Why should 'professional' operatives? Perhaps training in manual 
handling should include warm-up routines. 
 Most big companies provide warm coats for salaried employees.  They may 'jibe' at 
doing it for wage earners or sub-contractors because of cost and theft.  However, some 
sort of, weightlifter type, back warmer/support belt might prevent a lot of this type of 
injury and pay for themselves.  Such a garment would be seen as PPE and not very 
attractive to steal.  Might be worth costing out and comparing with the cost of back 
injuries. 
 Not long with this employer? Influences whether he would ask for assistance or not? 
 IP describes job as very menial, doesn’t feel listened to by co-workers – relevant to not 
challenging the method of moving the tools around the site. 
 Poor environment at the time of the accident – light low.   
 Long working week for all 
 Time pressure generated from Supervisor 
 IP not consulted about work org / safety 
 SC firm not happy with housekeeping standard ‘provided’ by PC 
 MH training not well accepted – leaflets 
 IP doesn’t perceive value from inductions  
 IP has no lifting training with this co. – missed it - but doesn’t perceive lack of training 
as inadequate 
 IP no holiday in past year – paid in lieu 
 Safety judged by co-operation with wearing the PPE 
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 Foreman role for safety not specified in his job description – no guidelines and no 
individual appraisal - no formal H&S training 
 MS/RA are prepared pre-job \ no learning experience in the prep. for the people doing 
the work and are done by Contracts Director (What training?) & H&S people - Foreman 
doesn’t see himself in this role 
 
 
Case study 51 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Electrician 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
‘IP tripped on a loose board on the floor, tried to save himself from falling and twisted his right 
thumb’. (Quote from accident report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 Criteria for whether its appropriate to be using a tower around boarded area is not clear 
 Impression from IP that the area would have been boarded if any members of public 
had been at risk, but that this care isn’t taken for construction workers. 
 What is the force and manoeuvrability of the tower is like 
 What is the maintenance programme for the tower wheels 
 Tower hire company address the erection process, but don’t seem to have offered any 
advice about manoeuvrability – is it reasonable to try to push it over a board or not? 
 Manhole covers put on after accident – could that have been done before accident task 
 Manhole cover could have been on - why is this sort of procedure not in general work 
methods - training given- and made compulsory? Again, it is probably too general and 
fine detail to expect it in MS but it does come under general site housekeeping and can 
be monitored. It is also a purchasing and detailed, short-term planning issue - was the 
cover on site in time - was it available at the work location (purchasing personnel/site 
management)? Is there any resistance to using the cover at this stage because of possible 
damage and replacement cost? If so, what about supplying old covers, as temporary 
expedient, and moving them from site to site?  General housekeeping issue, which 
could have contributed to the manhole not being properly protected (site management 
and training). 
 Housekeeping – abhorred, but seen as a responsibility of the PC  
 Debris on the floor – additional obstacle for manoeuvring the tower 
 Brickies work seems to generate a huge amount of debris – is the management of this 
accommodated in the work set-up .   
 Block work debris like ball bearings – a design issue? 
 Very laborious procedure to go through to get another set of trades to clear up after 
themselves – chain of 4 telling to different people 
 Lighting problems – subtle, may have been an environmental factor for the accident or 
just a demotivator 
 Good ideas to prevent reoccurrence of the accident event (barriers) have not gone 
beyond the SC team – communication issue. 
 Suggestion that other trades were in the area at the time – irritation not so much caused 
by their presence, but rather the overlap of work location requirements Disharmony 
with the brickies – they’re dirty, don’t turn up and upset their work programme. 
 Safety instruction / training seems to be mainly the responsibility of the S.O? Can lead 
to loss of ownership issues 
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 Doesn’t seem to be a huge amount of within team communication (new ideas) for IP 
 ‘Programme’ is the measure for co-ordination /communication, yet simultaneously we 
here that the formal programme is always being challenged by circumstances such as no 
show of ops etc. – other method is just a walk round 
 Measure of compliance with safety rules etc = use of PPE – high dependence on this 
measure 
 Own company induction = read out 
 MS/RA – usual sign and read system for ops 
 Safety responsibilities informally assumed for supervisor – not managed 
 IP senior and seen as ‘supervisory’ in the hierarchy anyway? Some loss of overseeing 
for these experienced people 
 
 
Case study 52 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Groundworker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
The IP was hand digging for temporary water main for site use, shovel cut through rusty armour 
on cable and cut outer covering of copper cable causing a short. The area was surveyed with 
CAT machine prior to excavations starting but the cable was not located, also cable did not 
show on record drawings.  The electricity company attended site and cable pot ended’. (Quote 
from accident report).  Site supervisor’s remedial action to the accident - called in the electricity 
company - they pot ended and left it alone They couldn’t turn it off, as they didn’t know where 
it came from.  Had run CAT over it several times and never traced it. 
  
Emerging Issues 
 Definitely a potential fatality 
 Inadequacy of below-ground services information – permanent works design 
implications 
 Why did CAT detector not work? 
 Supervisor acknowledged ‘pot-ends’ as a problem to trace – but was not aware if other 
equipment was available to trace them 
 No user information regularly supplied to site with detector 
 Ineffective procedures 
 ‘Job and knock’ – did this encourage hasty progress? – Supervisor acknowledges time 
pressure problems although he stresses not for accident task 
 Experienced operative 
 Comments that RAs are a waste of time 
 
 
Case study 53 
Construction type Residential IP Role Pipe fitter 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
‘IP was dragging hose back towards external tap. He tripped over loose rubble and went over on 
right ankle.  IP sustained swelling to his right ankle’. (Quote from accident report.  Entry made 
by the injured person). 
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Emerging Issues 
 Housekeeping is major issue here 
 Site supervisor’s thoughts of accident cause and remedial action – ‘an untidy site’ – ‘it 
was visible and therefore up to the individual to decide whether they wanted to track 
across a particular part of the ground.  In the corner where the work was the area was 
untidy.  But it was an access point as this is the only water point for the site; therefore 
the builder is under an obligation to keep this clear.  Could have reported it to the PC as 
it was perhaps too dodgy.’ 
 Indication that housekeeping is worse when things are delayed – more rubbish but also 
more materials not being fixed. 
 Provision and location of site water supply – site visit showed that it was fairly 
inaccessible. 
 Comments of weather effects on housekeeping – more materials lying around when 
people are ‘rained-off’. 
 Time pressure due to needed to test the pipe work to release area for ceiling fixers 
 Remedial action = Area was cleaned up.  No attempt to address underlying issues. 
 
 
Case study 54 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Scaffolder 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
Whilst carrying a scaffold tube the IP slipped on some ethofoam (protection for curing 
concrete), causing injury to his back (from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The ethofoam should have been cleared before other trades came to the place of work.  
 Is there another way of protecting the concrete rather than using “slippy” ethofoam?   
 What have manufacturers done about this issue? 
 Why was the temporary lighting not on? Did this prevent IP from seeing the foam?  
 Who had made the decision to proceed before all ‘ethofoam’ removed from area of 
work?  
 IP thought the safety culture on site was terrible - why?  
 IP commented that there have been no toolbox talks – why? 
 
 
Case study 55 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Scaffolder 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
IP stepped onto scaffold boards, board toppled IP fell and hurt side (From accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 There are conflicting reports with this accident - it is possible the accident didn’t happen 
where the accident book said it did.  If it did happen at the location and if the wind was 
that strong the IP should have not been working. This is a training and supervision 
issue.  
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 Training - manual handling - wind danger handling large panels/boards.  What is 
normally given? - CITB?  What was given to the IP on his scaffold course 3 months 
ago? 
 The incident seems to have happened in the lift shaft.  It may not seem to be a location 
with a high risk of wind - was this recognised in the RA?  How is this being dealt with 
for the future?  It could have, presumably, unbalanced the IP and sent him to the bottom 
of the shaft, in slightly different circumstances -so its not a trivial incident. 
 Safety culture is recognised as "bad" - the foreman did not know how the accident had 
taken place and it is not clear whether it had even been recorded.   
 Why is the housekeeping on the site so poor? Did this have any effect on the cause of 
the accident? Supervisor suggested that operative was helping labourer tidy up at time 
of accident. 
 What are the safety policies of PC - and how are they implemented/disseminated?  They 
don't seem to be making much impact on this site. 
 Could a different design, methods of working have avoided the need for scaffolding 
altogether? 
 Why are the operatives not shown the MS/RA for their tasks? Are the operatives 
consulted about the MS/RA during its production?  
 
 
Case study 56 
Construction type Eng Construction IP Role Labouring 
Construction phase End Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP went to lift large vacuum cleaner which, he thought, was empty - it wasn’t and the additional 
weight caused him to strain his back. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 This is a typical ‘random’ task with the potential to face an operative with unexpected, 
heavy or awkward lift.  It is a generic problem that has dimensions of training, 
supervision, communication, leadership, culture.  The challenge is to attack the attitudes 
that say that this type of accident is unavoidable; that trying to avoid it is a waste of 
time and money; and that to do so would be demeaning to the macho image of 
construction.  
 Awkward area to lift load through door, load may have been unstable, vacuum 
contained rubble. 
 No MS for task, only generic - this sort of task will not be covered in MS/RA 
documents or designed out under the current approach towards risk management. 
 Safety advisor now works in visiting role to site, was on site full time until ~3 months 
ago 
 Op has received training in manual handling techniques – they should have included 
how to lift; to check weight; how to check weight, if the object is not labelled etc.; two-
person lifting tasks.  
 Supervision and reinforcement of MH technique application - to ensure that they are 
applied.  A short course is inadequate without follow-up to ensure that they become 
habit.  
 Possible design issues for the vacuum cleaners: vac-full warnings; handle design for 
ease of lifting; etc. 
 Job rushed, not expecting to do straight away 
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 Op working alone, felt it was not appropriate to ask for help but if needed would be 
difficult as only labourer on site - works alone much of the time, isolated as only 
labourer, difficult to get help 
 
 
Case study 57 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Labouring 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst lifting sheet piles (with the crane), the IP trapped his hand between chain and pile.  His 
wound was wrapped with a sterile bandage, and taken to hospital.  He was wearing gloves at the 
time. (Adapted from accident book) 
 
Emerging Issues 
 IP asked what the study for, he then stated it is very difficult to prevent an accident an 
accident is what it sounds like, an accident. 
 Why was the crane driver allowed to use mobile phone whilst working? 
 Why was there not better communication between the operative and the driver for the 
lift? – Third party to communicate between the two as the driver could not see the 
operation due to crane location/confined working area – why had this situation 
occurred; what did the MS for this operation suggest? 
 Why was the correct ‘lift puller’ not used? 
 
 
Case study 58 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Scaffolding 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst repositioning scaffold boards IP stood on the end board being repositioned and fell 
through to ground level approx 5m causing bruising to shin and thigh and cut to nose. (From 
accident book) 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The scaffold was for the formwork carpenters to work off. There was a lot of 
complicated returns and junctions, is there a need for so many? Could the designers not 
have made more standard forms? 
 Design issue- was there a need for the work to be done?  
 Training issue- why did the scaffolder fall through?? 
 
 
Case study 59 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Electrician 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was cutting a piece of trunking with a hand held hacksaw when the hacksaw jumped and the 
blade cut a cross my thumb. 
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Emerging Issues 
 12-hour day, possible lack of concentration and fatigue affecting manual control of 
tools - but no time of day recorded. 
 PPE (gloves) would probably have avoided injury - why are they not worn? 
 Could the cutting have been designed out?  What about possible pre-fabrication off site, 
or even in a properly set up workshop on site, to allow cutting in a better environment?  
Are push-fit joint systems an option for this trunking? 
 General lack of attention to MS and RA - might not have prevented this accident, but 
not good. 
 
 
Case study 60 
Construction type MB Refurbishment IP Role Ductwork removal 
Construction phase Start Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
‘During the renewal of overhead ductwork using Genie lift.  Genie lift was thrown from under 
duct due to weight of duct.  Struck [IP] and trapped him against plant upstand causing injury to 
left side badly bruised, broken skin, treated at A&E.  Back at work on light duties [following 
day]. (Quote from accident report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 This is a typical example of the effect of the combination of construction macho culture 
(get on with it - worry about the consequences when they happen) and ad hoc, 
unrehearsed/unpractised tasks (often occurring in activities not subject to 'learned' trade 
skills - particularly evident in demolition).  The problem (90 degree bend hitting floor 
first), even if not the consequences (destabilising the 'Genie'), could easily have been 
foreseen.  It would have needed a bit of careful, lateral thinking, before the task was 
started; but this needs training of operatives and/or author of method statement.  The 
tick-box, check-list style of the manual handling form and RA is better than nothing; 
but how much real thought, leading to problem recognition and solving, is it likely to 
provoke? 
 Does management positively encourage operatives and supervisors to look for and 
report problems?  
 Are supervisors and leading-hands, TRAINED to be pro-active in problem recognition, 
reporting and discussion (or is "stop whinging and get on with it" the normal response)? 
It’s all about positive reinforcement really.  
 Are managers TRAINED to anticipate problems? - its all about rigorous  planning.  
 Are current RA formats and training in their preparation adequate? 
 Rather than encourage total standardisation in risk management, it would be better to 
require managers and supervisors to respond to some open-ended questions (particularly 
for non-repetitive tasks) like: What might be the barriers to completing this task in a 
continuous process? (eg labour, plant and equipment, PPE, space, etc.) What are the 
most significant risks/problems during this task? What are you going to do about it? 
Who is doing what at each stage? 
 It is really all part of a rigorous short-term planning process, of which safety plans are 
only a part and should not be seen as an end in themselves. 
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Case study 61 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Stripping cables 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
‘The IP was removing redundant cables supported by brackets at high level.  The brackets ahead 
were not securely fixed and gave way and the weight of the cables caused by the brackets 
collapsing proved to be too heavy to hold, it slid through his hand cutting it severely’. (Quote 
from accident report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 
 Site supervisor’s thoughts of accident cause and remedial action: 
o Accident cause = It happened on a Saturday.  Taking our redundant electrical 
cable which was badly installed.  There weren’t sufficient brackets and it all fell 
away. 
o Remedial action = it was just a one off – one redundant cable.  He didn’t have 
gloves on  - but these wouldn’t have made it better or worse anyway.  [Under 
different circumstances] the weight of the cable could have caught the glove 
and pulled him.  It was not an everyday job.  It may have been ok if there were 
2, but he’s keen and attempted it alone.  Didn’t know that he was dong the job.  
Didn’t ask him to do it and he took it on his own back to pull it down. They had 
had a site induction (it wasn’t part of the original contract to take the cable 
down) therefore extra time of 2hrs/day to take the cable down. 
 Only generic MS in place – should specific measures have been taken to support the 
cable as it dropped 
 Is the use of ‘rebar’ as a splint for cable repair acceptable practice?  Has this been 
considered re the risk of injury similar to this incident (of even just snagging rebar when 
walking by)? 
 
 
Case study 62 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Pipe fitter 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
‘IP slipped on inside of scaffold, fell and twisted left knee.  Mud on boots caused slip.  
Designated footpath was asked for in H&S meeting (Quote from accident report).   
 
Emerging Issues. 
 Cleaning of boots - facilities and training - Although it is recognised that this should be 
done, there is no provision for it - boot scrapers or water bin.   
 There is also the related issue of keeping ladder rungs clean - the accident happened on 
the way down; it may not have been mud on the boots themselves.   
 What specific safety advice and training is generally available on these issues?  How is 
disseminated? Does the dissemination really get to those at risk in a form that demands 
attention, as opposed to 'something to read and sign for'? 
 Safety culture - There is much evidence in the data that the safety culture on the site is 
poor.  The impression is of a site, on which safety issues are a side issue, to be 
addressed when forced to, rather than central to the production management process.  
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 The respective responsibilities of the PC and the SC seem to be unclear, at least to those 
involved on site.   
 There is mention of instructions from the SO (which SO - PC or SC?) and Safety Rep. 
Where are these recorded and were they discussed at safety or general planning 
meetings? 
 Some suggestion that lack of job security may have negatively affected the safety 
culture 
 
 
Case study 63 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Bricklayer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness Late   
 
Accident description 
‘While fixing a ‘tek’13 screw to a steel column within the car park a small fragment of steel was 
projected into the eye of [IP}.  [IP] received first-aid  (eye wash) and then was taken to hospital 
where the fragment was removed. [IP] returned to work the next day. (Quote from accident 
report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 PPE - 'wear-ability' of goggles/glasses and steaming up – an equipment design issue - 
has it been solved by any manufacturer? - Is it a cost issue? Safety glasses would 
probably be sufficient for this task. 
 Tool design - Do any electric hand tool manufacturers make protective shields to attach 
to the 'drill'?  At first sight it would not seem difficult to provide a clear plastic plate, 
possibly angled, to allow the operator to see the bit (or drill) and screw/work area, but 
providing protection from flying swarf.  It would tend to get scratched and eventually 
opaque but better than nothing and cheap to replace. 
 Work position/work sequence - Working overhead is always going to be more difficult, 
uncomfortable, tiring and therefore dangerous.  Could the operative have carried out the 
task from a different position or in a different sequence, with a bit of forward planning, 
to permit a better work position?  Could it even have been done before the steel was 
fixed in position?  Even, perhaps, by the steel erectors? 
 Safety culture - There is little evidence of the PC’s safety management at all, except for 
the mention of induction.  There is a definite overall impression of the PC being rather 
'hands-off' and maybe trusting to luck or simply hiding behind the SC responsibilities. 
 
 
Case study 64 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Pipe fitter 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
‘Walking (across the floor slab) -  IP tripped on a floor setting out point that was not marked 
and twisted left knee’. (Quote from accident report).   
 
                                                     
13 ‘Tek’ term used by interviewees in this accident study to describe self-drilling /self-tapping screws – They may not 
have been manufactured by Tek. 
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Emerging Issues 
 IP’s comment on remedial action - At time put a traffic cone over the top – but the 
cones get moved because these are in access routes.  Thinks that PC put these in too 
early – they should be done just before the area gets screeded over. 
 Setting out points are an essential part of the construction process – However, and 
perhaps because of this, they are frequently overlooked as trip hazards.  Most safety 
advisors would probably walk passed such a hazard and not even notice it. 
 The main issue may be one of establishing and maintaining safe walk-ways. 
 
 
Case study 65 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Bricklayer’s labourer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
‘Whilst lowering hod full of bricks, bricks tumbled out and squashed little finger on right hand, 
breaking skin. (Quote from accident report).   
 
Emerging Issues 
 Are hods still an acceptable method to transport bricks – what are the alternatives? 
 Pre-assembled brickwork would have prevented the need for bricks on site – was this 
option considered viable? 
 What training did the IP have regarding the use of the hod – probably none as it is 
considered something that every bricklayer’s labourer can use. 
 No gloves? – Why not? – Use-ability/comfort/availability etc 
 
 
Case study 66 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Dryliners’ labourer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
I was on my way down to tea break when I saw a piece of the metal strut sticking out at eye 
level and I tried to remove it and cut my hand (this is part of his job) (IP interview account) 
 
Emerging Issues 
 This appears to be a design issue?  Why was the metal sticking out after it had been 
installed?  An obvious hazard!  Should it have been there (i.e. part of the construction)? 
Was it fixed?  Could it have been 'designed out'? 
 Training of tradesmen (dryliners) - any safety content to avoid leaving sharp edges 
sticking out - if no formal training of dry-liners, as a trade, why no TBT training on 
responsibility to other workers, specific to the job? 
 Training and supervision of IP - Why not encouraged (told) to wear gloves when 
handling potentially sharp objects?   
 The 'manager' says it is not possible to be there 24 hours a day but is there REAL 
encouragement to wear gloves? 
 Availability of PPE - no mention of gloves in the list of PPE provided – Why not? - Are 
they provided and by whom? 
  146
Case study 67 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Site electrician 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst walking on the deck making preparation for a transformer, IP stepped on a piece of wood 
with nail in it  (from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 IP commenting on housekeeping- ‘could have been tidier, there are plenty of skips 
available but people don’t use them enough’. 
 What is the housekeeping management system on this site?  Is there a gang (person) 
responsible for keeping the site clear and safe or is it 'everybody's (or nobody's) job'? 
What training is given?  How often?  When was it last given – and was housekeeping 
given proper focus? 
 How are managers/supervisors trained to deal with housekeeping?  Are they, 
themselves supervised by senior management?  When was the last time that a senior 
manager visited and mentioned housekeeping? 
 What is the relevant company policy and how is it administered? 
 Is there a real danger for electricians wearing steel-soled boots and, if not, why does the 
IP think there is training?   
 Why were appropriate boots not provided and insisted on? 
 
 
Case study 68 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Site Labouring 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
The IP was walking through props (temporary works) and stood on a sleeper prop, knocking the 
prop over which fell and landed on his head then onto his shoulder (from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 This seems to be all about training and site management systems. 
 The IP was walking between jobs 
 Should the IP have been walking between the props?  If not, what is done to prevent this 
happening - induction, and supervision?   
 Should the props not have been cordoned off?   
 Should this have been written in the risk assessment?   
 Should the prop have been properly secured?  If so, what is the content of trade, 
induction, and TBT training to try to ensure that appropriate precautions are taken; and 
how is this training reinforced through supervision? 
 If the props can be left in an unstable condition (to say nothing of the formwork that 
they support), then what warning notices or other systems are in place to ensure that 
nobody gets hurt?   
 Why hadn’t the props been checked to make sure that they were all tight? 
 Could the design been changed to prevent the use of props? 
 Could the need for in-situ concrete have been designed out, to avoid this and many 
other potentially dangerous (and unhealthy) situations? 
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Case study 69 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Construction Manager 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Shutter (being lifted by crane) knocked the IP down one flight on ladder, leaving his left hand 
bruised-sore side and back-sprained fingers (taken from accident book).  Supervisors comments- 
Accident cause ‘this really was a “freak accident” the shutter caught the top of the ladder and 
knocked him off’. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 This seems to be mainly a problem of inadequate work and logistics planning, RA and 
safety training.   
 Why was a table form shutter being slung into position near an access area (ladder)?  
Ladder access, or indeed any pedestrian access, immediately below work with a crane 
must be a potential danger - was it considered and why was the ladder not either 
removed or access blocked?  Surely this should not have happened- this issue should be 
written in the Risk assessment.   
 Wind is often a problem when using a crane to lift large panels.  Why were they moving 
the shutter when it was so windy?  Was wind considered in the RA or in short-term 
planning? (e.g. was the weather forecast available and discussed?) 
 There seems to be an underlying lack of consciousness of danger in many of the 
statements and little concern for training - safety culture is not good, in spite of the 
belief of the employees - why so little training and why was this particular type of 
danger not covered? 
 Design - could in-situ concrete have been avoided altogether? 
 Working hours - 12 hours a day, with a half hour break, is too much and likely to lead 
to tiredness and lack of concentration - could this have been a factor? - There is no time 
of day recorded for the accident, but in any case, this sort of schedule must lead to 
cumulative tiredness, especially in a physical occupation. 
 Remedial action = none, which suggests that the site did not see that there were things 
that could have prevented the accident. 
 
 
Case study 70 
Construction type Residential IP Role Ground worker 
Construction phase End Employer status PC 
Timeliness 3 weeks late   
 
Accident description 
The IP was putting rubbish in the skip and a slab fell over and landed on his foot (from accident 
report).  IP Accident description:  ‘I was cleaning up the site. There was a pile of slabs by the 
skip and the strap round them was broken and the slabs were held up by a piece of wood.  As 
the excavator drove passed the vibration of the machine dislodged the wood just as I was 
passing by and one of the slabs fell onto the bridge of my foot.  
 
Emerging Issues 
 This is typical of sites when nearing the end - trades and materials tend to be 
everywhere- Would it not have been better to store the slabs at the intended installation 
location?  Why wasn’t this done? 
 Why hadn’t slabs been supported/ stored better? - not enough site supervision? 
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 Has supervisor done site inspection may have revealed the slabs were stored unsafely  
 Training on material storage? 
 Remedial action= slabs were tidied up and made safe, which suggests that the site did 
not see that there were things that could have prevented the accident. 
 
 
Case study 71 
Construction type Residential IP Role Plumbing installation 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP’s version of the accident: ‘I was testing out the heating system, but the pump wasn’t wired up 
so I got the apprentice electrician to wire the pump in, when I switched it on the boiler cut out 
so I went up to see if the pipes were getting hot and held the pipes close to the pump, and I was 
electrocuted. The current held me in for about 15 seconds.’  Plumbing manager’s version: 
‘Basically it was a wiring problem- a design fault that was overlooked by the manufacturer- The 
push-in electrical socket was put in the wrong way by the apprentice electrician making the 
appliance “live”. This gave the IP an electrical shock.’ 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Manufacture error - pump was modified by manufacturer after accident 
 Why didn’t the pump ‘fail-safe’ 
 Was wiring error obvious?  Why not? 
 Remedial action = ‘We traced all the said pumps (100) and removed them- the 
manufacturer was informed subsequently the pump has been removed from the market’. 
 
 
Case study 72 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Brickwork Manager 
Construction phase Unknown Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
‘Quickform’ scaffold fell over damaging helmet and knocking IP over. (From accident book)  
The works manager (PC) version: ‘The materials were not stacked properly- and the scaffolding 
fell onto him 
 
Emerging Issues 
 This could have been very serious, site storage and planning of operations needed to be 
addressed better, especially as this accident was in a major walkway. 
 Scaffold workers/ erectors (should have been stored better).  
 Why was there scaffolding lying around that could fall?  
 Were too many trades working in one area? 
 What was housekeeping system? 
 Remedial action = stacked the scaffold properly and removed to storage areas, which 
suggests that the site did not see that there were things that could have prevented the 
accident. 
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Case study 73 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Groundworker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP got his foot caught in piece of ‘rebar’ sticking out of the crushed concrete hardcore and fell 
onto stub column- bruised right side just above hip (taken from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 This is a design issue relating to specification of re-cycled hardcore. 
 Similar accidents had happened previously on this site with trips and falls on the 
hardcore. They were using hardcore from the site demolition, it clearly wasn’t crushed 
enough- down to the specification.  It was not clear who was responsible for hardcore 
specification? 
 Should rebar have been removed? - Why not seen as a hazard? 
 Workers responsible for laying hardcore- “eyeballing” for problems – Is this effective? 
 Site manger – housekeeping/ safety checks – Why weren’t they done?  What was the 
system? 
 
 
Case study 74 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Scaffold erection 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Holding chain sling from fork lift around tower used by steel fixers on columns- chain slipped 
and tightened around left hand thumb causing bruising to shank of thumb (taken from accident 
book).  IP’s version of the accident: ‘We were slinging the tower and the chain came across my 
thumb- caught chain between scaffold tube and the fork. It is hard to control the lift when using 
the forks as they jerks when you lift- really we should have been using the crane but it was 
being used elsewhere’. 
 
Emerging Issues  
 Why wasn’t the crane free to take down scaffold rather than the fork lift? - Scheduling 
 Why were they allowed to proceed without using the crane? 
 Was the forklift ‘approved’ for this use? 
 Was forklift ‘designed for this use? 
 
 
Case study 75 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Setting out engineer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP trod on ½ brick and turned right ankle that had swollen. Ground is made up with crushed 
brick material and it is inherent that these materials will be loose (taken from accident book). 
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Emerging Issues  
 IP was walking around the site - See accident 73 regarding hardcore specification. 
 Who made the decision regarding the ground fill material- not broken up finely enough? 
 Was the hardcore sufficiently compacted? 
 Was this risk acknowledged by designers, specifiers and installers? – If not, why not? – 
If it was then why wasn’t anything done? 
 
 
Case study 76 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Formworker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was walking between jobs.  Scraped shin on bars in top of columns which lock into slab 
(starter bars) (from accident record). 
 
Emerging Issues  
 The main issue here seems to be why was the footpath /access route so close to the 
protruding rebar? 
 One of the steel fixers had had a similar accident the day before.  Why was something 
not done? 
 Could protruding bars have been protected / highlighted in some way?  Is there any 
provision in the method statement for protection of work? If not should this be 
included? 
 Why was rebar sticking out of columns?  Could it have been designed out? – Yes, but 
only for a period and only in a way that would significantly increase the cost. 
 IP had read the MS and thought it was fairly easy to understand.  It was helpful and 
appropriate in fact it was very specific to the task – But this ‘activity’ was off-task. 
 
 
Case study 77 
Construction type Residential IP Role Apprentice carpenter 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was putting a roof-trussed rafter up. He walked backwards along the working platform of the 
scaffold. At some point he stepped into a void in the platform created by two missing battens.  
Unknown persons had removed these.  He knew they were missing and perceived this 
hazardous but took no action to rectify it.  IP fell through the void injuring his ribs (From 
accident record). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The whole issue of the boards being removed was passed from trade to trade and no-one 
admitted to it.  
 Why were boards moved? - No one saying.  
 Why hadn’t they a) put the scaffold boards back or b) reported that they had been 
moved? If they moved them – why?  
 Non-conformance with the MS for the task supervisor aware of the missing boards, but 
continued to work. 
 Was there enough space for working? 
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 This was a difficult crane lift – Why were they proceeding in wet/windy weather?  
 IP had not seen the RA or MS for the task 
 IP’s partner was on piecework therefore was he tempted to work when unsafe? 
 IP was having apprentice training at the time from a carpenter on piece work- is this 
good practice? 
 
 
Case study  78 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Electrician 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Gash above left eyebrow after heavy armoured cable became loose and fell across side of IP’s 
face (from accident book).  IP’s version of the accident: ‘I was working in the switch room 
which is quite confined. There was the main supply coming in (75mm armoured cable) on a reel 
lying on the floor so I stood it up and tied it up by the fuse board. The weight made it fall over 
and it fell onto my left leg’. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Why was the cable so long?  Should it have been cut off by the electricity company? 
 Inadequate working/storage space.  
 Should the reel of cable have been stood on its end?  
 Why hadn’t the cable been cut back previously: “In hindsight the cable should have 
been cut off beforehand as there was no need for the reel of cable to be there” 
(Supervisor) 
 Remedial action: tied it back up again. The remedial action says it all!   
 Why wasn’t any further remedial action taken to provide more or better storage? 
 
 
Case study 79 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Scaffolder 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Walked away from point of attachment to extent of lanyard causing sudden jolt.  Pain in lower 
back at base of spine (from accident book).  IP’s version of the accident: “I was fitting the 
scaffold out with boards and tubes.  I was hooked on to the scaffold top rail with my harness I 
tried to pick up a 21 footer (scaffold tube) past the length of the lanyard and hurt my back - to 
be honest I forgot I had it (the harness) on.”  Supervisor described it as a ‘freak accident?  IP 
forgot that he had his harness on and moved beyond its reach and consequently hurt his back’. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Was the harness worn correctly? 
 Was this obvious? 
 Was IP trained? 
 Did IP understand harness limitation? 
 Why did he ‘forget’ it was on? 
 What does this say about the IP’s attitude towards a safe working environment and 
PPE? 
 Was method statement clear about when harnesses were necessary? 
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Case study 80 
Construction type Residential IP Role Carpenter 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was fitting a garage door, finger was trapped between latch plate and garage frame- left hand 
tip of thumb (from accident report).  IP’s description of the accident: ‘I was putting a garage 
door on- screwing the lock in position which snatched my hand trapping my thumb between the 
mechanism and the frame’. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Is this a manufacturing issue or was he just going too fast as he was working on a price? 
 Should he have been wearing gloves?  Were they available / suitable? 
 Sounds like a two-person operation – why was he alone? 
 Was sufficient task lighting available?  
 
 
Case study 81 
Construction type Residential IP Role Bricklayer labourer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP tripped on a broken brick on the scaffold (taken from accident book).  IP’s version of the 
accident: ‘I was walking on the scaffold, stood on half a brick and twisted my ankle’. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 His job was to clean the scaffold which he didn’t do - He should know this is part of his 
job – but it should be written in a MS or job description 
 Housekeeping- IP should have cleaned it up in the first place? 
 Housekeeping on scaffold – was not being tidied.  Time pressures at the time of the 
accident were due to ‘price work’ payment for brickwork, which may have discouraged 
IP from cleaning/clearing the scaffold.  
 IP dissatisfied with job and place of work – this may have affected his inclination to 
keep work area tidy. 
 Training on H&S by the site manager? 
 Remedial action: IP cleaned the scaffold, which suggests that the site did not see that 
there were things that could have prevented the accident. 
 
 
Case study 82 
Construction type Residential IP Role General site labourer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP, whilst tidying round a scaffold bent over hat fell off, when picked it up tried to stand up to 
put it back on, didn’t notice scaffold tube and hit causing cut to temple (taken from accident 
book)  IP’s version of the accident: ‘I didn’t have my hard hat on at first and as I was lifting 
some concrete from under the scaffold I hit my head on a scaffold tube’.  
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Emerging Issues 
 Commenting on PPE, IP stated: “I don’t like wearing them that’s why I had my hat off - 
I bought my own boots as they are more comfortable.  
 Perhaps there should be better training on PPE use and care? 
 Training on H&S by the site manager? 
 Safety procedures? 
 Lots of negative comments about job satisfaction – possibly leading to disregard for 
safety? 
 
 
Case study 83 
Construction type Residential IP Role Trainee Site Manager 
Construction phase Middle Employer status SC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was moving glass and cut his finger (taken from accident book).  IP’s description of the 
accident: ‘I was moving a piece of glass in the container and a splinter went into my little 
finger’. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Should have been wearing gloves if it is necessary to handle glass - Injured party at 
fault therefore no causal chain? 
 Did MS state that when handling glass all operatives should wear gloves? Is this 
enough? 
 Were appropriate gloves available?  Why didn’t the IP wear them? 
 Was the temporary lighting sufficient?  
 Why was the glass broken?  
 Why was a trainee site manager moving glass? 
 Remedial action: made people wear gloves when handling glass. 
 
 
Case study 84 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Ground worker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was placing kerbs, lost grip, block fell onto fourth finger of right hand causing slight bruising 
(taken from accident book).  IP’s description of the accident: ‘I was picking a kerb up and I 
dropped it trapping my finger between another block’.  
 
Emerging Issues 
 This was the first time he had done the task. Therefore had he had sufficient training for 
the work?  
 Also he was working on his own for a first time task.  He had had not been on any 
courses prior to the accident either. 
 Why were better gloves for the task (i.e. more grip plus protection for the fingers) not 
available? 
 Who chooses gloves?  What is the purchase strategy? 
 Manual handling – was the kerb stone too heavy to be lifted? Was there/is there 
specialist equipment that could have been used for the task?  
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 Were risk assessment and method statement in place? 
 Could the designer / supplier have designed kerb better to ease installation and manual 
handling? 
 
 
Case study 85 
Construction type Civil Engineering Contract type Joint venture 
Construction phase Middle IP Role Trainee foreman 
Timeliness On time Employer status PC 
 
 
Accident description 
Leg was caught by the JCB14 whilst walking past (taken from accident book).  IP Accident 
description: my leg (right) was run over by a JCB whilst I was helping the JCB driver pick up a 
compressor. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Should the trainee foreman have been doing this? Clearly he was not trained for the job. 
 Should they have been working in this weather?  
 Was the JCB the right plant for the job?  
 Co-ordination between the JCB driver and the foreman during the accident task was 
insufficient  
 Was the work area too confined for the task?  
 Was correct lifting equipment being used to pick the compressor up?  
 Did the site conditions (wet & muddy) play a part in the accident?  
 Lack of supervision?  
 No method statement or risk assessment. 
 Did design allow for enough working space? 
 
 
Case study 86 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Plant operator 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Cut inside of left hand on piece of metal from the pile (taken from accident book).  IP Accident 
description: ‘I got out of the machine and walked past one of the piles tripped and grabbed the 
pile and a metal splinter went into my left hand palm through the glove’.  Supervisors comment 
on the accident cause: ‘he was trying to get past the pile and caught his hand on a spike sticking 
out’. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Was there the need to walk so close to the piles? Walkway required? 
 Gloves were being worn but were they in good condition and of acceptable 
quality/thickness/toughness?  
 No information on the type of piles - but could the splinter that caused the injury have 
been removed in the manufacture or protected on site, to prevent the possibility of the 
injury?  
                                                     
14 ‘JCB’ term used by interviewees in this accident study to describe multi-functional back-hoe excavator – The 
excavator may not have been manufactured by JCB. 
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 Otherwise, difficult to see how the accident could have been avoided except by the IP 
taking more care - possible general training issue. 
 Were gloves of a sufficient thickness/quality?  
 What did the IP trip over – site tidiness?  
 Confined working area – design consideration? 
 
 
Case study 87 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Apprentice Formworker 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was dismantling timber shutters using crow bar and strained his wrist  (taken from accident 
book) 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The IP does the task frequently so one may presume he was fully trained and had 
sufficient experience for the task?   
 Can this operation be classified as a repetitive strain injury? 
 Assuming that the IP was using the correct tool, and there is nothing to suggest 
otherwise, then he must have been using it in the wrong way.  This makes it an 
ergonomics problem.  To take this any further, it would be necessary to know much 
more about the way that the task was being carried out.   
 If it was being done in a potentially dangerous way, then it also becomes a training 
issue. 
 What specific training had the IP had in positioning himself correctly in relation to the 
work piece, positioning and supporting the work piece, handling hand-tools safely, etc. 
 
 
Case study 88 
Construction type Residential IP Role Trainee scaffolder 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
Whilst carrying scaffold clips he tripped on a brick band falling to the ground causing an injury 
to his left side.  Later report given saying there was rib damage (taken from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The IP was carrying the clips in his arms in front of himself - a manual handling issue - 
How is the operative trained to carry scaffold clips?  Is it written down anywhere?  
Even if it is, how is the method communicated to the operative?  He should have been 
trained to carry them in a sack or a bucket or another carrying device 
 Site housekeeping poor (ish) at the time of the accident - What is the system is for 
dealing with housekeeping.  Is it a specifically allocated responsibility?  Is there 
sufficient time allowed for dealing with it? What does the person (or gang) who are 
supposed to deal with it think of the arrangements? etc. 
 As it happened quite early in the day, there does not appear to be a reason for 
carelessness or lack of concentration. 
 Why did his supervisor allow him to proceed?  
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Case study 89 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Joiner 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was trying to straighten a starter bar.  His mate was holding the top of the rebar whilst the IP 
hit it with a sledgehammer to straighten it. On approximately the third hit the rebar bounced out 
of the hands of his mate and hit the IP on the side of the head. This area swelled up, there was a 
small cut but it did not bleed. 
 
IP Accident description: “I was trying to straighten a starter bar.  My mate was holding the top 
of the rebar whilst I hit is with a sledgehammer. On about the third hit the rebar bounced out of 
the hands of his mate and hit me on the side of the head.”-  
 
Emerging Issues  
 If the bar was a starter bar (presumably already concreted in), why was mate holding it? 
– if not already concreted in, then becomes very dangerous to be hitting it with sledge, 
while held. 
 Surely this practice is not written in the MS – Therefore, no MS/RA for the accident 
task 
 Using wrong tools - a training and supervision issue.  Had IP ever had instruction as to 
the correct way of carrying out the task?  Were the correct tools available?  The 
supervisor stated that “the IP was using the wrong equipment for the task” – But what 
would be the right equipment? 
 Is bending damaged bars straight acceptable under the spec. anyway?  i.e. is it a 
recognised task? 
 Site organisation/housekeeping - If the bar had not been damaged, the accident would 
not have happened.  What protective actions are taken to avoid damage?  Why did they 
fail?  
 Why did supervisor not stop the activity and make sure that they used the correct 
equipment?  
 
 
Case study 90 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Joiner 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
 
Accident description 
IP was assisting co-workers to move a table deck on a trolley when it toppled and fell onto his 
leg causing a deep cut to the left shin.  IP accident description: “I was helping three others to 
move the table deck, because the gang member who normally does it was off doing something 
else.  
 
Emerging Issues 
 Was the trolley faulty? Who should have checked? Is it a common problem that the 
wheels on the formwork table trolley’s get damaged? Effect of site housekeeping on the 
wheels? Effect of use on the wheels – i.e. had it been misused? 
 There is clearly an issue of trolley design.  It is neither suitable for the difficulties 
frequently encountered nor robust enough to stand up to site conditions. 
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 There is the question of suitability of the IP for the task being undertaken - he was not 
the usual operative for the task, and maybe not thoroughly familiar with the particular 
handling problems; he was also maybe somewhat elderly to be undertaking such a 
physical task. 
 What, if any, preparations are made (or could be made) to the work area to prevent 
trolley wheels running into a gulley - could it have been covered?   
 What about pre-planning of the work area? 
 There is also the question of training for manual handling.  It is frequently the case that 
operatives will 'dive' into a heavy task with inadequate thought as to exactly how it is to 
be accomplished and who is to do what.  For example, was the route that the trolley was 
to take, in this case, planned to avoid the gulley in the concrete, or did they just plough 
on regardless?   
 The pressure is normally to get the task done, even if there is no explicit time pressure 
and little or no training in task planning. 
 IP should have not been doing the task.  
 
 
Case study 91 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Joiner 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
 
Accident description 
IP was erecting a wall shutter and although he was aware of a piece of protruding scaffold 
behind him, when he turned round he caught his head on it and cut the bridge of his nose. His 
helmet took the brunt of the blow. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Remedial action - the piece of scaffold was removed to prevent recurrence of the 
incident. This should have been picked up earlier. Workers should be encouraged to 
report potential hazards. 
 Layout of site (Permanent works design issue) – not enough space for working.  
 Design of scaffold not suitable.  
 Responsiveness of management – IP had already mentioned the issue previously and no 
action had been taken. 
 
 
Case study 92 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Electrician 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was working in a ceiling void pulling cables through when he caught his elbow on the ceiling 
trim causing a cut to his arm (From accident book).  Supervisors comments: “The accident was 
a common occurrence; it is very easy to catch your arm on the grid, especially if not wearing 
long sleeves.  
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Emerging Issues  
 Remedial action – IP told to wear long sleeves when doing that task.  In the MS should 
electrician be wearing overalls? 
 Protection of IP through adequate PPE - even long sleeves do not seem entirely 
satisfactory as they would only partially protect against really sharp edges and would be 
snagging all the time, impeding work and causing distraction.  It would seem 
worthwhile to investigate a more suitable form of personal protection, say a type of 
leather arm protector or long gloves. 
 Could the ceiling components be protected around their sharp edges, at least where the 
wiring has to be pulled through? 
 Can the ceiling components be designed differently, so that there are no such sharp 
edges? 
 There is also the issue of excessively long working hours.  11-hour days are bound to 
result in fatigue and loss of concentration. 
 Did the task have to be completed after the ceiling grid was in place?  
 Did the design &/or installation of the ceiling grid mean that it was sharper than other 
types?  
 Are there other methods of work/types of ceiling systems that are easier to work 
around? 
 
 
Case study 93 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Bricklayer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness Shell – behind   
 Fit out - ahead   
 
Accident description 
Concrete fell from pour above. The men moved away, came back to work on 1st lift block B, 
when more concrete fell and splashed into eye of IP. (Taken from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Planning issue why were they working underneath a concrete pour? 
 What is the process of short-term planning?  
 Is there any systematic way in which the potential for this accident could, and should, 
have been recognised? 
 What does the main programme, MS and RA actually say about this issue?  Sequencing 
of trades and co-ordination of trades on site – i.e. to prevent trade overlap. 
 Was the actual activity being carried out of sequence?  If this happens, how is any 
consequent danger SUPPOSED to be noted?  Why wasn't it? 
 There are many indications that the site communications are not what they might be.  
How come that this event was repeated several times, without it being noted and action 
taken?   
 Is the general site culture, or particular individuals, providing resistance to free 
communication?   
 Are concerns listened to and acted upon (there is some evidence to suggest that they are 
not)? What should happen?   What is the reporting system? 
 Looking further upstream, did the design influence the construction sequence in a way 
to increase the risk of this accident (and it could, presumably, have been much more 
serious with heavy and difficult material like concrete being handled immediately above 
a working gang).  Could a different design have avoided this circumstance?  Was there 
a design risk assessment and did it have anything on this issue? 
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Case study 94 
Construction type Major Building IP Role General Labourer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness Shell – behind   
 Fit out - ahead   
 
Accident description 
IP was breaking concrete in lift pit using electric breaker. Whilst using the breaker it burst into 
flames, burning the IP’s ring finger on left hand (from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Had the equipment been PAT tested? Is it policy to PAT test equipment on site?  
 Had the supplier done any checks on the equipment prior to bringing it to site? 
 Was it properly maintained? - Check maintenance records, record of electrical safety 
checks, source of tool (e.g. hire company). 
 If it looked “dodgy” the users need to learn to report potential problems 
 Was the tool adequate for the job being undertaken? - was it powerful and robust 
enough? 
 Was it being (or had it been) incorrectly used? - e.g. was it being handled in such a way 
that the cables were likely to be damaged?  The Site Manager seems very sure that it 
had been mishandled - why had he done nothing about it? 
 Training in the correct use and care of breakers and their electrical tools?  There had 
apparently been none. 
 Tool design - given that it was probably common practice to 'drag it around by the 
cables', are the cables and fitting designed (or could/should they be) to stand up to this 
treatment?  
 Without good training AND better supervision it WILL happen.  
 Why had the supervisor not commented to the labourer that he shouldn’t be picking the 
breaker up by the cables? 
 Why was the labourer not wearing gloves?  
 
 
Case study 95 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Assistant engineer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was knocking in a peg when it split at the bottom on the first hit. On the second hit hurt his 
finger. Was using a sledgehammer at the time. 
 
Emerging Issues  
 Was the correct equipment being used at the time (i.e. correct size sledgehammer)?  
 Were the pegs faulty? Is there any check of the quality of the pegs?  
 Is there proper supervision  i.e. Equipment being used by chain lads?  
 Why was the IP not wearing gloves? 
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Case study 96 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Assistant Engineer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was stacking rolls of terram when one slipped. IP tried to stop it rolling causing fingers to be 
bent back, this caused bruising and swelling. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 His supervisor put it down to “horseplay” which is possible.  
 IP recorded a high degree of negative scores in the job satisfaction chart.  
 Why was an engineer handling the terram?  
 Was the stack to high?  
 The accident may have been due to carelessness or inexperience but to call it horseplay 
suggests an inappropriately cavalier attitude on the part of the Site Engineer and his 
remedies do not seem constructive.  Is this indicative of a culture of safety carelessness 
among middle management? 
 Why was an assistant engineer moving Terram anyway? Not a usual task. 
 1.5m high seems much too high for a pile of heavy rolls - surely potentially unstable 
and too high to lift from with safety.  The whole question of safe material storage and 
handling should be looked into on this site.  What are the company rules/guidelines and 
training approaches to this issue? 
 Was the IP properly supervised at the time? Should the IP have been undertaking the 
accident task? Were the rolls of terram stacked properly – was the pile too high? 
 
 
Case study 97 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Assistant engineer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP hit left shin with 7lb sledge hammer causing bruising (from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The remedial action says it all, coupled with follow-up statements- Remedial action= 
None apart from a personal realisation about what to do next time.  
 Training - the IP 'had task training' but did it include handling sledgehammers and 
positioning of body relative to work task? 
 Was the 7lb sledge appropriate - would a lump hammer not have been better for 
someone unused to handling heavy tools?   
 What does 'training manual', if there is one, say about this issue? 
 The problem seems to have been recognised before - what is the site communication 
system for such issues and why did it not work - yet anyway? 
 Is there proper supervision re. Equipment being used by chain lads?  
 Had the IP lost focus at the time of the accident?  
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Case study 98 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Joiner 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was cleaning shutter with metal scraper, scraper head caught a nail, which forced the handle 
into the side of IP’s neck causing bruising (from accident book). 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The main issue seems to be task and tool design.   
 Was the task being attempted in the most ergonomically beneficial way?   
 Was the shutter upright or horizontal and was it most easily cleaned in the way it was 
positioned? 
 Was the scraper easy to control?  Was it the best tool for the job - e.g. would high-
pressure water jet be better?   
 Had shutter been adequately prepared for the previous pour - e.g. sufficient release 
agent? 
 Excessive working hours (11.5 per day) and an accident happening late in the day 
maybe an issue.  Is this a case fatigue? 
 Lack of control of a long-handled tool becomes much more likely with fatigue. 
 Why had the shutter not been checked for nails before the cleaning began?  
 Nearly all positive ratings in the job satisfaction - enjoys his work.  
 
 
Case study 99 
Construction type Civil Engineering IP Role Joiner 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
IP was drilling a hole in shutter and brushing dust away, caught fingers in drill and broke 2 of 
them.  IP accident description: “We were drilling a hole in a shutter and needed to brush away 
the dust that was being created around the hole – whilst doing this I took my eye off it and 
caught my fingers in the drill and broke 2 of them”. IP rated it a very easy task. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 Carelessness and taking obvious risk but fatigue from excessive working hours (IP 10.5 
hour day and foreman. 11.5 hour day) could have had something to do with it.  Accident 
was on a Monday and the IP last day off was 4 days ago - worked weekend?  This 
situation is likely to lead to fatigue, boredom and careless actions. 
 Foreman reference to gloves is hardly relevant - the accident could even have been 
made worse - but the IP reference to being told to use the correct tool is interesting and 
in relation to training and supervision. 
 Was task being done at the workface?  Could it have been done in the site joinery shop, 
if there was one, or even off site? Thus giving a greater of control and better machinery. 
 Why was the correct tool not being used?  
 Why did the supervisor allow them to proceed without the correct tool?   
 Why had the IP not received training in the use of the equipment? 
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Case study 100 
Construction type Major Building IP Role Bricklayer 
Construction phase Middle Employer status PC 
Timeliness On time   
 
Accident description 
The IP was walking along scaffold when IP felt a board move underneath him.  IP fell though 
about 0.5m. 
 
Emerging Issues 
 The IP was walking between jobs. This could have been very serious- a near miss? 
 How often is scaffolding checked? Is this weekly daily? 
 Unqualified and irresponsible operatives modifying scaffold.  The answers must lie in 
training (not to), supervision (to prevent) or frequent inspection of scaffold to remedy 
any deficiency.   
 Had the scaffolders not been available to make the adaptations themselves? 
 Expected practice, actual current operative practice, relevant training and supervisory 
practice, including sanctions adopted in the event of expected practice not being 
followed?   
 Some sites operate, or at least threaten, instant dismissal if seen without a hard hat.   Yet 
the practice of removing elements of scaffold, without prior permission and appropriate 
safeguards, seems much more serious, in that it puts others at risk.  Why not the same 
policy here? 
 Operations planning -Was the interference of the scaffold anticipated?  If not, why not?  
What sort of systematic short-term planning takes place? 
 Could another form or method of construction that does not require scaffold, or even 
insitu brickwork, have been selected? 
 Why had the bricklayer moved the scaffold? – had it not been put up as required?  
 Why had the supervisor allowed them to move the scaffold?  
 Co-ordination/communication between the bricklayers and the scaffolders?  
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(4) 
001 Struck by rebar tie-wire – 
injured eye 
Loss of sight or penetrating 
injury to eye 
    Loss of sight or penetrating 
injury to eye 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
002 Cut by circular saw – injured 
hand 
More serious hand lacerations 
requiring time off 
    Even more serious hand injury – 
loss of fingers or use of hand 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
003 Fire – no injury? 
 
Injuries from fire – eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Fatalities from fire     Severity depends on chance and 
effectiveness of emergency 
procedures 
004 Struck by falling prop – 
injured back 
More serious back injury or 
shoulder dislocation – eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Serious head injury leading to 
fatality or permanent disability 
    Severity depends on body part hit 
005 Struck when dropped steel 
angle – injured finger 
More serious crush injury to 
hand - eg requiring 
hospitalisation 
    Loss of finger / hand     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
006 Ring snagged on protrusion – 
injured finger 
Fracture to finger requiring 
time off 
    Loss of finger     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
007 Cut with knife whilst cutting 
board – injured leg 
More serious leg laceration 
requiring time off 
    Other laceration – eg leading to 
loss of finger or hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
008 Hit self with scaffold tube – 
injured foot 
Fracture to toe requiring time 
off 
    Serious fracture to foot / ankle 
leading to hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
009 Struck by steel ‘banding’ to 
brick pack – cut arm 
More serious laceration to arm 
or other body part requiring 
time off 
    Loss of sight or penetrating 
injury to eye 
    Severity depends on body part hit 
and use of appropriate PPE 
                                                     
15 Incident outcome and resultant injury summarised from accident book record and interview data. 
16 Potential outcomes have been established as ‘likely’ and ‘possible’ based on the RIDDOR classification.  This rationale is based on an evaluation of the incident information and evaluation 
of alternative outcomes if the IP had been in a slightly different location or if a different part of the body had been involved.  Likely outcomes require only a minor change in circumstances; 
possible outcomes would require a number of circumstances to change for them to occur. 
17 Outcome categories based on RIDDOR classification.  Some of the ‘major’ incidents may have led to permanent disability and hence loss of the individual to the industry. 
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(4) 
010 Struck by falling formwork 
during removal – minor injury 
More serious injury - eg shoulder 
dislocation 
    Fatality or permanent disability 
from falling formwork 
    Severity depends on body part hit 
011 ‘Hiab’ delivery vehicle 
overturned whilst off-loading 
– no injury 
Permanent disability or fatality 
from crush injury 
    Fatality from crush injury     Plant-related – serious potential 
consequences - Severity depends 
on ‘chance’ and body part hit 
012 Struck by ‘foam’ ball and 
concrete whilst clearing 
concrete pump line – groin 
and back injury 
More serious impact injury 
requiring time off 
    Even more serious impact injury 
- eg dislocation of knee or hip, 
or requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
013 Screwed through wood into 
finger using powered 
screwdriver – injured finger 
More serious hand laceration 
requiring time off 
    Possible loss of finger     Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
location of impact 
014 Cut self with knife – injured 
finger 
More serious hand laceration 
requiring time off 
    Even more serious hand injury - 
eg loss of finger 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
015 Struck by concrete slab whilst 
demolishing – cut hand 
Fracture or hospitalisation (eg 
from head injury) 
    Fatality from head injury     Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
016 Fall from step ladder – injured 
leg and elbow 
Dislocated knee     Even more serious fall injury eg 
falling onto sharp object 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
017 Tripped over cable – injured 
ankle 
More serious trip injury – eg 
dislocation of knee 
    Even more serious trip injury eg 
falling onto sharp object or fall 
from height 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’, 
body part hit or location 
018 Struck nail protruding from 
insert in concrete – injured 
arm 
More serious hand / arm 
laceration or eye injury 
requiring time off 
    Loss of sight or penetrating 
injury to eye 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
019 Struck by falling prop whilst 
moving tower – injured back 
Dislocation or injury requiring 
hospitalisation 
    Even more serious back injury 
or head injury leading to fatality 
or permanent disability 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
020 Fire whilst removing gas pipe 
– no injury 
Serious injury from fire or 
fumes - eg requiring 
hospitalisation 
    Fatalities from fire or explosion     Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
effectiveness of emergency 
procedures 
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021 Struck steel ‘slither’ whilst 
checking wagon contents – 
injured thumb 
More serious hand laceration – 
possible infection requiring 
time off 
    More serious injury from fall 
from height after injuring hand 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
022 Crushed by plasterboard 
whilst removing from trolley – 
injured hand 
More serious hand crush 
injury – possibly fractured 
finger requiring time off 
    Hand crush injury – possibly 
fractured finger requiring time 
off 
    Unlikely to be worse than > 3-day 
023 Slipped on oil on stairs – 
injured elbow and hip 
More serious slip injury – eg 
hip or knee dislocation 
    More serious injury eg fall from 
height down stairs leading to 
fatality or permanent disability 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’, 
location and body part hit 
024 Cut self with saw whilst 
cutting services hanger – 
injured hand 
More serious hand injury (eg 
loss of finger) 
    More serious injury from fall 
from height after injuring hand 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
location 
025 Struck roofing component 
whilst climbing down scaffold 
– injured leg 
More serious leg injury 
requiring time off 
    Fatality from fall from height 
off scaffold after injuring leg 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
location 
026 Knocking in sheet pile with 
sledge hammer – injured back 
More serious back injury / 
MSD requiring time off 
    Dislocation of shoulder or other 
long term disability / MSD 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
IP fitness / work history etc 
027 Helmet fell off whilst bending 
over – cut head on stanchion 
More serious head injury / 
laceration requiring time off 
    Even more serious head injury - 
eg requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
028 Slip whilst unloading plywood 
– fractured wrist 
More serious fall injury - eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Fatality from more serious fall 
injury eg hit head in fall 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
029 Manual handling lifting forks 
on excavator – injured back 
More serious musculoskeletal 
injury requiring time off 
    Dislocation of shoulder or spine     Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
IP history /  resilience 
030 Knocking in sheet pile with 
sledge hammer – injured back 
More serious back injury / 
MSD requiring time off 
    Back injury leading to 
hospitalisation or shoulder 
dislocation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
IP fitness / work history etc 
031 Struck by lorry platform 
whilst attaching it – hand 
injury 
More serious hand injury – 
possible amputation of finger 
    More serious hand injury or 
other crush injury - eg requiring 
hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part crushed 
032 Dropped concrete pump pipe 
– injured foot 
More serious foot or leg crush 
injury requiring time off 
    Leg or ankle fracture     Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
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033 Laying kerb – trapped and 
injured finger 
Fracture to finger or thumb 
requiring time off 
    More serious hand injury - eg 
requiring hospitalisation or 
leading to loss of finger / thumb 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
034 Unstacking ductwork – caught 
and cut hand 
More serious hand laceration 
requiring time off 
    Laceration leading to loss of 
finger 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
035 Drilling ductwork – swarf 
injured eye 
Penetrating injury to eye     Loss of sight     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
036 Descending from access tower 
– caught harness and fell – 
fractured elbow 
More serious fall injury - eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Even more serious fall injury 
leading to fatality or permanent 
disability 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
037 Caught foot on cables – 
twisted knee 
Knee dislocation     Knee dislocation and additional 
head injury from fall 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
038 ‘Jockey’ wheel on bowser 
gave way – injured arm 
More serious arm crush injury     Crush fatality caused by being 
trapped under bowser 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part crushed 
039 Torquing bolts on gantry – 
injured back 
More serious musculoskeletal 
injury requiring time off 
    Shoulder or spine dislocation     Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
IP history / resilience 
040 Concrete contact with ankles 
during pour – cement burns 
More serious cement burns 
requiring time off 
    Cement-related dermatitis 
leading to permanent disability 
    Severity depends on exposure 
frequency / IP history etc 
041 Vehicle caught winch cable – 
injured leg 
More serious leg injury – eg 
severe laceration requiring 
time off 
    Dislocation caused by winch 
cable – or hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
042 Maintenance to boring 
machine – glove caught and 
injured wrist 
Loss of finger     Loss of finger / hand     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
043 Installing cables in ceiling 
void – debris in eye 
Penetrating injury to eye     Loss of sight      Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
044 Struck by falling timber – 
injured arm 
More serious arm injury / 
MSD requiring time off 
    Fracture or other injury 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
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045 Soldering pipe – removed 
glasses and rubbed eye with 
flux on fingers – Injured eye 
More serious eye injury – 
infection from flux etc 
requiring time off 
    Loss of sight or penetrating 
injury to eye 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
046 Tripped by shallow hole 
whilst walking across site – 
cut hand and twisted knee 
MSD requiring time off     Fracture /dislocation or hit head 
during fall -hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit during fall 
047 Fall from piling rig during 
maintenance operation – slight 
foot injury 
Ankle fracture or knee / hip 
dislocation 
    More serious fall injury – eg hit 
head during fall - requiring 
hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit during fall 
048 Laying membrane which 
snagged – injured shoulder 
MSD requiring time off     Shoulder dislocation     Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
IP history / resilience 
049 Cutting cladding panels – 
swarf entered and injured eye 
Penetrating injury to eye     Loss of sight      Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
050 Manual handling bucket of 
tools – strained back 
 
More serious musculoskeletal 
back injury requiring time 
off 
    Even more serious MS injury - 
eg spine or shoulder dislocation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
IP history / resilience 
051 Tripped on board - twisted 
thumb 
Wrist fracture or shoulder 
dislocation 
    Fatality from fall from height     Severity depends on location 
052 Struck underground cable - no 
injury 
Fatality or at least 
unconsciousness from 
electrocution 
  ?  Fatality from electrocution     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
053 Tripped on rubble - injured 
ankle 
Fractured ankle or dislocated 
knee 
    Fatality if fall from height     Severity depends on location 
054 Slipped on insulation - injured 
back 
More serious back injury - eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Fatality if fall from height     Severity depends partly on location 
and partly on ‘chance’ 
055 Fall through scaffold* 
(Accident book record and IP 
account differ significantly) -
injured side / hand 
Serious injury from fall - eg 
fracture or requiring 
hospitalisation 
    Fatality from fall from height     Lift shaft scaffold is high risk 
therefore strong likelihood of 
serious consequences 
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056 Lifting equipment - injured 
back 
More serious back injury / 
MSD requiring time off 
    Shoulder or spine dislocation or 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Manual handling injuries often 
depend on IP history 
057 Trapped hand (crane) -injured 
finger 
More serious injury to hand or 
arm – eg loss of finger 
    Loss of limb     Craneage accident – serious 
potential consequences 
058 5m fall through scaffold - only 
slight injury to leg and face 
Serious injury from fall - eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Fatality from fall from height     Very likely to have serious 
consequences  
059 Cut with saw – injured thumb More serious injury to hand - 
eg hospitalisation 
    Loss of thumb     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
060 Trapped by falling plant – 
bruised side 
Dislocation /fracture or 
hospitalisation from crush 
injuries 
    Permanent disability or fatality 
by crushing 
    Plant-related - Very likely to have 
serious consequences 
061 Struck by falling cable – cut 
hand 
Finger amputation    ? Fatality if hit head     Severity depends on body part hit 
062 Fall from ladder – injured 
knee 
Knee dislocation     Fatality from fall from height     Severity depends on height fallen 
etc 
063 Drilling swarf – injured eye 
 
Time off from eye injury – eg 
infection from swarf 
   ? Loss of sight or penetrating 
injury to eye 
    Severity depends on chance 
064 Tripped on board – twisted 
knee 
Knee dislocation     Fatality if fall from height     Severity depends on location 
065 Struck by falling bricks – 
injured finger 
More serious hand injury – 
possible loss of finger 
    Serious head injury if materials 
hit head or other IP 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’, 
location and body part hit 
066 Cut hand whilst removing 
metal stud 
More serious hand injury – 
possible loss of finger 
    Even more serious hand injury 
or eye injury - eg hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
067 Stepped on nail in wood – 
injured foot 
More serious foot puncture 
injury requiring time off 
    Even more serious foot injury - 
eg requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
068 Struck by falsework prop – 
injured head 
More serious head injury - eg 
requiring hospitalisation or 
fracture 
    Even more serious head injury 
leading to fatality/disability 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
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069 Struck by formwork being 
lifted by crane – Injured side, 
back & fingers 
Fracture / dislocation or head 
injury and unconsciousness 
    Fatality or permanent disability     Craneage accident – serious 
potential consequences. Severity 
depends on body part hit 
070 Struck by paving slab – 
injured foot 
More serious foot or leg crush 
injury requiring time off 
    Ankle fracture     Severity depends on body part hit 
071 Electrocution – No apparent 
injury 
Serious injury or fatality from 
electrocution 
  ?  Fatality from electrocution     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
072 Struck by falling scaffold - 
unconscious 
Fatality from head injury     Fatality from head injury     Severity depends on height 
materials fall and ‘chance’ 
073 Tripped on rebar – bruised leg More serious trip injury 
requiring time off 
    More serious trip injury  - eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Unlikely to be ‘fall from height’ as 
groundworks operation 
074 Trapped finger during ‘crane-
lift’ 
More serious hand injury - eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Loss of limb     Using forklift as crane – likely 
serious potential consequences 
075 Tripped on rubble – injured 
ankle 
More serious trip injury – eg 
fracture or dislocation 
    Even more serious trip injury - 
eg requiring hospitalisation 
    Unlikely to be ‘fall from height’ as 
groundworks operation 
076 Struck rebar – injured leg 
 
Serious leg injury / laceration 
requiring time off 
?    Serious leg injury / laceration 
requiring time off 
    Unlikely to be more than > 3-day 
077 Fall through scaffold – injured 
ribs 
More serious rib / back injury 
- eg requiring hospitalisation 
    Fatality from fall from height     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
078 Struck by cable – cut face More serious face or eye 
laceration requiring time off 
    Loss of sight or penetrating 
injury to eye 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
079 Pulled against harness lanyard 
– injured back 
Injured back / MSD requiring 
time off 
    Shoulder dislocation     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
080 Trapped finger whilst 
installing door 
More serious finger crush 
injury requiring time off 
    Possible loss of finger     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
081 Tripped on brick on scaffold – 
injured ankle 
Ankle fracture or knee 
dislocation 
    Fatality from fall from scaffold     Severity depends on location 
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082 Struck scaffold – injured head More serious head injury 
requiring hospitalisation / loss 
of consciousness 
    Fatality from fall from scaffold 
following head striking scaffold 
    Helmet fell off – severity depends 
on possibility of falling from 
height 
083 Cut finger handling glass 
 
More serious hand laceration 
requiring time off 
    Loss of finger or injury 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
084 Manual handling kerb – 
injured hand 
More serious hand crush 
injury requiring time off 
    Loss of finger or injury 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
085 Struck by ‘JCB’ – injured leg Knee or hip dislocation     Fatality from crush injuries     Plant-related incident – likely 
serious outcomes - Severity 
depends on ‘chance’ 
086 Tripped - Cut hand on steel 
pile 
More serious hand laceration – 
potential infection requiring 
time off 
    More serious injury (eg head) – 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on body part hit 
087 Injured wrist whilst using 
crow bar 
More serious wrist/arm injury 
/ MSD requiring time off 
    Shoulder dislocation     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
088 Tripped on brick ‘band’ – 
cracked rib 
Other fracture and / or head 
injury - loss of consciousness 
    Other fracture and / or head 
injury - loss of consciousness 
    Unlikely to be ‘fall from height’ as 
ground-level operation 
089 Struck by rebar – cut head More serious head / face / eye 
injury - hospitalisation 
    Possible fall from height (lift 
shaft) 
    Lift shaft location  
090 Struck by falsework – cut leg More serious leg or crush 
injury – eg hospitalisation 
    Fatality from crush injury or 
possible fall from height  
    Severity depends on body part 
crushed or location 
091 Struck scaffold – cut nose Injury requiring time off     Loss of sight or penetrating 
injury to eye 
    Severity depends on body part hit 
– Helmet reduced injury – Eye 
protection not worn 
092 Struck ceiling trim – cut arm 
 
More serious arm injury / 
laceration requiring time off 
  ?  More serious head or eye injury 
– eg requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on body part hit 
093 Struck by falling wet concrete 
– injured eye 
More serious eye injury eg 
infection requiring time off 
    Loss of sight or other crush / 
impact injury if more concrete 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
(amount of concrete) 
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094 Equipment fire – burn to hand 
 
More serious burn injury 
requiring time off 
  ?  Multiple fire-related fatalities     Fires on construction sites have 
very serious consequences 
 
095 Struck (self) with hammer – 
injured finger 
 
More serious hand injury 
requiring time off 
    Serious hand injury requiring 
time off 
    Unlikely to be more than > 3-day 
096 Struck by rolls of fabric – 
injured hand 
More serious hand injury / 
MSD requiring time off 
    Head injury having been 
knocked over – eg requiring 
hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ and 
body part hit 
097 Struck (self) with hammer – 
injured leg 
More serious leg or other limb 
injury requiring time off 
    Even more serious leg injury – 
eg requiring hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
098 Struck (self) with scraper – 
bruised neck 
More serious neck injury / 
laceration requiring time off 
    Even more serious neck or head 
injury – eg hospitalisation 
    Severity depends on body part hit 
099 Caught fingers in drill – broke 
fingers 
 
More serious hand injury – eg 
requiring hospitalisation 
    Even more serious hand injury – 
eg loss of fingers 
    Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
100 Fell through scaffold – no 
injury recorded 
 
Fall injury – fracture / 
dislocation 
    Fatality from fall from scaffold     Severity depends on ‘chance’ 
TOTALS Likely potential outcomes 
0
 
4
8
 
4
8
-
5
2
 
4
-
6
 
Possible potential  outcomes 
0
 
2
 
6
4
 
3
4
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Accident Causal Analysis (judged as being a causal factor with 'reasonable confidence') 
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001 Struck by rebar tie-
wire – Injured eye                      
IP not wearing eye protection, task not 
covered by RA/MS 
002 Cut by circular saw – 
injured hand                      
alternative sub-frames available that 
would have eliminated risk, old power saw 
worked in unsafe state, inadequate RA  
003 Fire – No injury? 
                     
fan protection against fire failed, RA's did 
not consider fire risk 
004 Struck by falling prop 
– Injured back                      
carpenter actions caused prop to be in an 
unsafe state, any RA obviously ineffective 
005 Struck when dropped 
steel angle – Injured 
finger                      
workers attempted to lift very heavy load, 
materials inappropriate for manual 
handling, no thought given to this in their 
specification 
006 Ring snagged on 
protrusion – Injured 
finger 
                     
no hand holds to aid stepping off lift, risk 
assessment should have identified 
problems 
007 Cut with knife whilst 
cutting board – Injured 
leg 
                     
IP should not have been cutting ply with a 
‘Stanley’ knife, not picked up by 
supervision or any RA 
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008 Hit self with scaffold 
tube – Injured foot                      
pipe clips dirty with concrete, concrete 
resistant or easy clean design should be 
possible 
009 Struck by steel 
‘banding’ to brick 
pack – Cut arm 
                     
plywood should be supplied with nylon 
straps, not picked up by any risk 
assessment 
010 Struck by falling 
formwork during 
removal – minor injury 
                     
hazardous procedure, with risk 
inadequately managed (including changes 
after incident) 
011 ‘Hiab’ delivery vehicle 
overturned whilst off-
loading – No injury                      
driver operated loader without stabilisers 
fully extended, insufficient space, neither 
lorry safety mechanisms nor risk 
assessment anticipated this eventuality 
012 Struck by ‘foam’ ball 
and concrete whilst 
clearing concrete 
pump line – Groin and 
back injury 
                     
inadequately trained, unsupervised 
operative, unsafe system of work 
013 Screwed through wood 
into finger using 
powered screwdriver – 
Injured finger 
                     
working in a small area at an inappropriate 
time 
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014 Cut self with knife – 
Injured finger                      
obvious risk of cuts when cutting sash 
window cords with Stanley knife, wrong 
tool, no consideration of safety  
015 Struck by concrete 
slab whilst 
demolishing – Cut 
hand 
                     
inexperienced work mate dropped slap 
with protruding steel, awkward location, 
no gloves worn, needed to get job done, no 
consideration of safety 
016 Fall from step ladder – 
Injured leg and elbow                      
3 week old stepladders reckoned to be 
faulty, not sure this represented a safe 
system of work but no evidence on this 
017 Tripped over cable – 
Injured ankle                      
trailing cable was a tolerated unsafe 
practice, suggestion of ankle weakness due 
to previous falls on site 
018 Struck nail protruding 
from insert in concrete 
– Injured arm 
                     
nails remaining after removal of 
shuttering, should have been knocked 
down, no local risk assessment 
019 Struck by falling prop 
whilst moving tower – 
Injured back 
                     
unsafe method of working, unsupervised, 
no risk assessment 
020 Fire whilst removing 
gas pipe – No injury                      
confusion in communications with utility 
supplier 
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 comments 
021 Struck steel ‘slither’ 
whilst checking wagon 
contents – Injured 
thumb 
                     
rail wagon damaged previously by digger, 
no handrails, no process of equipment 
inspection, tolerance of damaged 
equipment 
022 Crushed by 
plasterboard whilst 
removing from trolley 
– Injured hand 
                     
trolley design basic, quote - if the other 
man would have understood 'stop pushing' 
- may have helped - not enough labourers 
to help collect plasterboards so worker 
helped 
023 Slipped on oil on stairs 
– Injured elbow and 
hip                      
quote - people who spilled oil should have 
cleared it up - they didn’t and instead 
covered it with a piece of card, quote - oil 
spills out when pipe fitters move their 
machines upstairs! 
024 Cut self with saw 
whilst cutting services 
hanger – Injured hand 
                     
awkward difficult task, difficult access, 
difficult to do wearing PPE (glasses, 
gloves, helmet) 
025 Struck roofing 
component whilst 
climbing down 
scaffold – Injured leg 
                     
time pressure, delay, quote - project 
overwhelmed with design revisions / 
variations 
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026 Knocking in sheet pile 
with sledge hammer – 
Injured back 
                     
usually done by machinery but not 
possible, in a rush, doesn't do job often 
027 Helmet fell off whilst 
bending over – Cut 
head on stanchion 
                     
high risk area - overhead lines, trains, high 
voltage cables, helmet very uncomfortable 
in the heat 
028 Fall whilst unloading 
plywood – Fractured 
wrist 
                     
plastic gloves slipped over wet plywood, 
ground wet with leaves, raining 
029 Manual handling 
lifting forks on 
excavator – injured 
back 
                     
awkward lift, no safety training, no fork 
lift truck available 
030 Knocking in sheet pile 
with sledge hammer – 
Injured back                      
awkward - hitting sheet piles lower than 
feet level with sledgehammer, completing 
work of machinery, rushing to go to next 
job - had been working 4.5 hours without 
a break 
031 Struck by lorry 
platform whilst 
attaching it – Hand 
injury 
                     
awkward, difficult and heavy task, worker 
was helping the wagon driver, quote - 
safety culture fine when boss about 
otherwise risk taking 
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 comments 
032 Dropped concrete 
pump pipe – Injured 
foot                      
inexperienced worker helping a mate, 
difficult awkward task and awkward area 
to get into, no change in pump design in 
decades 
033 Laying kerb – Trapped 
and injured finger 
                     
quote - gloves hot, sweaty, uncomfortable, 
still get concrete burns - believes if he had 
worn gloves would still have damaged 
finger 
034 Unstacking ductwork – 
Caught and cut hand                      
ductwork oily, awkward manual handling 
035 Drilling ductwork – 
Swarf injured eye                      
  
036 Descending from 
access tower – caught 
harness and fell – 
Fractured elbow 
                     
quote on harness - they get in the way and 
I don't know why you have to wear one. 
037 Caught foot on cables 
– twisted knee                      
quote - the pressure to accommodate build 
means that housekeeping goes down (area 
could have been better lit and tidier) 
038 ‘Jockey’ wheel on 
bowser gave way – 
injured arm                      
safety officer and engineer had already 
identified shortcomings with the design of 
the jockey wheel i.e. no feedback as to 
whether securely engaged 
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039 Torquing bolts on 
gantry – Injured back                      
task at awkward height and posture, quote 
- have fallen behind with the work - trying 
to get the job done as quickly as possible 
040 Concrete contact with 
ankles during pour – 
Cement burns 
                     
concrete had been ordered and had to get 
the job done - deliveries were late 
041 Vehicle caught winch 
cable – Injured leg                      
one person short to look out for traffic 
042 Maintenance to boring 
machine – Glove 
caught and injured 
wrist 
                     
pushed for time, long hours, repetitive task 
using inherently dangerous machinery 
043 Installing cables in 
ceiling void – debris in 
eye 
                     
cable stiff to draw out and unravel - 
awkward task, restricted space 
044 Struck by falling 
timber – Injured arm                      
  
045 Soldering pipe – 
removed glasses and 
rubbed eye with flux 
on fingers – Injured 
eye 
                     
confined space, hard hat makes access 
more difficult 
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046 Tripped by shallow 
hole whilst walking 
across site – Cut hand 
and twisted knee 
                     
piezometer installers should have back-
filled the holes, de-lineated walk paths 
would also help 
047 Fall from piling rig 
during maintenance – 
Slight foot injury                      
debate on the design of the crane running 
board - rails might prevent the rig from 
working, handrails around cab on newer 
machines 
048 Laying membrane 
which snagged – 
Injured shoulder 
                     
quote - should have asked for help - 
pressure to get things done - they want you 
to hurry without saying so 
049 Cutting cladding 
panels – swarf injured 
eye 
                     
quote – ‘I imagine the Method Statement 
says wearing goggles and ear defenders 
are needed when using jigsaws!’ 
050 Manual handling 
bucket of tools – 
Strained back 
                     
trying to lift heavy bucket of tools through 
narrow aperture in scaffold 
051 Tripped on board - 
Twisted thumb                      
had to manoeuvre scaffold around bits of 
steel, loose brick etc 
052 Struck underground 
cable – No injury                      
old cable had no markings, not found by 
CAT, not on electricity boards drawings 
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 comments 
053 Tripped on rubble - 
Injured ankle                      
quote - a bit behind - always more to do 
054 Slipped on insulation 
whilst carrying 
scaffold - Injured back 
                     
lifting scaffold tube - ethofoam should 
have been cleared 
055 Fall through scaffold - 
Injured side / hand                      
  
056 Lifting equipment - 
Injured back 
                     
heavy (40 kg when empty - full at the 
time) industrial vacuum cleaner pushed 
across site and lifted up step, quote - I 
know you are not supposed to lift over 
25kg but don't want to appear lazy 
057 Trapped hand (crane) -
Injured finger                      
correct lift puller not used, crane driver 
using mobile phone, put fingers in hole 
whilst chains lifting 
058 5m fall through 
scaffold - Only slight 
injury to leg and face 
                     
confined space, complex scaffolding 
around beams 
059 Cut with saw – Injured 
thumb                      
why was he not wearing gloves? 
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 comments 
060 Trapped by falling 
plant – Bruised side                      
Genie shifted and unbalanced, supported 
unknown weight, little chip / pebble could 
have tipped it over, no formal training on 
using the Genie 
061 Struck by falling cable 
– Cut hand                      
awkward heavy task at height, not wearing 
gloves 
062 Fall from ladder – 
Injured knee                      
mud on boots, very muddy walkway, 
should have lane for traffic and one for 
walking or tarmac surface 
063 Drilling swarf – 
Injured eye                      
quote - didn't realise steel gets stuck in the 
eye, looking up, working above head 
064 Tripped on steel plate 
– Twisted knee                      
setting out point not marked, no 
walkways, ?points put in too early 
065 Struck by falling 
bricks – injured finger                      
quote - bricks are sharp - normally wears 
gloves but had removed them - many find 
gloves a hindrance  
066 Cut hand whilst 
removing metal stud                      
not wearing gloves 
067 Stepped on nail in 
wood – Injured foot                      
quote - unsure if it was appropriate for him 
to wear a steel plate in the sole of the boot 
as he was an electrician 
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 comments 
068 Struck by falsework 
prop – injured head                      
Prop was 'loose' - IP should not have been 
there 
069 Struck by formwork 
on crane – Injured 
side, back & fingers 
                     
IP climbing ladder - formwork on crane - 
dangerous overlap of trades - positioning 
of access dubious 
070 Struck by paving slab 
– Injured foot                      
Paving slabs stacked and fell over 
071 Electrocution – No 
apparent injury                      
Electric pumps were faulty 
072 Struck by falling 
scaffold – 
Unconscious 
                     
Scaffold section loose and was knocked 
off platform - helmet reduced injury 
073 Tripped on rebar – 
bruised leg                      
rebar' protruding from concrete rubble 
used as hardcore 
074 Trapped finger during 
‘crane-lift’ from fork-
lift 
                     
Use of forklift in this way is questionable 
075 Tripped on rubble – 
Injured ankle                      
Tripped on brick rubble used as hardcore 
076 Struck rebar – injured 
leg                      
Lack of walkways to keep IP away from 
hazard 
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 comments 
077 Fall through scaffold – 
Injured ribs                      
IP may have removed scaffold boards 
himself and then forgot 
078 Struck by cable – cut 
face                      
Heavy armoured cable came loose - 
ceiling void working area is 'tight' 
079 Pulled against harness 
lanyard – injured back                      
IP forgot he had harness on - It was not 
needed at that stage anyway 
080 Trapped finger whilst 
installing door                      
IP appeared to be doing the work in an 
inappropriate situation - ie not on a bench 
081 Tripped on brick on 
scaffold – injured 
ankle 
                     
IP was responsible for clearing scaffold - 
he tripped on 'his own' rubbish 
082 Struck scaffold – 
injured head                      
Helmet fell off when IP bent over 
083 Cut finger handling 
glass                      
Gloves not worn 
084 Manual handling kerb 
– Injured hand                      
IP not accustomed to task and not trained 
085 Struck by ‘JCB’ – 
Injured leg                      
Plant / pedestrian zones should be separate 
086 Tripped - Cut hand on 
steel pile                      
Top of pile damaged during installation - 
Gloves worn but ineffective 
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087 Injured wrist whilst 
using crow bar                      
IP provided own tools - location and 
position of shutter may not have been 
ideal 
088 Tripped on brick 
‘band’ – Cracked rib                      
Brick pallet packing band was protruding 
from the ground 
089 Struck by rebar – cut 
head                      
Inappropriate method being used to 
straighten rebar 
090 Struck by falsework – 
Cut leg                      
Trolley 'table-form' toppled - a 'common 
occurrence' but not addressed 
091 Struck scaffold – Cut 
nose                      
Scaffolding and shutter erection very close 
- scaffold protruding 
092 Struck ceiling trim – 
Cut arm                      
IP working in congested ceiling void - 
accident was a common occurrence but 
not addressed 
093 Struck by falling wet 
concrete – Injured eye                      
Concrete pour proceeding above IP work 
area 
094 Equipment fire – Burn 
to hand                      
Supervisor believed operatives abused the 
concrete breakers which may have 
contributed 
095 Struck (self) with 
hammer – Injured 
finger 
                     
Setting out peg broke when hit 
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096 Struck by rolls of 
fabric – Injured hand                      
Rolls were being stacked when they fell - 
Supervisor believed that this was 
'horseplay' 
097 Struck (self) with 
hammer – Injured leg                      
Trying to hit a timber stake and 'missed' - 
ground conditions may have contributed 
098 Struck (self) with 
scraper – Bruised neck                      
Scraper caught nail and struck IP - shutter 
being cleaned may not have been in the 
best location / position 
099 Caught fingers in drill 
– Broke fingers                      
Brushing dust away from hole whilst 
drilling - correct equipment not used 
100 Fell through scaffold – 
No injury recorded                      
Scaffold boards moved by 'unknown 
persons' 
                          
  Count 49 42 7 13 5 11 15 9 11 19 12 8 13 44 19 12 27 24 12 15 84   
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Potential for Designers to reduce the accident risk 
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Comments 
001 Struck by rebar tie-
wire – Injured eye 
Reduce or remove 
need for rebar 
fixing – eg by pre-
assembly or by not 
using insitu 
concrete 
 
   Should supplier 
consider tie wire 
storage and use on 
site? 
   Establish access 
walkways 
   Tie wire storage 
and dispensing 
equipment 
   Prefabricated rebar 
‘mats’ are available 
for many 
applications 
002 Cut by circular saw 
– injured hand 
Change design to 
prevent need for 
cutting mitres on 
site 
 
 
   Pre-cut mitres    Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improved design of 
saw and guard – 
saw jammed 
    
                                                     
18 Incident outcome and resultant injury summarised from accident book record and interview data. 
19 Potential issues for the permanent works designers (Architect/Engineer etc) have been developed from the accident study accounts.  These are not necessarily causal 
factors, but are better viewed as things that designers could have done to reduce the risk.  As a general comment, designers can reduce incident likelihood by removing or 
reducing the need to do the work on site although this may not be practicable in all instances.  In some cases existing alternative, safer solutions exist (eg many pre-assembled 
systems), in some cases the design team may need to design or procure specialist design of safer alternatives. 
20 No/Maybe/Yes – These columns indicate the likelihood that action by the each of the designers would have actually prevented the incident. 
21 Potential issues for the materials designers (Often not directly involved in the construction design process) have been developed from the accident study accounts.  These 
are not necessarily causal factors, but are better viewed as things that designers of materials could have done to reduce the risk.  Some of the materials issues could have been 
specified by the permanent works designers, for others it is more likely that the materials designers themselves would be best placed to take the action themselves. 
22 Potential issues for the temporary works designers (Usually employed by the principal contractor or sub-contractor) have been developed from the accident study accounts.  
Temporary works cover, in particular scaffolding and formwork/falsework.  These are not necessarily causal factors, but are better viewed as things that TW designers could 
have done to reduce the risk.  It is recognised that some of these interventions would require a significant re-orientation of the traditional TW design approach. 
23 Potential issues for the tool or equipment designers (not usually directly involved in the construction design process) have been developed from the accident 
study accounts.  These are not necessarily causal factors, but are better viewed as things that tool or equipment designers could have done to reduce the risk.  
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Comments 
003 Fire – No injury? 
 
Design for 
demolition / 
decommissioning to 
avoid need for 
cutting up of 
elements on site 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Fan and filter 
design to reduce 
fire risk 
    
004 Struck by falling 
prop – Injured back 
 
Reduce or remove 
need for insitu 
concrete 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Falsework – design 
props to be 
restrained during 
striking 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
005 Struck when 
dropped steel angle 
– Injured finger 
 
Reduce size & 
weight of angle – 
Design cladding 
support as part of 
structure 
   Should angle 
supplier have taken 
action to facilitate 
manual handling? 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
006 Ring snagged on 
protrusion – Injured 
finger 
 
Unlikely except to 
reduce on-site work
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Equipment design 
to remove snag 
risks 
    
007 Cut with knife 
whilst cutting board 
– Injured leg 
 
Remove need to cut 
board on site – eg 
pre-assembly or pre-
cut boards to suit 
toilet pan 
   Should board 
supplier specify 
cutting method? 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Knife design    Site work because 
of flexibility 
needed in 
refurbishment 
008 Hit self with scaffold 
tube – Injured foot 
Unlikely except to 
reduce on-site work 
– eg insitu concrete 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Concrete pump pipe 
design – especially 
couplings 
    
009 Struck by steel 
‘banding’ to brick 
pack – Cut arm 
 
Unlikely except to 
reduce on-site work 
– eg brickwork 
   Alternative 
packaging method 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
010 Struck by falling Reduce or remove    Unlikely to have    Re-design    Unlikely to have     
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Comments 
formwork during 
removal – minor 
injury 
need for insitu 
concrete 
reduced risk formwork to 
prevent falling 
during removal 
reduced risk 
011 ‘Hiab’ delivery 
vehicle overturned 
whilst off-loading – 
No injury 
Unlikely except to 
reduce on-site work 
– Perhaps building 
footprint may have 
exacerbated tight 
space 
   Alternative delivery 
method – but this 
may have generated 
other risks 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Prevent off-loading 
unless stabilisers 
fully extended 
    
012 Struck by ‘foam’ 
ball and concrete 
whilst clearing 
concrete pump line 
– Groin and back 
injury 
Reduce or remove 
need for insitu 
concrete 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Re-design pump 
clean out technique 
    
013 Screwed through 
wood into finger 
using powered 
screwdriver – 
Injured finger 
Canteen work not 
part of PW design 
brief 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Safety cut out on 
screw-driver 
   Work to site 
canteen 
014 Cut self with knife 
– Injured finger 
 
Design for 
demolition to 
remove need for 
cutting 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better knife design 
– Better glove 
design 
    
015 Struck by concrete 
slab whilst 
demolishing – Cut 
hand 
Design for 
demolition – risk 
assessment 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Temporary support 
during demolition 
   Better hand 
protection? 
    
016 Fall from step 
ladder – Injured leg 
and elbow 
Unlikely    Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Appropriate work 
platform design 
   Step-ladder design     
017 Tripped over cable Remove or reduce    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have     
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Comments 
– Injured ankle 
 
need for on-site 
installation of 
brickwork or  
power cable – eg 
pre-assembly 
reduced risk reduced risk reduced risk 
018 Struck nail 
protruding from 
insert in concrete – 
Injured arm 
Remove or reduce 
need for insitu 
concrete work – 
Specify post-drilled 
fixings 
   Alternative fixing 
for inserts to avoid 
need for protruding 
nails 
   Formwork design 
to produce ‘fail-
safe’ insert fixing 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   But post-drilled 
fixings also bring 
other hazards 
019 Struck by falling 
prop whilst moving 
tower – Injured 
back 
Remove or reduce 
need for insitu 
concrete 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
020 Fire whilst 
removing gas pipe 
– No injury 
 
Design for 
demolition – risk 
assessment 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
021 Struck steel ‘slither’ 
whilst checking 
wagon contents – 
Injured thumb 
Unlikely    Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improved glove 
design? 
    
022 Crushed by 
plasterboard whilst 
removing from 
trolley – Injured 
hand 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
(plasterboard)  
   Should plasterboard 
supplier provide 
suitable trolley? 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Plasterboard trolley 
design 
   However, 
plasterboard typically 
has less site work 
than alternatives 
023 Slipped on oil on 
stairs – Injured 
elbow and hip 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce site work 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Access stair design    Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
024 Cut self with saw Reduce site fixed    Re-design hanger    Unlikely to have    Saw design     
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Comments 
whilst cutting 
services hanger – 
Injured hand 
above ceiling 
services  by pre-
assembly - Re- 
design hanger 
system (SC design) 
system reduced risk Alternative tool for 
cutting ceiling 
hangers 
Improved glove 
design 
025 Struck roofing 
component whilst 
climbing down 
scaffold – Injured 
leg 
Reduce need for 
built-up roofing 
system (lots of site 
cutting etc) 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design 
interface with roof 
works 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
026 Knocking in sheet 
pile with sledge 
hammer – Injured 
back 
 
Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Alternative to 
manual installation 
of sheet piles 
   Produce alternative 
tool for manual 
installation 
    
027 Helmet fell off 
whilst bending over 
– Cut head on 
stanchion 
Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improved helmet 
design to encourage 
use and prevent 
‘fall off’ 
    
028 Fall whilst 
unloading plywood 
– Fractured wrist 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce general on-
site work 
   Consideration of 
manual handling of 
ply sheets 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improved glove 
grip in wet weather 
    
029 Manual handling 
lifting forks on 
excavator – injured 
back 
Unlikely except 
reduce general on-
site work 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improved design of 
excavator forks 
especially when 
changing 
    
030 Knocking in sheet 
pile with sledge 
hammer – Injured 
back 
Unlikely    Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Alternative to 
manual installation 
of sheet piles 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
031 Struck by lorry Unlikely except    Change materials    Unlikely to have    Change platform     
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Comments 
platform whilst 
attaching it – Hand 
injury 
reduce on-site work 
– possible building 
footprint impact on  
working space 
design to ease off-
loading 
reduced risk design to fail-safe 
032 Dropped concrete 
pump pipe – 
Injured foot 
 
Reduce insitu 
concrete 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Lifting hold-points 
on concrete pump 
pipes – design for 
manual handling 
    
033 Laying kerb – 
Trapped and injured 
finger 
 
Change kerb design 
to reduce MH risk 
   Change kerb design 
to reduce MH risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improve 
mechanical 
handling equipment
    
034 Unstacking 
ductwork – Caught 
and cut hand 
 
Reduce insitu 
ductwork 
   Ductwork design to 
reduce sharp edges 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
035 Drilling ductwork – 
Swarf injured eye 
Reduce insitu 
ductwork 
   Ductwork design to 
reduce need to drill 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Drill guards to 
protect against 
swarf? 
    
036 Descending from 
access tower – 
caught harness and 
fell – Fractured 
elbow 
Reduce insitu M&E 
services 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Access tower 
design (platform 
height, handrail 
solution in 
restricted areas 
   Harness design to 
reduce ‘catch’ risk 
   Access to ceiling 
zone as continually 
problematic 
037 Caught foot on 
cables – twisted 
knee 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce general on-
site work 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
038 ‘Jockey’ wheel on 
bowser gave way – 
injured arm 
Unlikely except 
reduce general on-
site work 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Jockey wheel 
design 
    
039 Torquing bolts on Unlikely except    Unlikely to have    Gantry design     Torquing tool     
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Comments 
gantry – Injured 
back 
 
reduce general on-
site work 
reduced risk design 
040 Concrete contact 
with ankles during 
pour – Cement 
burns 
Specify non-
hazardous cement 
or reduce insitu 
concrete 
   Cement suppliers to 
produce cost-
effective ‘safer’ 
cement 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better design of 
boots to increase 
effective use 
   German use of 
cement that doe not 
cause dermatitis 
041 Vehicle caught 
winch cable – 
Injured leg 
 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce general on-
site work 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Traffic 
management plans?
   Winch cable 
arrangements 
    
042 Maintenance to 
boring machine – 
Glove caught and 
injured wrist 
Unlikely except 
reduce work on site 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better  access for 
maintenance – 
Better glove design 
    
043 Installing cables in 
ceiling void – 
debris in eye 
Remove or reduce 
need for work in 
ceiling void – eg 
pre-assembly / 
modular wiring 
looms 
   Produce value for 
money modular 
wiring systems 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improve eye 
protection design to 
increase use 
    
044 Struck by falling 
timber – Injured 
arm 
Remove / reduce 
on-site work at 
height – eg ad-hoc 
cutting of timber 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Formwork design 
to reduce need for 
cutting on site 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
045 Soldering pipe – 
removed glasses 
and rubbed eye 
with flux on fingers 
– Injured eye 
Remove or reduce 
need for on-site 
joints in pipework – 
eg pre-assembly or 
solder-free joints 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improve eye 
protection to 
increase use – 
prescription safety 
glasses? 
   Glasses were 
prescription not 
PPE 
046 Tripped by shallow Unlikely except    Unlikely to have    Access walkways    Unlikely to have     
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Comments 
hole whilst walking 
across site – Cut 
hand and twisted 
knee 
reduce work on site reduced risk reduced risk 
047 Fall from piling rig 
during maintenance 
– Slight foot injury 
Unlikely except 
reduce work on site 
– Difficult for this 
work element  
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Provide safe access 
for plant 
maintenance 
   Even pre-assembled 
piles need rigs to 
install them 
048 Laying membrane 
which snagged – 
Injured shoulder 
Unlikely except 
reduce work on site 
– Difficult for this 
work element 
   Have manufacturers 
considered MH 
issues? 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
049 Cutting cladding 
panels – swarf 
injured eye 
Remove or reduce 
need to cut cladding 
on site (particularly 
at height) – eg 
easier to control 
pre-assembly off-
site or at ground 
level 
   Materials design to 
reduce need to cut 
on site 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Cutting equipment 
– guard to protect 
from swarf – better 
eye protection to 
increase use 
    
050 Manual handling 
bucket of tools – 
Strained back 
Reduce on-site 
required at height – 
eg pre-assembly of 
cladding 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Provide effective 
and transportable  
tool container 
    
051 Tripped on board - 
Twisted thumb 
Design to ensure 
MH cover is 
installed along with 
structure 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   More effective 
temporary covers to 
manholes to 
remove trip hazard 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
052 Struck underground 
cable - No injury 
Design to avoid 
other cables 
 
   Cable design to 
reduce injury risk 
   TW designer could 
have had clearer 
role 
   Improve brief to 
cable detector to 
reduce misuse 
   Temp water main is 
PC responsibility 
not PW designer 
053 Tripped on rubble - Unlikely except    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have     
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Comments 
Injured ankle reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
reduced risk reduced risk reduced risk 
054 Slipped on 
insulation whilst 
carrying scaffold - 
Injured back 
Design to avoid or 
reduce need for 
scaffold 
 
   Insulation used in 
this way – have slip 
hazards been 
considered? 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
055 Fall through 
scaffold - Injured 
side / hand 
Design to avoid or 
reduce need for 
scaffold – e.g. pre-
assembled lift-
shafts 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design to 
prevent removal of  
boards and hence 
prevent fall hazard 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Pre-assembled lift 
shafts remove need 
for shaft scaffolds. 
Some modular 
scaffold systems 
make ad-hoc board 
removal harder 
056 Lifting equipment - 
Injured back 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Try transparent 
vacuum ‘bag’ or 
‘full’ indicator - 
suitable hand holds 
- warnings 
    
057 Trapped hand 
(crane) -Injured 
finger 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
or check building 
footprint for 
adequate working 
space 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Crane and lifting 
tackle design to 
prevent hand trap 
    
058 5m fall through 
scaffold - Only 
slight injury to leg 
and face 
 
Design to avoid or 
reduce need for 
scaffold 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design to 
prevent removal of 
boards and hence 
prevent fall hazard 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Some modular 
scaffold systems 
make ad-hoc board 
removal harder 
059 Cut with saw – Design to avoid or    Produce alternative    Unlikely to have    Saw design – guard     
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Comments 
Injured thumb reduce need for site 
cutting of trunking 
trunking that does 
not require site 
cutting 
reduced risk / safety features? 
060 Trapped by falling 
plant – Bruised side
Original design 
method developed 
for removal of 
ductwork 
   Weights marked on 
all installed 
elements 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Stability of lift and 
fail-safe solution if 
overloaded 
    
061 Struck by falling 
cable – Cut hand 
Original design 
method developed 
for removal of 
cables 
   Weights marked on 
installed elements – 
Bracket design to 
fail-safe 
   Original TW design 
method developed 
for splicing and 
removal of cables 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Cable possibly 
temp supply, 
therefore PC’s 
responsibility 
062 Fall from ladder – 
Injured knee 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better access ways    Improved ladder 
design to cope with 
mud 
    
063 Drilling swarf – 
Injured eye 
 
Design to remove 
or reduce need to 
site-drill steelwork 
 
   Self-drilling screw 
design to prevent 
swarf propulsion 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better designed eye 
protection to 
encourage use 
    
064 Tripped on board – 
Twisted knee 
Unlikely – setting 
out points not PW 
design issue 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better access way - 
Covers to setting 
out points to 
remove trip hazard  
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
065 Struck by falling 
bricks – injured 
finger 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
by pre-assembling 
brickwork 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Provide loading 
platforms to 
scaffold 
   Better design of 
brick-carrying 
device to retain 
bricks – better 
glove design 
    
066 Cut hand whilst 
removing metal 
stud 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
   Studwork design to 
reduce cut risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better glove design 
to encourage use 
    
067 Stepped on nail in Unlikely except    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have    Better boot design     
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Comments 
wood – Injured foot reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
reduced risk reduced risk to encourage use 
068 Struck by falsework 
prop – injured head 
Remove or reduce 
on-site work using 
falsework (ie insitu 
concrete)  
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Falsework design to 
reduce risk of prop 
falling 
   Prop design to 
ensure correctly 
secured 
    
069 Struck by formwork 
on crane – Injured 
side, back & fingers
Remove or reduce 
insitu concrete - or 
check building 
footprint for 
adequate working 
space 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better access ways 
– Protected stair 
access not ladders 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
070 Struck by paving 
slab – Injured foot 
 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
   Paving slab design 
to aid storage and 
manual handling 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Improved boot 
design or selection 
    
071 Electrocution – No 
apparent injury 
Design such that 
electrical work 
could not have been 
installed incorrectly 
– ie fail-safe 
   Heating pump 
design in error 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
072 Struck by falling 
scaffold - 
Unconscious 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design    Better helmet 
design 
    
073 Tripped on rebar – 
bruised leg 
Consider 
appropriateness of  
re-cycled hardcore 
specification 
   Recycled hardcore 
‘design’ 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Reinforced concrete 
rubble used as 
hardcore may have 
provided hazard 
074 Trapped finger Unlikely except    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have    Appropriateness of     
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during ‘crane-lift’ 
from fork-lift 
reduce on-site work 
- or check building 
footprint for 
adequate space 
 
reduced risk reduced risk fork-lift in ‘crane’ 
mode 
075 Tripped on rubble – 
Injured ankle 
Consider 
appropriateness of  
re-cycled hardcore 
specification 
   Recycled hardcore 
‘design’ 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Re-cycled hardcore 
(brick rubble) may 
have been key 
factor 
076 Struck rebar – 
injured leg 
 
Reduce formwork 
(ie insitu concrete) 
– Possibly design 
column starter bars 
to avoid trip hazard 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Established access 
ways 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Starter bar 
protruding is a 
standard detail 
077 Fall through 
scaffold – Injured 
ribs 
Remove or reduce 
on-site work using 
scaffolding 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design to 
prevent removal of 
boards and hence 
prevent fall hazard 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Some modular 
scaffold systems 
make ad-hoc board 
removal harder 
078 Struck by cable – 
cut face 
Remove or reduce 
need to install large 
cables on site – 
perhaps by pre-
assembly 
   Design of cable 
reels and cable 
stability during 
installation 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
079 Pulled against 
harness lanyard – 
injured back 
Unlikely except 
remove or reduce 
on-site work using 
scaffolding 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design to 
reduce need for 
harnesses in 
erection 
   Harness design to 
reduce risk 
    
080 Trapped finger 
whilst installing 
door 
Design to remove 
need for lock 
installation on-site 
 
   Lock design to aid 
installation 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
081 Tripped on brick on Unlikely except    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have     
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Comments 
scaffold – injured 
ankle 
remove or reduce 
on-site work using 
scaffolding or insitu 
brickwork 
 
reduced risk reduced risk reduced risk 
082 Struck scaffold – 
injured head 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design to 
reduce head injury 
risk 
   Better helmet 
design to prevent 
‘fall-off’ 
    
083 Cut finger handling 
glass 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better glove design 
or selection 
    
084 Manual handling 
kerb – Injured hand 
 
Reduce kerb weight 
/ Provide hand-
holds  
 
   Kerb design to ease 
manual handling – 
weight / hand holds 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
085 Struck by ‘JCB’ – 
Injured leg 
 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
- or check building 
footprint for 
adequate space 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Suitability of 
excavator as lifting 
equipment – lifting 
points for 
compressor 
    
086 Tripped - Cut hand 
on steel pile 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
 
   Pile design to 
remove cut risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Better glove design 
or selection 
    
087 Injured wrist whilst 
using crow bar 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work  
(insitu concrete in 
particular) 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Formwork design 
to reduce site 
alterations 
   Crow bar design     
088 Tripped on brick Unlikely except    Review banding to    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have     
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Comments 
‘band’ – Cracked 
rib 
reduce on-site work 
in general 
brick packs reduced risk reduced risk 
089 Struck by rebar – 
cut head 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
(insitu concrete lift 
shaft in particular) 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Design or selection 
of equipment to 
straighten rebar 
    
090 Struck by falsework 
– Cut leg 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work  
(insitu concrete in 
particular) 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Table-form design, 
especially for 
moving 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
091 Struck scaffold – 
Cut nose 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work  
(insitu concrete in 
particular) - or 
check building 
footprint for 
adequate space 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design to 
prevent protruding 
elements 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
092 Struck ceiling trim 
– Cut arm 
 
Pre-assembled 
ceiling services 
avoid need for 
above ceiling 
access 
   Design ceiling trim 
to reduce sharp 
edges – modular 
wiring reduces site 
work 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
093 Struck by falling 
wet concrete – 
Injured eye 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
in general (insitu 
concrete in 
particular) 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Formwork and 
scaffold design to 
prevent concrete 
falling 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
094 Equipment fire – 
Burn to hand 
 
Remove or reduce 
need for concrete 
breaking 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Breaker design to 
prevent fire risk – 
fail-safe 
   Unsure if the task 
was due to 
contractor’s error or 
design change 
095 Struck (self) with None    Unlikely to have    Unlikely to have    Hammer design for     
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Comments 
hammer – Injured 
finger 
 reduced risk reduced risk human interaction 
096 Struck by rolls of 
fabric – Injured 
hand 
 
None 
 
   Design of rolls to 
facilitate site storage
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
097 Struck (self) with 
hammer – Injured 
leg 
 
None 
 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Hammer design for 
human interaction 
    
098 Struck (self) with 
scraper – Bruised 
neck 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work  
(insitu concrete in 
particular) 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Review formwork 
design to reduce 
site cleaning 
requirement 
   Scraper design for 
human interaction 
    
099 Caught fingers in 
drill – Broke 
fingers 
 
Unlikely except 
reduce on-site work 
(insitu concrete in 
particular) 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Drill design – better 
glove design or 
selection 
    
100 Fell through 
scaffold – No injury 
recorded 
 
Unlikely except 
remove or reduce 
on-site work using 
scaffolding 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
   Scaffold design to 
improve platform 
safety 
   Unlikely to have 
reduced risk 
    
 TOTALS 
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5
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5
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DISTAL FACTOR ANALYSIS 
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Accident 1 – Carrying tying wire 
 
The end of the tying wire snagged and sprung back into the operative’s eye.  A standard 
construction method was being used.  There are alternative methods of construction, eg pre-cast 
concrete or pre-fabrication of rebar, that would have avoided the task being undertaken 
(carrying rebar tying wire).  This is a design issue but would require detailed understanding of 
the construction process and risk factors, by the designer, to consider objectively.  There are 
also alternative ways of holding/dispensing and carrying the wire, which would have avoided 
the particular danger encountered, a design of materials handling and task issue. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; Designer (of building) response; training; construction feedback into design; design 
of equipment and methods. 
 
Accident 2 – Mitre cutting for window sub-frame 
 
An innovative construction method of window installation, to avoid scaffolding (for cost 
reasons), was introduced by contractor with designer agreement.  It resulted in an avoidable site 
joinery task, during which the circular saw safety guard jammed, and a hand injury.  The 
designer was not familiar with the construction requirements of this type of site work when 
making the decision, but it is unlikely that this would have changed his decision. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; designer response; design of equipment. 
 
Accident 3 – Angle grinder sparks ignited fan filter 
 
Sparks, from the use of an angle grinder in an enclosed space, caused ignition of the filter in an 
extractor fan.  Inadequate RA and MS – failed to recognise and take account of this particular 
fire risk.  There is insufficient data to speculate as to the reasons. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; RA/MS failure. 
 
Accident 4 – Acrow prop fell during stripping formwork 
 
An ‘Acrow’ prop was not supported or removed before stripping formwork and fell on a 
scaffolder working in the same area.  There was an inappropriate construction method and 
conflict of two activities, resulting in congestion; plus failure by carpenter to follow work 
procedures.   There was inadequate supervision but no real evidence of time pressure.   
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction control; inappropriate construction operation; 
inappropriate operative action; training; supervision. 
 
Accident 5 – Dropped steel angle, trapping hand, while moving it into new position 
  
Poor design of construction method – excessive size/weight of steel components – combined 
with inadequate manual handling methods.  PS denied responsibility for MS/RA. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construct planning; inappropriate construction operation; 
MH training. 
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Accident 6 - Caught wedding ring on protrusion 
 
Wearing of jewellery (ring) while working resulted in it snagging on a protrusion on a scissor 
lift and caused lacerations.  Design of equipment (access to the scissor lift) was also implicated. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate operative action; inappropriate construction operation; 
training; supervision; design of plant. 
 
Accident 7 – Cutting ply with Dolphin knife 
 
An operative was cutting ply with a small open bladed knife, towards himself.  This resulted in 
a cut leg.  Inappropriate construction operation – tool (‘Dolphin’ knife) was provided by 
employer and used in a dangerous cutting method. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; inappropriate operative action; tool selection; training. 
 
Accident 8 – Trying to connect concrete pump line 
 
Trying to close a dirty clamp onto a concrete pipe joint resulted in foot injury.  Poor equipment 
design and/or maintenance caused problems in making the joint in the concrete pipe.  There was 
careless use of scaffold tube as a ‘hammer’, possibly due to lack of proper tools, conveniently to 
hand. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction operation; inappropriate operative action; lack 
of appropriate tools; training. 
 
Accident 9 – Cutting steel banding on bundle of new ply 
 
Cutting steel banding caused the recoil of the band and injury to an arm.  It was an inappropriate 
construction operation – two person task – using an inadequate tool (cutters).  Materials 
packaging design (steel banding) is conducive to this type of risk during unpacking.  
Manufacturers had made a RA but this was not accounted for in site activity planning. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; inappropriate tool; inadequate RA and/or training. 
 
Accident 10 – Struck formwork fell through hole in floor 
 
Formwork being struck fell through a hole in a concrete floor and straight through a matching 
hole in the next floor, dislodging a protective ply cover on the way.  Inappropriate construction 
operation – release of formwork over a hole – combined with inadequate protection (weak ply) 
of the hole on the next floor. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; training; RA/MS; design of hole protection. 
 
Accident 11 – Hiab lorry tipped over 
 
A ‘Hiab’ delivery lorry tipped over due to failure to use stabilising legs while unloading in a 
confined space.  Work planning (co-ordination) issues were inadequately covered in the MS.  
There are also plant design (safety) issues. 
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Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction control; 
inappropriate construction operation; training; supervision. 
 
Accident 12 – Hit by foam ball during blowing out of concrete pipeline 
 
Operative hit by foam ball, discharged under pressure from concrete pipeline when cleaning out.  
Inappropriate construction method during concrete pipe blow-out.  Lack of task training.  Lack 
of adequate supervision.  Inadequate RA dissemination and training. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction operation; inappropriate operative action; 
MS/RA; training; supervision. 
 
Accident 13 – Electric screwdriver went through wood into finger 
 
Using electric drill as screwdriver, without sufficient concentration, resulted in penetration of 
wood and injury to a finger.  There was difficulty with interruption from people walking by and 
lack of space.  Possibly, the workspace could have been designed better – e.g. cordoned off 
during task execution.  No evidence of lack of training. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate operative action; 
workspace design; congestion. 
 
Accident 17 – Trip over cable while carrying equipment 
 
This was a typical trip accident on a loose electric cable, probably caused by lack of training in 
trip hazards for supervision and management and lack of clear responsibility for management of 
temporary cabling. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate site condition; safety 
training; unclear responsibilities. 
 
Accident 18 – Caught arm on shuttering nail left protruding 
 
This was due to failure to remove a nail from partially stripped formwork and possible design 
failure in work method or formwork construction, to avoid nail hazard.  MS/RA was not used 
on this task (even if relevant). There was also a possible excessive hours issue (tiredness/lack of 
concentration) due to moonlighting (3-4 hours/d). 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate site condition; inappropriate construction planning; method 
design; RA communication. 
 
Accident 19 – Prop to falsework frame fell while moving frame 
 
Careless sequencing of task activity resulted in an unstable prop to falsework; and the prop fell 
onto an operative.  There was also a possible issue of inadequate RA communication. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction operation; task sequencing; inappropriate 
construction control; training/supervision in relation to RA. 
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Accident 20 – Cutting out (live!) gas main 
 
Incorrect information about a live gas main resulted in ignition of gas during cutting of main to 
remove it.  There was an inappropriate procedure during removal of the gas main.  There was 
also no RA or MS for a potentially very dangerous task. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; communication; work method/procedure; RA/MS. 
 
Accident 21 – Inspecting contents of rail wagon 
 
A supervisor hurt his hand on the damaged edge to a wagon, while climbing the outside in order 
to inspect contents.  There was poor design of access to view the wagon contents, due to either 
wagon design or method design. The wagon condition was potentially dangerous.  There was 
also high time pressure and excessive hours being worked. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; inappropriate operative action. 
 
Accident 22 – Crushed hand while pushing plasterboard trolley 
 
The IP’s hand was injured by crushing against an unprotected scaffold nut, while pushing a 
fully loaded plasterboard trolley.  He was being assisted by a foreign labourer, with whom there 
were language communication problems.  Careless use of the trolley, an unprotected scaffold 
clip and inadequate materials handling methods are all implicated. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction operation; language difficulty; materials 
handling; scaffolding/housekeeping. 
 
Accident 24 – Cut thumb while cutting threaded stud in ceiling erection 
 
A different construction method could have avoided the need to cut the rod.  Task, cutting tool 
and cutting method could all have been designed differently. 
 
Possible distal factors: designer response; inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate 
construction operation. 
 
Accident 33 – Trapped finger between kerb block and stone bed 
 
This is a manual handling injury in which a finger was crushed between a heavy kerb and the 
stone bed during positioning of the kerb.  Training, supervision and PPE issues are evident.  
Gloves were not worn due to heat and discomfort.  There are possible design of task/materials 
interface issues in task method. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction operation; inappropriate operative action; 
training; PPE selection/use. 
 
Accident 34 – Hand slipped from steel ducting 
 
IP’s hand-hold on ducting slipped on its oily surface, while attempting to release it from inside 
another piece of ducting, resulting in banging his hand on adjoining ducting stack.  Gloves were 
not worn – too restrictive.  Possible task/component/material design issues related to manual 
handling – there was little design/production liaison. 
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Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; training; PPE selection/use; task and material design. 
 
Accident 35 – Swarf in eye while drilling ductwork 
 
Electric drilling caused a swarf injury to IP’s eye – no goggles worn.  There are possible 
material/task design issues, as well as PPE design/comfort issues. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate operative action; task 
design; PPE. 
 
Accident 36 – Banged elbow on part of hatch on mobile access scaffold 
 
Harness which was unhooked got caught while descending scaffold tower – possible PPE 
design issue.  Harness would not have been required if the scaffold tower design had been 
flexible enough to accommodate ceiling shape.  There were also design of access tower hatch 
and possible building design/task access issues. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate construction 
operation; PPE; scaffold tower design. 
 
Accident 37 – Trip over cables led to knee injury 
 
Trip hazard on temporary power supply cables led to a twisted knee injury.  There are clear 
housekeeping and workplace design issues.  The knee was already weak from a previous injury 
suggesting a health surveillance aspect. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate site condition; 
housekeeping; workplace design; health surveillance. 
 
Accident 38 – Bowser jockey wheel collapse  
 
An inadequately clamped jockey wheel on a fuel bowser collapsed when the bowser was being 
moved, causing a wrench strain to arm and shoulder.  Jockey wheel design, plant design and 
specification could have been improved.  There are also care in operation and training issues.  
The injury exacerbated an old shoulder injury, suggesting a health surveillance aspect. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate operative action; plant 
design/specification; training; health surveillance. 
 
Accident 39 - Torquing ‘Robello’ ring on gantry 
 
Maintenance, checking and correcting the torque, on part of a gantry required heavy activity in 
an awkward position (bending).  The equipment (slewing ring) was used in the wrong context – 
possibly specified incorrectly for such a piece of plant (gantry).  The torquing process was being 
done by someone unused to the activity and in a difficult posture. 
 
Possible distal factors: inappropriate construction planning; inappropriate operative action; 
equipment design; task design. 
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